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THESIS SUMMARY 
This mixed-methods study examines the perceptions and opinions of United Kingdom 
FTSE 350, and US Fortune 500 board of director members regarding the significance of 
gender and racial diversity on board governance.  Perceptions were gathered from 
eighty-two directors using self-reported surveys and semi-structured interviews.  This 
thesis provides: (1) an opportunity to investigate the perceptions (opinions) of directors 
regarding the effects of board gender and racial diversity on new board appointments and 
on the dynamics of board decision making (2) an opportunity to investigate the perception 
(opinions) of directors regarding the effects of social capital, new board appointments and 
the dynamics of board decision making, and (3) an opportunity to investigate 
comparatively the differences between UK and US director perceptions regarding the 
effects of board gender and racial diversity on new board appointments and board 
decision making. 
My findings indicate that directors believe that expertise and experience are by far the 
most important attributes when decisions on the selection of new directors are being 
considered.  While US directors report observing tangible benefits to gender and racial 
diversity, for their firms, as well as a willingness to consider diversity as an attribute in the 
selection process; most UK directors were strongly opposed to positive discrimination 
measures.1  A majority of directors do not believe that their own demographic 
characteristics, such as race or gender were attributes to their being selected to a board 
position; however white males perceive that these attributes were considered attributes to 
the appointment of diverse directors.  Moreover, in the United Kingdom, male directors 
reported that they may be at a disadvantage for board selection when compared to their 
female counterparts, hence advocating for a selection process with minimal 
considerations of the demographic characteristics of new directors.  Directors do not 
seem to consider diverse social capital of directors when making board appointments.  
Instead, US directors were more likely to be assisted in board appointments by their 
having similar social capital, and UK directors indicated that they only consider director 
expertise, and that expertise is considered to ensure a broad mix of skills and 
professional experience on the board.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Positive discrimination is the practice or policy of making sure that a particular number of jobs, etc. are 
given to people from groups that are often treated unfairly because of their race, sex, etc.  (Oxford Advanced 
Learner's Dictionary)   
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CHAPTER 1- INTRODUCTION 
UK and US Board of Director`s perception of gender and racial board diversity and their 
effects on board governance. 
 
1.1 Prologue 
The context of this study was to investigate the perceptions and attitudes of directors 
towards gender and race diversity and board governance, and attempt to evaluate how 
these board members perceive whether their own race and gender or that of their co-
directors affect the ability of board members to govern effectively.  Namely, it answers the 
broader question of whether directors perceive gender or racial diversity as valuable to 
the governance process.  Moreover, if diversity is valuable to the directors, what are their 
perceptions of why it is valuable and what rationales do they use?  Additionally, its 
context was to examine if social capital considerations might influence the director 
selection process, and board governance. 
Diversity is defined in alternate ways and can be measured across a variety of 
components.  A general description of the term diversity, according to Webster: 
“The condition of being diverse: the inclusion of diverse people (as people of 
different 
race or culture) in a group or organisation” (Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 
2010).  
 
Demographic diversity has been used as a proxy for different experiences, sensibilities, 
and points of view (Krawiec et al. 2013).  As it relates to corporate governance, the 
concept of diversity is related to board composition and the numerous attributes, 
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characteristics and expertise of individual board members.  The various types of diversity 
that may be represented among directors in the boardroom include age, gender, 
ethnicity, culture, religion, constituency representation, independence, professional 
background, knowledge, technical skills and expertise, commercial and industry 
experience, career and life experience (Milliken and Martins, 1996).  For the purposes of 
this study, race and gender diversity have been used in the analysis of surveys (Chapter 
6) and interviews (Chapter 7).  Other types of diversity including age, ethnicity, and years 
of experience were analyzed in the Chapter 5 analysis of all UK FTSE 350 directors. 
This study will examine whether board directors perceive any general governance 
benefits, or social capital benefits to corporate board gender or race diversity, and 
whether these perceptions support the board diversity rationale that have been argued in 
the literature (Ramirez 2007, Fairfax 2005).  Thus, the current thesis contributes to the 
literature on director perceptions (Burch 2008, Conley et al. 2009, Krawiec et al. 2013), 
rather than provide an argument that the benefits of board diversity as measured by 
financial performance is valuable (Farrell and Hersch 2005, Smith et al. 2006, Hussein 
and Kiwia 2009)2.  Namely, it answers the question of whether directors perceive gender 
or racial diversity as valuable to the governance process.  Moreover, if diversity is 
valuable to the directors, what rationales do they use to describe this value? 
There are often five rationales discussed on how board diversity is valuable to firms.  
These rationales include: the talent rationale, the market rationale, the litigation rationale, 
the employee relations rationale, and the governance rationale.  (Fairfax 2005)  The 
rationales are important for this researcher’s thesis, as they form the basis of what 
questions were asked of the Directors to gain their perceptions of how diversity is thought 
to be a benefit to corporate governance.  The rationales are discussed further in Chapter 
3, as well as in chapter 8.  In additional, they allow this researcher to determine if 
directors perceive that social capital assists in achieving these purported benefits? 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 A study of financial performance and board diversity has been left to other research.  The question of 
whether board diversity improves financial performance has been debated in a number of studies which are 
referenced throughout this thesis.  
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1.2 Introduction to Methods 
The goal of this thesis study was to gain a greater understanding of how directors 
perceive board diversity.  Specifically, to find out if directors would articulate rationales for 
board diversity that would support the previous rationales.  Additionally, Terjesen et al. 
(2009) propose that there is a need to obtain the viewpoints of board directors regarding 
the social capital resources of directors. 
“It would be interesting to obtain the views of Chairs and other board members 
about the relative usefulness of diverse human capital and social capital resources 
of incoming directors once they have been fully integrated into the board and its key 
committees.” 
To gather these viewpoints, it was essential to choose a method that would allow the 
directors to articulate these perceptions.  Using both interviews and surveys would allow 
this researcher an opportunity to gather these perceptions directly from the directors 
themselves.  McCracken (1998) argues that interviews are best used in collaboration with 
quantitative methodologies such as surveys.  Utilizing a mixed methods approach, this 
research looks at two separate aspects of the board member: 1) the director selection 
processes, and 2) director communication and interaction with other board members.  
This study explores how these two critical activities may be impacted by board attitudes 
towards race and gender diversity and how such diversity is perceived to impact the 
governing process.  The mixed methods approach blended two different research 
strategies, qualitative interviews and quantitative surveys.  Recognizing the 
complementary approach of using qualitative and quantitative research methods (Morse, 
1991; Corbin and Strauss, 1990), the data from surveys were used to gain insights into 
director perceptions of diversity and whether or not leveraging social capital is a 
consideration when the board is choosing new directors.  While the surveys allowed a 
large number of directors to be contacted, the survey collection method did not allow for 
follow up questions, seeking clarification, or observation of the interviewees.  However, 
information derived from these surveys was used for analysis, as well as to develop an 
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interview guide that was used for semi-structured director interviews.  The qualitative 
analysis of in-depth semi-structured interviews was conducted to gather detailed insights 
into director expectations, attitudes, and perceptions regarding their selection and their 
general perceptions of the role of diversity in board governance.  Director interviews 
allowed the researcher to seek clarification from the director when needed, ask follow-up 
questions, and in most cases observe the body language of the director. 
 
1.3 The Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question of whether directors perceive gender 
or racial diversity as valuable to the governance process.  In addition, this study explores 
the idea of whether directors have “bought in” to the diversity arguments, or rationales, 
which attempt to connect enhanced governance to diverse boards (Dallas, 2002; Fairfax, 
2005; Catalyst, 20043).  There are additional ways that this study is different than others 
on the subject.  First, it seeks to provide insights regarding the expectation of alternate 
types of value the director may bring to the firm.  Therefore, this researcher believes it is 
important to consider within this thesis, other ways in which diverse directors can 
enhance firm value that is not strictly oversight or financial in nature.  One such value 
may include social connections that have the ability to bring additional resources to the 
firm.  Specifically, this thesis looks at the perceived social capital that a director may hold, 
and investigates what expectations of social capital the firm may have for diverse 
directors.   
Social capital, in the context of this thesis, describes networks together with shared 
norms, values and understandings that facilitate cooperation within or among groups4.  
One such way diverse directors may provide additional value to the firm, is through the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 This Thesis includes a number of references to Catalyst studies.  It is noted for this and other references to 
Catalyst, that the research, while performed by academics, is not peer reviewed academic journal research.  
4 Social Capital definition provided by the United Kingdom Office for National Statistics (ONS) adopted 
definition November 2001 
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unique social capital that may be introduced to the board by virtue of their board 
membership.  Just as financial capital is of value to the firm, so too is social capital.  
Figure 8.1 will proposes a view of social capital, where demographically diverse directors 
may be expected to provide social capital that is different or unique than their 
demographically similar counterparts resulting in a ‘bridge’ or spanning to new networks. 
This different or unique capital results in an increase in firm capital.  This discussion, 
along with Figure 8.1 is described and developed from the literature as a part of the 
theoretical chapter in section 8.2, where a detailed discussion of social capital is included. 
One of the indirect effects of diversity is the opportunity for the firm to access the diverse 
groups of contacts, relationships, and social ties that diverse directors may bring.  Social 
ties with key external constituencies may result in strategic ties and strategic resources 
that the firm can leverage for resources (Pfeffer and Salanik, 1978).  An aspect of 
diversity that has been studied in previous literature is social capital and its connection to 
diversity of social ties (Van der Walt et al. 2002, Van der Walt and Ingley 2003, Scott 
1991, López-Fernández and Sánchez-Gardey  2010). 
Research outcomes for whether board diversity leads to enhanced governance is a 
legitimate question; however, this thesis is different in that in investigates how and if 
directors see diversity’s impact on the board.  Additionally it seeks to determine if these 
perceptions appear different for directors due to country of residence, gender, or race. 
Existing empirical research, in the area of diversity and board governance, has generally 
found a positive link between board diversity and governance (firm value) (Catalyst 2011, 
Ararat et al. 2010, Catalyst 2004, Carter et al. 2003, Erhardt et al. 2003, Westphal 2000).  
Research from these studies supports the argument that diversity enhances governance.  
For example, Fondas (2000) found that boards with larger proportions of women were 
less likely to let CEOs dominate the board and more likely to power share, and have 
significantly more influence over management decisions than boards without female 
directors, providing support for a diverse board enhancing the governance process 
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(Fondas, p 172). Adams and Ferreira (2002) also found a positive significant relationship 
between the proportion of female directors and financial performance as measured by 
Tobin‘s Q, but they found no relationship or a negative relationship between board 
gender diversity and ROA.  However, few have offered much empirical evidence to 
substantiate the reasons directors believe diversity improves governance.  Few 
researchers (Krawiec et al., 2013) have had discussions with directors to attempt to 
validate the cited reasons for these observed benefits, or whether directors believe they 
exist at all (Butler, 2012; Broome and Krawiec, 2008; Broome et al., 2011; Catalyst 2004; 
Krawiec, 2013).  Researchers such as Butler (2012), Hafsi (2012), and Rhode and Packel 
(2010) have contributed research supporting the positive impact of board diversity on 
governance, but these researchers have restricted their studies to one country, thereby 
missing the opportunity to assess the impact that cultural influences, based on nationally, 
may have on director opinions about diversity. 
The impact of board demographic characteristics and firm governance likely varies by 
country because of the different regulatory and governance structures, economic climate 
and culture, and size of capital markets (Kang et al. 2007).  Therefore, board diversity 
should be studied within the influence of country (Kang et al.).  Moreover, Toms and 
Wright (2005), argue that US/UK comparative work has been neglected, and that 
“although there are important similarities [between the US and the UK corporate 
governance systems], there are also differences that have not been fully investigated” (p 
267).  Some of these differences are discussed in research by Armour et al. (2009) and 
Deakin (2005); who found considerable differences between the US and UK governance 
systems related to insolvency law, and labour law, which they argue “casts doubt on a 
unitary “Anglo-American” view of corporate governance.”  This thesis provides UK and 
US comparative research on board diversity, which helps to fill this gap. 
The link between board diversity and enhanced governance is often illusive or bimodal, 
pointing to both positive and negative relationships between diversity and governance 
(Rhode and Packel, 2010).  For example, in the Female FTSE Report, 2005, Singh and 
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Vinnicombe state, “diversity is always part of exemplary corporate governance which will 
enhance shareholder value in the long term.”  Yet they found no significant correlations 
between the presence of women directors and financial performance measures (Singh 
and Vinnicombe 2005).  Similarly, Rose (2007) were unable to determine any significant 
link between firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q and female representation.  
Ahern and Dittmar (2011) found that when a board had a 10% increase in the number of 
women, Tobin’s Q declined by 12.4%.  However, Lückerath-Rovers (2010) found that 
firms with women have better ROE than those without women.  These studies, and 
others, are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis.  
A number of reasons for and against a diverse board of directors have been furthered in 
existing governance research.  These reasons include first, how board diversity may 
influence how boards make decisions (Krawiec et al., 2013; Rhode and Packel, 2010), 
thereby evaluating how diversity may affect the process of board functions; secondly, 
how diversity may impact the types of decisions that are made (Rose, 2007; Miller and 
Triana, 2009), thereby impacting firm outcomes.  
Arguing against diversity, several studies have suggested that diversity may decrease 
firm value (Ahern and Dittmar 2011, Adams and Ferreira, 2002).  However, other 
empirical studies of Fortune 500 firms have provided insights into how diversity can 
positively impact firm outcomes.  Miller and Triana (2009) showed increased innovation 
and reputation within the board demographic diversity–firm performance relationship.   
Van der Walt and Ingley (2003) argue that board diversity may have a variety of impacts 
on the board, the firm, and the stakeholders.  These impacts include organizational 
performance, board performance, organizational dynamics, and stakeholder dynamics.  
They present the figure below as a method of explaining the impact of board diversity. 
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Figure 1.2 Source Van der Walt and Ingley 2003, pg 222 
 
Additionally, according to Van der Walt and Ingley, the impact of diversity can include the 
individual characteristics of the directors and a variety of situational factors (Bilimoria and 
Wheeler, 2000; Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; Burke, 2000; Mattis, 2000).  
1.4 Research Questions 
This researcher contributes to this body of knowledge by increasing the knowledge of 
how board race and gender diversity may enhance governance, and by validating why a 
positive relationship may exist.  Additionally, this study discusses the rationales often 
given by scholars to support board diversity, to determine whether director answers lend 
support to these rationales.  This study contributes to prior research (Catalyst, Broom et 
al. 2008, Conley et al., 2009) as the methods allow directors to speak for themselves 
about what impact diversity has on governance duties.  In accomplishing this goal, this 
researcher has completed a dual focused study which enhances the knowledge of this 
topic: 1) An examination of social capital expectations and outcomes in selection criteria 
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of women and minority board members; and 2) board director perception of how race and 
gender diversity impacts the board. 
The subsidiary research questions which guide the thesis were as follows: 
Research Question 1 - Directors perceive that board appointments are impacted by 
demographic factors such as their race, gender, age, or nationality. 
Research Question 2 - Directors perceive that board governance is positively impacted by 
having diverse members on the board. 
Research Question 3 - Directors perceive board diversity is an important signal of board 
values to the marketplace. 
Research Question 4 - Directors perceive that board members are chosen to improve 
board networks and board capital, and this enhances board social capital. 
Research Question 5 - Directors perceive that recruitment firms are important to board 
appointments. 
These questions extend the current research as to how racial and gender diversity 
impacts governance, and allow this researcher to fill gaps in the existing literature by 
including director perceptions by gender, race, and country, on topics such as board 
diversity and social capital, board selection process, and board interactions. 
1.5 Limitations 
This study increases our knowledge of board of director perception and attitudes about 
director race and gender diversity.  By critically analyzing the interviews and survey data, 
it is possible to conclude whether these directors are acting in ways that support certain 
previous theories about board diversity.  Equally important, each individual interviewed 
gives an account of their understanding of the circumstances which led to their 
appointment to the board.  These accounts are assumed to be correct and offer 
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perspectives into expectations of director social capital.  Several limitations are presented 
below including the lack of both racial and gender diversity in the UK respondents, 
personal bias of the researcher, and the difficulty of generalizability.  Future research 
which seeks interviews with others in the selection process such as recruitment firms, 
could further understanding of this issue. 
 
1.5.1 Lack of UK Diversity 
While the US directors were diverse, representing both racial and gender diversity; due to 
the general lack of diversity on UK boards, the survey population was overwhelmingly 
non-diverse.  For example, a review of data on the number of women directorships in the 
UK revealed that as of 2005, there were only 14 women (3.4%) in executive directorships 
in the FTSE 100.  Female non-executive directors numbered 107 (Singh, 2005).  In 2008, 
this same publication reported women directors numbered 27 executive directors and 115 
non-executive directors at FTSE 250 firms.  In the US, as of 2006, women held 208 of the 
1219 Fortune 100 board seats (Alliance for Board Diversity, 2008), almost double the 
number of UK women in the FTSE 250.  The extremely low numbers of potential board 
participants qualifying as racial minorities made the ability to study minority director 
viewpoint in the UK even harder to accomplish.  As of 2008 only 47 of the 1147 FTSE 
100 directorships are held by non-white ethnic backgrounds.  In contrast, as of 2006, 188 
of the 1219 board seats of the US Fortune 100 were held by non-white directors (Alliance 
for Board Diversity, 2008). As the ability to make generalizations depends heavily on the 
representativeness of the sample, the inability to identify and access a sufficient sample 
of non-white directors in the UK is a limitation of this study.  Without it, the UK 
perspectives become a study of the opinions and perceptions of white directors who are 
primarily British men.   
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 1.5.2 Statement of Personal Bias 
Interviewer bias happens when survey responses are recorded inaccurately or when 
interviewers guide individual’s responses (Shaughnessy et.al., 2006,  p.157). Interviewer 
bias can also occur as a result of motivations by the respondent or interviewer (or both) to 
falsify their response (Williams,1964, pp 339) Response bias can occur when 
respondents’ seek to present themselves favorably to the interviewer.  When using 
qualitative methods, there is a potential for bias, or appearance of bias.  I am a Black US 
American woman.  By virtue of this fact, there is a potential that my face-to-face 
interviews about diversity would lead respondents to answer in ways designed to portray 
themselves in a favorable light to the interviewer, by espousing views especially favorable 
to positive ethnic diversity.  Additionally, there was a possibility that my US American 
cultural framework regarding the importance of race and gender would result in undue 
influence on the interview questions.  To assist in mitigating this risk, an interview guide 
was developed with input and feedback from the supervisors of this thesis project.  The 
two supervisors are white British males; who in principle should not share the same bias 
as I do.  Once approved, the interview guide was followed exactly in every interview to 
assure that the directors were interviewed with a standard, pre-approved format.  This 
allowed for some consistency in the interview format, assisted in the reduction of 
researcher bias; yet still allowed room for the directors to provide in-depth responses.  As 
it relates to the transcription of interviews, the transcription of these interviews was 
performed in a meticulous manner to ensure the interview was recorded accurately.  
Detailed notes were taken during each interview, and those interviews were entered into 
Microsoft Word ™ for record keeping. 
Despite the interview guide and the meticulous manner of note taking, I believe that the 
impact of some researcher bias is unavoidable.  Given that I am a black woman, this bias 
is unavoidable with a subject such as board diversity.  Specifically, the overarching 
questions for this thesis study evolved from a combination of professional experience of 
the researcher in the accounting and auditing field, a personal interest in diversity and 
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inclusion issues born from my racial background and experiences, my experience of living 
and studying in both the UK and US, and the increased media interest in corporate 
governance due to the corporate failures in 2001-2002.  These four distinct areas 
provided a base of information that encouraged this researcher to seek additional 
knowledge in this subject.  This thesis context is designed to provide an explanation of 
these influences, and how the gathering of the data needed for this thesis was affected 
by it.   
One criterion that Creswell recommends considering when deciding which method is 
more appropriate is the prior training of the researcher.  In qualitative studies, the 
researcher is the instrument.  Whether the researcher’s presence is sustained and 
intensive, as in long-term ethnographies, or whether relatively brief but personal, as in in-
depth interview studies, the researcher enters into the lives of the participants (Marshall 
and Rossman, 1999).  The researcher’s role entails varying degrees of participantness – 
from full participant to complete observer, and all possible mixes along the continuum. 
Because the researcher is the instrument a qualitative report must include information 
about the researcher (Patton, 1990).  
I am a black American woman born and raised after the tumultuous Civil Rights Era; 
some writers would consider my upbringing post-racial.  I was born in a Pennsylvania 
steel town in the late 1960’s to parents employed in heavy manufacturing, and as such 
enjoyed a middle class upbringing.  I attended primary schools in the 1970’s that were 
integrated and was taught by both black and white teachers.   
I attended Pennsylvania State University, a 30,000+ public college with less than 3% 
Blacks enrollment.  During my enrollment at Pennsylvania State University, I studied 
International Economics for one semester in Oxford, England.  This experience gave me 
a broader view of the world around me and ignited an intellectual curiosity about the 
country that remains to this day. 
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After college I held several accounting and management positions each with 
progressively more responsibility and less supervision.  These included management 
accounting jobs in large firms, a position as a Bank Examiner with the Federal Reserve 
Bank, and Controllers Division responsibilities as an Assistant Vice President with 
Wachovia Bank (now Wells Fargo).  As it related to the current research, the time I spent 
as a bank examiner with the Federal Reserve Bank was helpful.  In that position, I 
performed the attest function, reviewing the work and strategy of senior bank 
management.  The position allowed me to read the minutes of the board of directors and 
to meet and discuss my finding with senior management as well as with the board itself. 
Fortuitously, I was able to return to England in 2002.  My spouse secured a two-year 
temporary assignment working for the CEO of a large British firm.  Over the course of the 
two years, I was privileged to meet many of the firm’s senior managers.  I was also able 
to meet Jamaicans and Africans with whom I was able to discuss the socio-economics 
status of people of African descent.  These discussions included our differences and 
similarities of living, working, and progressing as a minority citizen.  I was also privileged 
through church and civic groups to meet many white British women who occasionally 
discussed their experiences of gender differences in the UK.  These discussions assisted 
me in creating a broader world view of what it means to be a minority in both America and 
the UK. 
 While I am not of the Civil Rights era, educated in predominantly white institutions, 
worked and managed in large white corporate environments, and travelled extensively 
throughout the world, I still consider myself to be deeply affected by my racial ethnicity.  
This cultural identity of being a black woman has the ability to influence my personality 
and decisions in ways where I least expect it.  While I am not naïve enough to think that 
this is the case for every women or every black American, I feel confident in saying that 
this cultural difference does influence an individual in some way whether they 
acknowledge it or not.  My own professional management career has been influenced in 
ways which occasionally result in behaviors that mirror what researchers have come to 
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discuss as female leadership attributes.  These include less hierarchical, more 
cooperative and collaborative, and more oriented towards enhancing the others’ self-
worth (Higgs 2003).  Other traits characteristics which have been ascribed more strongly 
to women than men include speaking tentatively, not drawing attention to oneself, 
accepting others’ positions, supporting and soothing others, and contributing to the 
solution of relational and interpersonal problems (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001).  
Understanding this influence, I became very interested in how race and gender affect 
those in management, and especially how such influence might affect the way those at 
the highest ranks govern their companies.   
While my career in accounting began in 1989 after my graduation with an undergraduate 
degree in accounting; my interest in governance began in 2002.  The news so prevalent 
at the time was the US corporate scandals such as Enron, Worldcom, Tyco, HealthSouth, 
and others.  This coverage of scandals highlighted how directors were not always 
effective in their governance, and their shareholders paid a huge price in lost 
investments.  My academic inquiry wondered if somehow the “old-boy” network of white 
male directors had made such scandals a possibility.  More especially, I considered if 
perhaps diversity of the boards and perhaps therefore increased independence and 
personal ties could have prevented some of these calamities. 
This prior experience gave me a level of confidence about my abilities to complete a 
mixed-methods study, which used many of these same skills and capitalized on this 
experience as an auditor and bank examiner while my background gave me an 
intellectual curiosity about this issue.  This experience and its associated competence 
was an advantage to pursuing the methodology for this study.  Lastly, as a minority 
woman manager and student, I was able to use my personal attributes as a manager and 
researcher to assist in the determination of what aspects of my own personality might be 
an asset to corporate governance.  In order to accomplish this task, I consider my 
experiences in private firms as well as my experiences as a director in a university 
setting.  I evaluated my own actions in this setting to decide what unique positive 
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attributes I may have contributed to the governance of my areas under my supervision.  
These attributes included an ability to critically think through issues and provide honest 
and unfiltered feedback to my superiors, the ability to multi-task projects, the need to seek 
justice for myself and those under my supervision, and the ability to remain unbiased 
regarding friendships and acceptable performance.  These attributes enhanced my ability 
to decipher narrative clues such as “The woman director was very thorough”, “The 
women on our board lent more structure to our processes”, and “The women on our 
board ask many tactful questions in an effort to better understand the issues.”  These 
answers resonated with me due to my own experiences as a minority and a woman in 
management. 
My interest in gender/ethnic/racial diversity has been heightened in the UK by the 
passage of the Equality  Act of 2006, which consolidated various “acts” and 
“requirements” of British law governing equality, diversity, and human rights. In the Act, 
public authorities are required to govern themselves based upon these acts; however, 
this has not translated into multiple identity representation on corporate boards.  Although 
this study does not give a review of the Act, here it is noted that portions of the Act speak 
specifically to diversity and different groups.  One of the intents of the Act is to work 
toward enabling member of groups to participate in society.  As it relates to equality and 
diversity, Section 8 Part 1 of the Act states: 
Equality and diversity 
(1)The Commission shall, by exercising the powers conferred by this Part— 
(a)promote understanding of the importance of equality and diversity, 
(b)encourage good practice in relation to equality and diversity, 
(c)promote equality of opportunity, 
(d)promote awareness and understanding of rights under the equality enactments, 
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(e)enforce the equality enactments, 
(f)work towards the elimination of unlawful discrimination, and 
(g)work towards the elimination of unlawful harassment. 
Thus, it is the intersection of my personal attributes and background, UK legislation on 
equality, and the corporate scandals that garnered so much media attention in the past 
decade provide an intersection of academic curiosity and gap in knowledge that provided 
the personal context and interest for this study. 
1.5.3 Generalizability 
When using surveys, there is a risk that response rates could be low (Simon and Francis, 
1998 p. 61).  In addition, due to response bias, the final sample may not represent the 
population.  In this study, there is a distinct possibility that only those on the board with 
strong views about diverse boards returned the survey.  This may have resulted in 
conclusions not necessarily representative of the entire board population of UK directors.  
This bias is not unique to this study and has been accepted as a normal dynamic of 
survey research.  In this study, the survey instrument was not designed to provide 
representation.  Instead the instrument was used to provide a framework to construct the 
interview guide, and provide additional support for the interview results.  Pinsonneault 
and Kraemer (1993) argue that one purpose of a survey research can be to explore 
important ideas, or to become more familiar with a topic and to try out preliminary 
concepts about it.  A survey used in this context is used to discover the range of 
responses likely to occur in some population of interest.  Although the result of this work 
does not provide a context for generalizability, they do reveal much about the individual 
director.  Broome, Conley and Krawiec (2011) discuss the inability to make 
generalizations based on a small number of a larger group: 
The fact that a member of a cultural group analyzes and interprets the world in a 
particular way does not, of course, permit one to generalize about what other 
members are thinking or doing.  Yet by the same token, aggregate data about a 
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group as a whole do not allow one to say anything about any particular individual.. 
(Broome, Conley and Krawiec  2011, p. 775 ) 
 
1.6&Context&of&Recent&UK&and&US&Corporate&Governance&Reports&&
The prominence of corporate failures and the attending media interest over the last 20 
years in UK and US history has propelled modes of governance into the forefront of 
possible sources of corporate instability and financial uncertainty.  The UK has a general 
corporate governance approach of "comply or explain"; versus the US, which has taken 
more of a legal approach with fines and prison sentences for serious corporate 
governance violations.  In addition to literature discussed in this thesis that argue various 
forms of governance, it is important to discuss the recommendations of best governance 
practices that have been suggested as a means to improve UK and US corporate 
governance.  The recommendations are the outcomes of congressional acts, and a series 
of committees that have been tasked with assessing, developing, and responding to the 
governance matters prominent during their tenure.  This section is not intended to present 
a full historical account of these recommendation; however, it provides a summary of 
recommendations over the previous 20 years.  The table below summarizes these 
reports. 
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TABLE 2.1: Major Industry and Governmental Governance Reports 
 
Report Name Year Commissioning unit Focus 
Cadbury Report - UK 1992 Financial Reporting Council, London Stock 
Exchange, accounting profession. 
General board governance principles 
Greenbury Report - 
UK 
1994 Confederation of British Industry Salary and bonuses of company senior executives 
Hampel Report - UK 1997 London Stock Exchange, the Confederation of 
British Industry, the Institute of Directors, the 
Consultative Committee of Accountancy Bodies, 
the National Association of Pension Funds and 
the Association of British Insurers  
Review of principles and purposes of Cadbury 
The Combined Code 
– UK 
1998 Financial Reporting Council A combination and refinement of a number of different reports 
and codes concerning opinions on good corporate governance 
The Turnbull Report - 
UK 
1999, 
2005, 
2012 
Institute of Chartered Accountants Guidance on internal controls 
The Higgs Report – 
UK 
2003 UK Government Adding specifics to the role of independent directors and audit 
committees 
Walker Report – UK 2009 UK Government Financial institutions governance 
Guidance of Board 
Effectiveness – UK 
2011 UK Government Leadership and effectiveness of the board 
The California Public 
Employees' 
Retirement System 
(CalPERS) 
2002 US State led activism Ensured that corporate value would not be destroyed by the 
relationships between the CEO and the board of directors 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 - US 
2002 US Government Auditor standards and requirements, penalties for corporate 
fraud 
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New York Stock 
Exchange and 
NASDAQ provisions 
2002 US NYSE and NASDAQ Director independence and management oversight. 
The Conference 
Board 
Recommendations 
2002 US Association of Prominent Companies To guide boards in designing top executive compensation 
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Cadbury 
As one of the first significant sets of UK governance recommendations, the Cadbury 
report has been referred to as “The beginning of a quiet revolution” (Jones and Pollitt, 
2002).  In 1991, the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange, and the 
British accounting profession set up a committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance.  The chairman of the Financial Reporting Council “FRC” approached Sir 
Adrian Cadbury to chair the committee. The Cadbury report presents general principles 
around which businesses are expected to operate to assure proper governance.6  The 
report offered a set of principles that were published not as a blueprint for government 
mandates, but as recommendations that UK companies would willingly incorporate into 
their board governance processes.  
The committee report is also referred to as the Cadbury Code of Best Practices.  There 
were a set of five key principles enumerated: 
1. Separation of Chairman and Chief Executives ; 
2.  A majority of independent non-executive directors  (The committee 
recommended that the majority  of non-executive directors should be 
independent, and defined this as ‘independent of management and free from any 
business or other relationship which could materially interfere with the exercise of 
their independent judgment [Cadbury Report, paragraph 4.12]); 
3. An audit committee with a majority of non-executive directors; 
4. A remuneration committee with a majority of non-executive directors; 
5. A nomination committee with a majority of non-executive directors. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 History of Cadbury Committee taken from the Cadbury Archive at Cambridge Judge Business School 
http://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/cadbury/report/index.html  Cambridge Judge Business School, Trumpington 
Street, Cambridge, CB2 1AG 
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The committee proposed that a voluntary code should be directed at establishing best 
practices, encouraging pressure from shareholders to hasten its widespread adoption, 
and allowing some flexibility in implementation (Cadbury Report, 1992 paragraph 1.10).   
Dahya and McConnell (2003), in an empirical study of 1124 UK companies, found that 
that the Cadbury Code improved the financial performance of adopting companies. They 
found that compliance with the Cadbury recommendations was followed by a statistically 
significant improvement in operating performance regardless of the performance 
benchmark used. (Dahya and McConnell, p. 4). 7 
In May 1995 Sir Cadbury dissolved the committee by presenting a report with significant 
findings on the implementation of the Cadbury Code. The report indicated a change in 
boardroom behavior from consistent with Code recommendations. Among FTSE250 
companies the percentage with an independent audit committee had risen from 45% in 
1992 to 87% in1995; the percentage with a nomination committee had risen from 8% in 
1992 to 60% in 1995; the percentage with a remuneration committee had risen from 60% 
in 1992 to 98% in 1995. Only 7 companies had a combined chairman and chief executive 
(discouraged by the code) without the suggested position of a named lead non-executive 
director (Jones and Pollitt 2002). 
The Cadbury Report and its resulting code have had wide influence on other codes of UK 
governance.  The Hampel Report, is one such code which is based on the 
recommendations of Cadbury. The Hampel Report states that the Cadbury Code’s 
provisions led to a higher standards and greater awareness of governance (Hampel 
Report paragraph 1.8). 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7!Dahya and McConnell (2009) report that the percentage increases are 2.50%, and .33% 
respectively, “the adopting firms experienced a statistically significant increase in average ROA of 
2.50%, from 7.04% to 9.54%. Over the same time interval, the adopting companies’ industry peers 
experienced an insignificant increase in average ROA of 0.33%, from 8.69% to 9.02%”[sic]. 
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Hampel 
The Hampel Report was organized to review the Cadbury Code and was implemented to 
ensure that the original purpose of the Code was being achieved.  Additionally, the 
Hampel Report reviewed any matters taken up by the Greenbury report. The committee 
articulated an additional task: to take fresh look at the roles of directors, shareholders and 
auditors in corporate governance, while keeping in mind the need to restrict the 
regulatory burden on companies.  (Hampel Report, paragraph 1.6). 
The Hampel Report (1997) included a list of recommended duties of the board of 
directors.  The duties reinforced the recommendations of the Cadbury Report.  Some of 
the specific listed duties they suggested include to act in good faith in the interests of the 
company and to exercise care and skill.   The report emphasizes the duty of the directors 
to the shareholders of the company whether current, future, or past.  This is 
communicated by the report at, “The duties are owed to the company, meaning generally 
the shareholders collectively, both present and future, not the shareholders at a given 
point in time.” (Hampel report paragraph 3.2) 
Combined Code 
Following the Hampel report, is a report referred to as The Combined Code (1998).  The 
Combined Code was the culmination of the recommendations from the Committee on 
Corporate Governance, and has since been revised in 2003, 2006, 2008, and 2009. The 
Combined Code (1998) is the consolidation of the work of the prior governance 
committees and was not intended to be a new set of guidelines (Combined Code 1998, 
paragraph 7).  
The Combined Code, like the Hampel report before it, provides recommendations to 
encourage firms to adopt the principles of good governance rather than it providing a set 
of uniform rules. The Combined Code requires that those companies who do not 
voluntarily comply with its provisions are required to explain the reasons why in their 
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financial statements.  This position is commonly referred to as “Comply or Explain.” 
By 2004 the level of compliance with the Combined Code varied by provisions and type 
of firm.  Arcot et al. (2009) indicated more than half of the non-financial firms of the 
FTSE350 were fully compliant with all provisions of the Code at the end of 2004. In 
addition, by 2007 almost 90% of companies had split the roles of Chief Executive and 
Chairperson, thereby complying with a key provision of both the Combined Code as well 
as the Cadbury report (Pensions Investment Research Consultants Ltd, 2007). 
Greenbury 
UK Governance practices have been influenced by other committee based 
recommendations targeting specific areas for governance.  For example, The Greenbury 
Committee was established in 1994 by the Confederation of British Industry to address 
the rising levels of salaries and bonuses being paid to senior executives. (Greenbury 
Report, 1994)  The key themes of the report were board accountability, responsibility, full 
disclosure, alignment of director and shareholder interest, and improving company 
performance.  Three of the key recommendations of the report were the following: 1.) that 
remuneration committees should be comprised of non-executive directors that would be 
responsible for setting the level of executive directors' salaries and bonuses; 2.) that there 
should be full disclosure of each compensation package and 3.) that shareholders would 
be required to approve these packages. Additionally, the committee recommended that 
4.) salary and bonuses should be more closely tied to performance and paid at a level to 
attract talent without being excessive (Greenbury Report, 1994). 
 Turnbull 
In addition to the Greenbury report which targeted salaries and bonuses, another report 
that is somewhat more focused in its governance target was the Turnbull report (1999, 
2005, 2012).  The Turnbull was authored by the Institute of Chartered Accountants to 
provide guidance to UK directors on company internal controls. The Turnbull report 
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recommended that directors ensure their companies have good auditing processes to 
provide quality financial reporting and to prevent fraud.  The report’s recommendations 
included that directors should detail their firm’s internal control systems, regularly review 
the internal control system for effectiveness, issue annual statements on internal control 
mechanisms, and if there is no formal internal audit system in place, to review periodically 
the need for one (Trumbull Report 2012, paragraph 2.2). 
Higgs 
The Higgs Report (2003) was commissioned by the UK Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI).  Its purpose is to advance and reflect best practice through proposed 
revisions to the Combined Code.  It includes elements that the authors believe are 
essential for an effective board with specific emphasis on recommendations for non-
executive directors.  Specific to this thesis research, the report specifically addresses the 
low UK board representation of women and minorities (Higgs, paragraph 10.22). 
The report is the result of meetings and interviews with 40 FTSE 350 directors, surveys of 
605 executive directors, non-executive directors, and chairmen of UK listed companies, 
and paper responses of 250 individuals. As it relates to theory framework, guidance from 
the report seems to support some traditional agency views of the corporate board and its 
goals of oversight and shareholder responsibility, it attempts to curb management (CEO) 
power with a suggestion to appoint a “senior independent director.  Additionally, it 
recommends the separation of the CEO and Chairman role which is accepted in 
stewardship theory.  However, it also supports behaviors seen in stewardship models.  
For example, the report suggests strong collaboration between executive and 
independent directors.  
“A strong relationship between the chairman and chief executive lies at the heart 
of an effective board…….the relationship works best where there is a valuable 
mix of different skills and experiences which complement each other. The 
chairman should not seek executive responsibility and should let the chief 
executive take credit for their achievements.  The chairman can be an informed, 
experienced and trusted partner, the source of counsel and challenge designed to 
support the chief executive’s performance, without becoming an obstacle to 
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questioning of the chief executive by the non-executive directors.”  (Higgs report, 
paragraph 5.4) 
Higgs explains that listed companies should have to report on how they apply the 
proposals and state whether they comply with the provisions or explain why they do not 
“Comply or explain.” 
A portion of the report provides research based on 40 in-depth interviews with directors.  
These interviews provide insight into the perspectives of the directors regarding their 
responsibilities.  The directors saw their role as both oversight as well as helping to set 
the strategy of the organization.  The director interviews also reveal that there was no 
essential contradiction between the monitoring and strategic aspects of the role of the 
non-executive director.   
The Higgs Report also specifically discusses diversity of the board under the section, 
“The pool of non-executive directors” (Higgs 2003 section 10.16-10.20).  The report 
argues that the composition of the board sends a signal about the values of the company.   
“The composition of a board sends important signals about the values of the 
company. A commitment to equal opportunities which can be of motivational as 
well as reputational importance is inevitably undermined if the board itself does 
not follow the same guiding principles.  Higgs, 2003, paragraph 10.16 
This signaling function of the board is explored in this thesis as Research Question 3: 
Directors perceive board diversity is an important signal of board values to the 
marketplace. 
The Higgs report also suggests that requiring previous PLC board experience is partly to 
blame for the lack of board diversity, and encourages boards and search firms to look 
beyond this primary requirement (paragraph 10.18).  The report also discusses the low 
numbers of young directors, and ethnic minority directors (paragraph 10.21); and female 
directors (paragraph 10.22).  Lastly, the report cautions against the tendency to populate 
boards with personal contacts, and suggest that this may be the reason for bias against 
women candidates. 
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Using personal contacts as a main source of candidates will tend to favour those 
with similar backgrounds to incumbent directors.  A rigorous appointments 
process is important to offset this natural bias.  The various criteria used for 
selection may also implicitly discriminate against women, such as requiring wide 
senior executive or PLC board experience. Higgs 2003, paragraph 10.24 
 
Walker 
The Walker Report was commissioned by the UK government in February 2009, to 
specifically focus on the governance of UK financial institutions that were experiencing 
critical financial losses and failures throughout the banking system at that time (Walker 
Report 2009).  The report provided 39 recommendations ranging from those providing 
guidance on board composition, board size, director qualifications, management 
remuneration, and company risk management.  The report also provided suggestions to 
institutional shareholders.  
Guidance on Board Effectiveness 
One of the more recent reports to be commissioned by the UK Government on 
governance is the 2011 Guidance on Board Effectiveness.  The UK Financial Reporting 
Council “FRC” published this new guidance on governance related primarily to Sections A 
and B of the Combined Code on the leadership and effectiveness of the Board.  The 
guidance was developed by the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators on 
the FRC’s behalf, and replaces ‘Suggestions for Good Practice from the Higgs Report’ 
(known as the Higgs guidance), which by 2011 had been withdrawn and replaced by this 
new guidance. 8 
US acts and reports over the past 20 years 
Prior to the 1980’s, the US Corporate Governance system focused on the ensuring the 
growth and sustainment of the company rather than maximizing shareholder wealth 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Information taken from the Financial Reporting Council website at http://www.frc.org.uk/Our-
Work/Codes-Standards/Corporate-governance/UK-Corporate-Governance-Code/Guidance-for-boards-and-
board-committees.aspx 
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(Holmstrom & Kaplan, 2003).  Additionally, according to Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003) 
external governance mechanisms available to dissatisfied shareholders were seldom 
used, raiders and hostile takeovers were relatively uncommon, and proxy fights were rare 
and didn’t have much chance of succeeding prior to the 1990’s.  Moreover, they argue 
that corporate boards tended to be cozy with and dominated by management, making 
board oversight weak.  However, the increase in takeovers after the 1990’s led to a 
greater focus on the shareholder as the preeminent stakeholder. 
!
Sarbanes-Oxley 
Table 2.2: Sarbanes-Oxley Provisions (Coates, 2007) 
Section Topic 
101–109 PCAOB’s creation, oversight, funding, 
and tasks 
 
302, 401–406, 408–409, 906  
New disclosure rules, including control 
systems and officer certifications 
t201–209, 303 Regulation of public company auditors 
and auditor–client relationship 
301, 304, 306, 407 Corporate governance for listed firms 
(audit committee rules, ban on officer 
loans) 
501 Regulation of securities analysts 
305, 601–604, 1103, 1105 SEC funding and powers 
802, 807, 902–905, 1102, 1104, 
1106 
Criminal penalties 
806, 1107 Whistleblowing protection 
308, 803–804  Miscellaneous (time limits for securities 
fraud, bankruptcy law, fair funds)  
Taken from Coates, 2007  
A significant influence on governance across the globe is the Sarbanes-Oxley “SOX” 
legislation, also known as the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002. SOX was designed to prevent a recurrence of the auditing crisis 
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of 2001 and 2002 . It was designed to reduce corruption and self-dealing by board of 
director members, and increase oversight of corporations and boards.  The primary goal 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation was to improve audit quality and reduce fraud (Coates 
2007). 
The law was passed in July 2002 as a response to several large-scale and highly 
publicized corporate scandals (Ramirez 2007, Butler 2013) such as the failure of 
Worldcom and Enron, and their auditing ineffectiveness.  As such, the passage of the 
legislation was a political response to negative media attention.   Romano (2004) argues, 
that the corporate governance provisions of SOX were not a result of careful deliberation 
by Congress, but that SOX was emergency legislation, enacted under conditions of 
limited legislative debate, during a media frenzy involving several high-profile corporate 
fraud and bankruptcy cases.  SOX was a combination of two separate bills by Oxley and 
Sarbanes which were passed in a relatively short period of time to address corporate 
fraud. 9 On June 25, 2002, WorldCom revealed it’s massive accounting fraud of $3.8 
billion, leading to additional public outrage. (Li et al. 2006).  Senator Sarbanes introduced 
Senate Bill 2673 to the full Senate that same day, and it passed 97–0 less than three 
weeks later on July 15, 2002.  The House and the Senate formed a Conference 
Committee to reconcile the differences between Sen. Sarbanes's bill (S. 2673) and Rep. 
Oxley's bill (H.R. 3763). The conference committee focused primarily on the provisions of  
S. 2673 and most changes made by the conference committee strengthened the 
prescriptions of S. 2673.    The Committee approved the final conference bill on July 24, 
2002, and gave it the name "the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002.10  
Prior to these high-profile scandals, federal laws had consisted of disclosure 
requirements, rather than substantive corporate governance mandates, which were 
traditionally left to state regulation and were not part of the federal securities mandates 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 All dates and vote counts can be found on the website of the US Library of Congress.  
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:S2673: 
10 The full bill and names can be found on the UK Government printing office website at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ204/html/PLAW-107publ204.htm 
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(Romano 2004). The key provisions of the Act included: 
1. Internal monitoring, requiring independent board audit committee to be 
responsible for hiring and overseeing auditors; 
2. Gatekeeper regulation; 
3. Regulations of insider misconduct; 
4. More disclosure; 
5. Regulating securities professionals to ensure independence. 
SOX created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB, a quasi-public 
oversight board to regulate auditing.   The law is developed from a framework of agency 
theory, focusing on the need to provide the guidelines to prevent management self-
dealing.  One of the ways that the law protects against self-dealing is to require auditors 
to enforce existing laws against theft and fraud by corporate officers. 11 
While SOX has not resulted in a complete cure of inadequate corporate governance in 
US firms, research indicates that it has provided some positive results.  SOX dramatically 
affected corporate boards, their activities, and their costs( Linck et al., 2008).  For 
example, Cohen et al. (2010) conducted semi-structured interviews with 30 firm partners 
and managers from three of the “Big 4” US audit firms.  They found that the corporate 
governance environment has improved considerably with SOX.   
Linck et al. (2008) argue that one of the outcomes of the law is that it has created a 
shortage of qualified directors.  In their empirical study of 8000 public companies from 
1989 to 2005, they find that the demand for directors post-SOX increased due to various 
regulatory mandates on director composition and workload. However, they also found 
that SOX led to a decreased supply of directors.  Director supply decreased due to 
increased workload and additional risks of being a director.  Moreover, factors related to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 Information taken from information on the Securities and Exchange Commision website at 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/pcaob.htm, and the PCABO website at http://pcaobus.org/Pages/default.aspx.  
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the decreased supply and increased demand for directors included changes in the 
structure of corporate boards (for example more independent directors are needed), the 
liability risk faced by directors, and the composition of the director pool.  Lastly, they 
found that composition of the boards changed with relatively more lawyers and financial 
experts and fewer executives from other firms than before SOX. (Linck et al. pg 3288). 
Butler (2013) argues that the financial expert requirement of SOX results in a gender bias 
against women directors.  SOX section 407, requires that at least one member of the 
audit committee is a financial expert.  She asserts that the title and definition for the audit 
committee expert contain a gender bias and have negative inadvertent consequences 
against women on public company boards of directors (p. 4).  Butler indicates that the 
intent of the requirement, was to ensure that one person was an accounting expert.  
Butler argues this requirement could have been an attribute for women on boards, since 
women make up a majority of those graduating from accounting programs.  However, 
both the title and qualifications highlight finance, which is a predominantly male 
dominated field.  Butler argues that these Expert Regulation requirements have a 
negative impact on the pool of qualified directors and current pipeline of women corporate 
board members, because the larger concentration of women professionals and entrants 
is in accounting and auditing as compared to finance. 
Other research has shown that SOX can help to reduce corporate insider trading 
(Ebrahim and Black 2013), and improve internet based financial reporting (Kelton and 
Yang 2008). 
While there have been improvements in governance under the new law, one of the 
possible limitations to these improvements is that government spending on enforcement 
has not been enough to keep up with the enforcement needs of the agencies.  Before 
Sarbanes-Oxley, total U.S. spending on securities regulation (per dollar of market 
capitalization was less than 80 percent of spending in the United Kingdom (FSA 2002).  
After the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, U.S. spending on securities regulation remains 
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below that of the United Kingdom (FSA 2004, Jackson 2005).    
Non-US firms registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including UK 
companies operating in the US, are also subject to SOX laws.  However, the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has identified guidance provided in the 
Turnbull report as a suitable framework for complying with US requirements to report on 
internal controls over financial reporting, as detailed in Section 404 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002 and related SEC rules (Financial Reporting Council 2004). 
There is no universal consensus that SOX has benefited corporate governance, or that 
the cost has outweighed the benefits to shareholders.  Ribstein (2005), in a review article, 
argues that the cost of SOX outweighs the benefits to the market.  Ribstein also argues 
that the market provides more efficient methods of regulating corporate governance, and 
that the US should adopt a “comply or explain” approach.  
Without understanding the full costs of the legislation, it may be difficult to determine the 
net benefits of the legislation to corporate governance.  However, the law has changed 
the corporate director structure, workload, and risk, so it bears a discussion in this thesis. 
!
US Stock Exchange Recommendations 
In 2002, both the New York Stock Exchange and NASDAQ submitted proposals designed 
to strengthen the corporate governance of their listed firms.  Both exchanges now require 
the following: (1) shareholder approval of most equity compensation plans; (2) a majority 
of independent directors with no material relationships with the company; (3) a larger role 
for independent directors in the compensation and nominating committees; and (4) 
regular meetings of only non-management directors. 
Compared to SOX, these proposals address U.S. corporate governance deficiencies both 
more directly and with lower costs.  Comparing the UK; the closest historical parallel to 
these proposals is the Code of Best Practices that was adopted by the London Stock 
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Exchange in 1992 (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003), Both the Code of Best Pracices, and 
the stock exchange recommendations emphasis independent directors and management 
oversite. 
The Conference Board Recommendations 
An association of prominent US companies formed an organization in 2002 to address 
corporate governance problems.  September 2002 they made recommendations to , 
provide a set of principles to guide boards in designing top executive compensation.  
These include: (1) compensation committees should be independent and should avoid 
benchmarking; (2) performance-based compensation should correspond to the 
corporation’s long-term goals--“cost of capital, return on equity, economic value added, 
market share, environment goals etc.”--and should avoid windfalls related to stock market 
volatility; (3) equity-based compensation should be “reasonable and cost effective”; (4) 
key executives and directors should “acquire and hold” a meaningful amount of company 
stock; and 45) compensation disclosure should be transparent and accounting-neutral--
i.e., stock options should be expensed (Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2003). 
!
1.7 Organization of Study 
This thesis represents an attempt to build knowledge of director perceptions of board 
governance and board diversity.  Additionally, this thesis seeks to determine if boards 
seek to increase diversity, or increase the social capital of the firm when they are making 
director appointments.   
The introduction and general rationale has been presented in Chapter 1 for investigating 
director diversity.  Chapter 2, examines the governance literature and theories that can 
be used to develop an analytic framework for a study about board diversity and 
governance. Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the literature that examines board of 
director diversity. Chapter 4, describes the methodological perspectives for this research 
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and explains the methods that were selected as appropriate for the study.  Chapter 5 
presents a quantitative analysis of the full dataset of directors from the FTSE 350 to allow 
the reader to understand the population from which the UK participants were chosen.  
Chapter 6 presents the results of the UK survey data and Chapter 7 presents the findings 
from the US and UK director interviews.  In addition, Chapter 7 provides a discussion of 
the how the findings from Chapters 6 and 7 support the research questions.  In chapter 8, 
provides a theoretical analysis of social capital and resource dependency based on the 
findings from research.  Chapter 9 of this research concludes with a discussion of the 
potential contributions and limitations of the research. 
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CHAPTER 2.  REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE ON GOVERNANCE 
THEORIES 
2.1 Introduction of Literature Review 
The literature review seeks to document the literature on boards of directors concerning 
the correlation between diversity and board governance. This literature review provides: 
(1) The essential literature on board of director diversity, effective governance, and 
diversity’s impact on the firm?  (2) The foundational work in agency, stakeholder, 
stewardship, and resource dependency theories which provides the guidance on what 
constitutes good governance? (3) What is the essential literature on social capital, and 
how might diversity affect social capital in organizations including the board.  The works 
included in this literature review are not intended to be an all-inclusive of related 
literature, but in the opinion of the researcher provide an essential historical as well as 
current framework in which to view this study.  
The literature will also attempt to provide reflections of the literature authors, their 
evaluations, and perhaps conflicting opinions regarding the validity of the assumptions 
based on related literature.12  Lastly, how the works presented relate to this thesis, and 
how the inquiry of the literature is similar or different than other literature. 
What is characterized as good governance is dependent on which theory is accepted as 
the appropriate way to govern the firm.  To accomplish the answering of these questions, 
the literature review is organized into two chapters.  The first chapter discusses literature 
related to agency, stakeholder, stewardship, and resource dependency theory.  These 
theories of governance are identified and discussed in the literature review, in order to 
closely examine the tension among theories and to determine what role diversity plays in 
board governance and to establish whether the theories of board governance offer any 
insights into that relationship.  In particular, are any of the theories of board governance 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Description of pattern of inquiry is in part taken from Dewey, J. 1938. Experience and education. New 
York: Collier Books. 
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conformable to impulses of diversity on the one side and are there any governance 
theories at the other end of the spectrum that are hostile?   Sections on agency theory 
are primarily historical, and are included to review how these historical writings help to 
form the basis of assumptions that form the foundation of much of the corporate 
governance literature that will be discussed.  Additionally, stakeholder and stewardship 
are discussed to help explain how those theories may suggest somewhat different 
behavior by the board for good governance practices, as well as discussing the difficulties 
of asserting one particular theory as an appropriate framework over all others.  Resource 
dependency theory is discussed as a basis for how diverse directors may provide unique 
and therefore valuable capital to the firm.  The final section of Chapter 2 (Section 2.4) 
discusses the relationship between social capital and board governance.  In particular, 
literature that is presented in this section was selected for its focus on social capital as a 
valuable tool for increasing firm resources and how social capital provides additional 
capital to the firm.   
Additionally, because of the influence that recruitment firms have on board director 
appointments and thus a board’s diversity, this section briefly discusses the role of 
executive recruitment firms, their relationship to board selection and social capital. 
Chapter 3 of the literature review discusses research on board diversity, as these studies 
provide insight into how elements of diversity may impact the performance of the board 
and therefore the firm overall.  In particular, the various rationales of board diversity are 
examined to provide guidance on the types of benefits that boards may gain from diverse 
members, and which will form the basis of interview and survey questions.   
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2.2 Review of Agency, Stakeholder, Stewardship, and Resource Dependency 
Theories 
Corporate governance research literature is not grounded in one agreed upon theoretical 
or conceptual framework.  This literature investigation attempts to determine if there is an 
empirical correlation between these models and the diversity of boards of directors that is 
more likely to encourage or deter the creation or expansion of a diverse board.  There are 
limitations to what we currently know about effective board governance and governance 
research.  No single approach to governance by a governing board has been shown by 
credible, replicated, research to be the best governance (Carver 2001).  Carver argues 
that the reason there is no definitive single approach to governance, is because the 
corporate community has not decided what governance is supposed to accomplish.  “It is 
impossible to research whether one or another method is more effective when we haven’t 
gotten together on what they should be effective at” (Carver p xxiii).  Given that there is 
no one agreed upon system of governance or governance research, this researcher 
thought it best to discuss a variety of alternatives argued in the literature.  No single 
theory is used universally as the underpinnings of corporate governance research, and as 
such this thesis will not purport to suggest that any of these theories is the absolute 
correct theory   
Three major theories of board governance – Agency, Stakeholder, and Stewardship – 
contend as overlapping alternative governance paradigms capable of explaining existing 
board behavior or of offering a prescription for future board governance success (Huse, 
2005).  Agency theory argues that the owners of the firm and the managers of the firm 
are distinct, often with contrary or conflicting interest on firm related decision-making 
matters (Smith, 1776, Berle and Means, 1932, Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  In contrast, 
stewardship theorists argue that there is no real core conflict between owners and 
managers and that whatever conflicts that exist can be reconciled (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991; Davis, 1997).  Triangulating the agency-stewardship opposition, stakeholder theory 
offers its own form of reconciliation through inclusion of interested of multiple constituents 
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who have a vested interested in the firm’s activities (Freeman 1984, Jensen 2000, 
Donaldson and Preston 1995, Heath and Norman 2004, Hsieh 2009).  In addition to 
these three main modes of governance; resource dependency theory offers a less 
popular, model to this thesis, through its emphasis on how director themselves provide 
resources to the firm based on their own unique characteristics. 
2.2.1 Agency Theory and Corporate Governance 
Recognition between the divergence between the interest of owner and the interest of 
those the owner hires to manage their firms is dated back as far as 1776 when Adam 
Smith wrote the following:  
The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather 
of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they 
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a 
private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, 
they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, 
and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the 
affairs of such a company. (Smith, 1776, Book V, Ch.1, paragraph V.1.107) 
 
Agency Theory Advocates and Diversity 
Given the separation of ownership and control described by Smith in his Wealth of 
Nations; agency theory has been used to mitigate this problem by ensuring adequate 
monitoring by the board of directors of managers who are prone to act within their own 
self-interest.  Agency theory is based on the problem that arises when two parties have 
different goals (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1976) and the owners (principals) are 
unable to write contracts for the managers (agents) which anticipate every possible 
situation (Hart 1995, p.680). The principal delegates responsibility to the agent to act on 
behalf of the principal.  The relationship between principal and agent is defined as a 
contract where the principal engages the agent in his/her duties to the principal (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976).  Agency Theory assumes that people are: self-interested, have 
bounded rationality, are opportunistic, and risk averse. The focus of the theory is to 
determine the best way to govern the contract between principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 
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1989).  The principal ‘shareholders’ can use the board as an information system to 
control and monitor the agents ‘executive managers’ and their assumed opportunistic 
behavior according to Fama and Jensen (1983) and Eisenhardt (1989).  As firms seek a 
way to reduce principal and agent problems, and their potential cost to the organization, 
principals have chosen to elect representatives or intermediaries to monitor their interest.  
This monitoring role is most often performed primarily by the boards of directors, who 
according to agency theory advocates, are the monitoring agents.   The board of directors 
bear the responsibility of reducing principal agent problems and their associated costs by 
astute monitoring. According to agency theory, boards represent the principal and are the 
primary and first line of defense as a mechanism for controlling manager’s opportunistic 
behavior (Fama and Jensen 1983).  A significant amount of corporate governance 
literature Bebchuk et al. (2004); Fields and Keys (2003), Hart (1995), Sternberg (1999), 
Fama and Jensen (1983), Moldoveanu and Martin (2001) uses agency as its preferred 
theory to help explain the important role of governance.  In corporate governance 
research, agency theory is often the primary framework used as the theoretical basis for 
developing standards of good governance.  This thesis seeks to provide support for the 
theory that directors believe that race and gender board diversity is one tool for 
enhancing the return to the principal and improving principal monitoring which is 
encouraged by agency theorist.  As such, this thesis considers several possible ways that 
diversity may enhance governance and therefore the investment of the principal. 
Berle and Means (1932) were two of the first modern era researchers of firm 
management model and have been credited with developing the terminology of 
separation of ownership and control (Mizruchi 2004).  Berle and Means’ expressed 
concern about the separation of ownership from control of the firm and the resulting lack 
of manager accountability to owners and society.  According to Berle and Means, this 
ownership dispersion made it difficult for the owners to actually control the decisions of 
firm managers.  Their viewpoint presents a viewpoint of agency, by their warnings of 
divergent interests of owner and manager.  They believed that when ownership of the 
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firm is too widely dispersed, there is little control that each owner can exercise over his 
own investment.  Specifically, due to this separation the owner is not able to control the 
actions of the manager to ensure the owner’s interests are protected and therefore 
pursued.  Additionally, they write that managers in these firms have more freedom over 
the decisions regarding resources due to this lack of control by each of the owners.  The 
research by Berle and Means is important to this thesis; as it lays the framework for why 
a board of directors, and their oversight function, is important to helping firms address the 
dispersed ownership problem.  This oversight role is discussed at length in research 
performed by Fama and Jensen (1983).  Fama and Jensen were troubled by the ability of 
organizations to survive where important decision agents (managers) do not bear a 
substantial share of the wealth effects of their decisions (Fama and Jensen p 1). They 
postulate that some of the problems inherent in the separation of ownership and control 
can be remedied with a clear separation of decision initiation and implementation 
activities (managers or agents) from ratification and monitoring activities (directors) 
(Fama and Jensen 1983, p. 9).   
It should be noted that occasionally directors also act in self-serving, self-maximizing 
ways13; therefore, principals may need mechanisms which assist them in ensuring that 
their own goals are being pursued (Dobbin and Jung 2010).  Jensen and Fama (1983) 
hypothesize that directors have an incentive to develop reputations as experts in their 
monitoring (decision control) function.  They argue that the director’s human capital is 
devalued when monitoring breaks down, or when there is an outside takeover.  The risk 
to their own human capital devaluation is seen to be a sufficient incentive for directors to 
act in the principal’s interest, and to deter collusion with management (Fama and Jensen, 
1983 p. 19).  The risk of human capital devaluation thus acts as a type of self-regulating 
factor so that productive firm outcomes are a proxy of good governance in the market.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 This is not a universally accepted viewpoint.  Alternative viewpoints are expressed by those who 
subscribe to a  viewpoint of the board and management.  A full explanation of this alternative is provided in 
the theory section 2.2.3. page 72 of the literature review.   
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As experience in a number of corporate board failures has shown, this threat is not 
always a sufficient deterrent.  
More recent research shows (Butler, 2012; Dobbin and Jung, 2010; Carter et al.,2010; 
Fanto et al., 2011; Nielsen and Huse, 2010; Galbreath, 2011; Luckerath-Rovers, 2011) 
that diverse boards present a possible deterrent to self-serving behavior. For example, 
Butler (2012) argues that diversity can aid the board to help to eradicate CEOs’“stacking 
the board.”  A diverse board arguably can influence the board nomination process and 
curtail the CEO clone syndrome or CEO parity concept—that is, selecting board 
members who are the CEOs of other companies who are happy to aid the CEO in his 
agendas through their voting preferences (Butler p 76).  This mode of literature informs 
this thesis study, specifically Research Question 2 : Directors perceive that board 
governance is positively impacted by having diverse members on the board. 
Additionally, Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that diversity is a tool for decreasing 
management self-serving behavior, risk reduction; and greater management due 
diligence.  Their research indicates that women attend more meetings and are more likely 
to be assigned to monitoring-related committees than men (Adams and Ferreira p 301).  
However, they also give a caveat to these findings by explaining that women arguably 
monitor more aggressively than men; this excess monitoring in well-governed 
corporations could possibly lead to inefficiency and increased shareholder costs (Adams 
and Ferreira p. 292).  
Jensen and Meckling discuss that there are costs associated with reducing the self-
interested behavior of agents; however, these costs are necessary to make sure that 
agents behave in a manner most advantageous to the firm.  Further, they say that agency 
costs include the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a set of contracts with the 
agents.  Additionally, as per Jensen and Meckling, agency cost include the firm value lost 
when the cost of full enforcement of this set of contracts exceed the benefits (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976 p.32). 
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Agency Theory Critique and Diversity 
Agency theory has acceptance in much governance research as described in the 
literature discussed above; however, there are shortcomings that bear mentioning.  The 
traditional view of agency relationship between the principal and the agent is grounded in 
an understanding of a ‘singular’ principal, such as shareholders.  This agent relationship 
is based on the fiduciary responsibility to these owners.  However, modern day 
corporations may have fiduciary responsibilities to a number of other entities.  For 
example, bond holders, financing entities, and other members of the capital markets 
broaden the base and perhaps the prioritization of those to whom the firm has a financial 
obligation.  Barclift (2007) argues the limitations of applying agency theory to the modern 
firm.  These limitations arise primarily because of a fundamental conflict between the 
distinct interest of the corporation14 and those of the shareholders.  Barclif describes how 
other theories such as stewardship theory have merits as well, and that by combining 
multiple theories of governance it is possible to come up with a best fit theory. 
Dobbin and Jung (2010) argue that since the 1980’s most US corporations have adopted 
an agency theory incentive based model with unsuccessful results.  This includes paying 
managers for increasing stock price through stock options (shareholder focus), and 
financing new expansion with debt in order to leverage the investment of shareholders 
which is thought to serve as discipline for executives tempted to use profits to expand into 
low-return ventures, and increasing the number of outside ‘non-executive’ directors to 
improve monitoring. They argue that while the average US firm has assiduously applied 
the agency theory principles that increase corporate entrepreneurialism and risk, it has 
not applied principles that bolster monitoring and foster executive self-restraint (Dobbin 
and Jung, 2010, p 54).  According to Dobbin and Jung, agency theory in the form that has 
been adopted by American firms is a theory that contributed importantly to two major 
recessions within a decade by exposing the corporation to increased risk. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14Barclift (2007) discusses the corporation as its own separate entity with interests that may be in fact 
different than those of its shareholders. 
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Other researchers have argued that firms managed by owners themselves instead of 
managers fare no better than those managed by agents.  Monsen, Chiu, and Cooley 
(1968) and Palmer (1973) found owner controlled firms to earn only slightly higher profits 
than management controlled firms, Kamerschent (1968) did not find that owner controlled 
firms fared better.  Larner (1970) found small differences, with owner controlled firms 
having slightly higher profits.  Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find no significant effect of 
institutional ownership on dividend payouts15.  These researchers provide a reason to 
question whether the interests of the owner is always in the best interest of the firm. 
Roberts (2002) and later Roberts et al. (2005) argue that there are theoretical foundations 
other than agency theory to describe and predict effective board governance.  They 
believe that the traditional use of agency theory to explain effective board governance is 
short sighted.  They also argue that a balance between control (agency model) and 
collaboration (stewardship model) is most effective for board governance. 
2.2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
The term stakeholder is widely used to describe the many groups of people that have a 
vested interest or ‘stake’ in an organization (Freeman, 1984; Key, 1999; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Coates et al., 1995).  Freeman (1984) was the first researcher to present 
stakeholder theory as a theory assessing the role of other internal and external actors, 
besides shareholders, who have interest in the firm’s environment and behavior.  The 
premise of stakeholder theory is that the firm has multiple constituents who have a vested 
interest in the firm’s activities, and the interests of these constituencies may often diverge 
or even conflict with each other and with expressed interest of the firm.  These 
stakeholders do not just comprise of financial stakeholders alone, but also those who are 
somehow directly or indirectly affected by the firm’s decisions and behavior.  Thus a 
firm’s stakeholders and customers as well as those communities that experience the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Dividend payouts are often used as an indication of management agency problems.  According to this 
theory, “managers prefer to reduce or even cut dividend payouts since paying dividends reduces the amount 
of cash at the managers’ disposal and this, in turn, exposes companies to potential external financial needs to 
encourage capital market monitoring and discourages inefficient investments”  Francis et al. 2011. 
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firm’s ecological, economic, political and social influence are stakeholders, direct and 
indirect, visible and invisible, voluntary and unconscious in the actions and decisions of 
the firm (Freeman, 1984, p. vi).  
When first considering what theory explains best practice corporate governance behavior, 
stakeholder theory was the theory that seemed plausible for consideration.  This is 
primarily because the stakeholder framework considers more than shareholder return on 
investment as the goal of the firm.  Additionally, stakeholder viewpoint is based on a 
belief that various groups are important to the firm’s survival and success.  This would 
seem to suggest that stakeholder viewpoint would naturally lead to a belief that 
consideration of multiple groups and multiple interests, including diversity, is a beneficial 
element.  As such, this researcher was curious as to whether the stakeholder viewpoint 
would support board diversity from the standpoint of representation, equality, and 
fairness, rather than increased returns.   
Stakeholder theory as compared to agency theory has five differences as it relates to 
purpose, governance, governance process, performance matrix, and risk holders.  These 
differences are detailed in the table below adapted from Kochan and Rubinstein (2000). 
Table 2.3 Shareholder versus Stakeholder Model Comparison 
 Shareholder Stakeholder 
Purpose Maximize shareholder 
wealth 
Pursue multiple objectives 
of parties with different 
interests 
Governance Principal-agent model, 
managers are agents of the 
shareholders 
Team production model 
Governance Process Control Coordination, cooperation, 
and conflict resolution 
Performance Matrix Shareholder value sufficient 
to maintain investor 
commitment 
Fair distribution of value 
created to maintain 
commitment of multiple 
stakeholders 
Residual Risk holder Shareholders All stakeholders 
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Freeman (1984) focuses on how executives can use the stakeholder approach to 
manage their organizations more effectively.  His approach sought to broaden the 
concept of strategic management beyond its traditional economic roots, by defining 
stakeholders as “any group or individual who is affected by or can affect the achievement 
of an organization’s objectives.  The purpose of stakeholder management was to devise 
methods to manage the myriad groups and relationships that resulted in a strategic 
fashion.” (Freeman and McVea, p 3)  Freeman shows how modern corporations can use 
the stakeholder paradigm as a strategic management tool to improve its success in the 
marketplace through the anticipation and consideration of divergent stakeholder interests 
in the boardroom.  The boardroom becomes a micro-ecology for diverse interests of the 
firm’s real ecological environment (Freeman, p 196).  Freeman’s justification for the 
claims of stakeholders is based on the legal basic rights to certain groups.  He 
acknowledges that not all rights are of equal status, and therefore stakeholder interests 
may not always prevail against contrary market forces merely because they are right-
based. 
Freeman’s stakeholder approach to strategic management says that managers must 
develop and implement processes which satisfy all groups who have a stake in the 
business. The task in this process is to manage and integrate the relationships and 
interests of shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, communities and other 
groups to ensure long-term success.  A stakeholder approach emphasizes management 
of the firm’s environment, relationships and the promotion of shared interests. 
Freeman says that there are diverse groups who have a stake in the success of the firm.  
Many traditional views of management, including agency theory described above, focus 
singularly on shareholder rights.  Freeman explains that exclusion of other important 
stakeholders may be appropriate in relatively stable environments.  However, in an 
environment of constant change this focus has limitations.  “The interests of key 
stakeholders must be integrated into the very purpose of the firm, and stakeholder 
relationships must be managed in a coherent and strategic fashion.”  (Freeman and 
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McVea, 2001, p 12)  Freeman discusses the constant change that firms face in the 
external environment including globalization, competition, government turmoil, and their 
effect on the markets their serve.  These factors are combined with influence of the 
media, and activist consumer, activist interest groups (Freeman, 1984 p10-22).  Freeman 
argues that in this highly dynamic environment, managers must not ignore firm 
stakeholders, as groups that are ignored can prevent the accomplishment of the 
organization’s purpose (Freeman, 1984 p. 52).  As a response to this highly changing 
environment, Freeman purports the necessity for firms to manage relationships with 
stakeholders in a strategic manner in order to achieve firm objectives.  Freeman 
developed the “wheel and spoke” stakeholder map with the firm ‘FIRM” as the central 
focus, and the relationship with its stakeholders depicted by arrows to and from the 
various stakeholder groups.  He attempts to describe how the external environment 
affects the manager’s ability to achieve organizational goals.  Freeman proposes a 
construct and an outlook which allows managers to deal strategically with actors in the 
external environment. 
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Figure 2.1: Freeman’s Stakeholder Map shown with 12 example stakeholders 
(Freeman 1984, p. 25) 
Freeman rejects the single aim of maximizing shareholder wealth, and instead 
stakeholder management is a task of balancing and integrating multiple relationships and 
multiple objectives.  A stakeholder approach encourages management to develop 
strategies by looking out from the firm and identifying, and investing in, all the 
relationships that will ensure long-term success. 
Donaldson and Preston (1995), using agency theory as the framework, provide a clear 
comparison and contrast of the stakeholder theory to the classical agency theory.  The 
purpose of the Donaldson and Preston article is to describe and explain some of the 
more important distinctions, problems, and implications associated with the stakeholder 
concept, as well as to clarify and justify its essential content and significance.  Central to 
the article is the belief that stakeholder theory is comprised of three distinct aspects.  
These aspects according to the authors are (1) descriptive stakeholder - it describes what 
a corporation is.  The theory is sometimes used to explain specific corporate 
characteristics and behaviors, and how what they do with regard to their stakeholders, 
such as how corporations are managed, or how managers manage stakeholder 
relationships. (2) Instrumental stakeholder – predicts and tests connections between 
stakeholder management and corporate performance objectives those who follow it.  An 
instrumental stakeholder theory of management must search out the different 
stakeholders and assess whether their rights and interest are fairly weighted in the 
decision-making and resource distribution activities.  The third aspect they describe is 
normative.  Normative stakeholder theory’s primary concern is to ensure that all 
individuals and groups who have a share in the costs of the firm’s activities play a role in 
the firm’s decisions making.  Those who follow a normative stakeholder theory of 
management are concerned with the moral or philosophical implications as to how 
corporations ought to manage their stakeholders.  They believe the organization must 
search out the different stakeholders and assess whether their rights and interest are 
fairly weighted in the decision-making and resource- distribution activities.   
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In the analysis of the stakeholder model, Donaldson and Preston say “all persons or 
groups with legitimate interests participating in an enterprise do so to obtain benefits and 
that there is no prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another” (p 
69).  They conclude that stakeholder model is the preferred model for describing the 
corporation primarily because of its normative value.  The interests of all stakeholders 
have intrinsic value and only considering shareholders is 'morally untenable' (p.88).  This 
perspective of a normative view is shared by Freeman as he writes about the normative 
view, but his take is slightly different.  For Freeman, he writes “while the stakeholder 
approach to strategic management is put forth here as a normative theory, it is not 
normative in the sense that it prescribes particular positions of moral worth to the actions 
of managers.  Instead, it presents a framework for discussing a host of different moral 
views” (Freeman, p. 210) Carney et al. (2010) also indicates the importance of the 
normative view as it relates to employee stakeholders.  “To the extent that employees 
view the firm as an institution, they may evoke a normative orientation that encourages 
identification with the firm.” (Carney pp 496).  This may be the behavior that these 
researchers believe to be most beneficial for stakeholders; however, it does not appear to 
be the behavior that boards and their firms adopt.  For example, Donaldson and Preston 
(1995) say that the interest of all stakeholders have intrinsic value; however, it is unclear 
how the benefits and interests of all stakeholders shape the actions of the firm.  While 
firm decisions are made with consideration of some stakeholders, it may be naïve to think 
that all stakeholder interests are considered.  Furthermore, it may be difficult if not 
impossible to identify all stakeholders and how to quantify the value of those various 
interests.  To assert that no prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over 
another exists, is to ignore the actions that firms and their boards take routinely.  These 
routine actions present us with evidence that this is indeed not the case.   
In the Freeman text, he too acknowledges this conflict.  He states that the stakeholder 
approach offers no concrete unarguable prescriptions for what a corporation should stand 
for.  Rather, it tries to make available the variety of flavors which are available for choice, 
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by surfacing the possible combinations of stakeholders, values, and societal issues 
(Freeman, p. 210).16  
A larger concern of using a stakeholder theory model in this thesis research was the 
subjectivity involved in identifying all stakeholders and their relative importance to each 
firm.  This subjectivity can leave firms without clear indications of which actions they 
should pursue, given the conflicting interests that are often present among various 
stakeholders groups.  Jensen (2001) presents similar concerns regarding stakeholder 
theory.  According to Jensen, “stakeholder theory should not be viewed as a legitimate 
contender to value maximization because it fails to provide a complete specification of the 
corporate purpose or objective function.  To put the matter more concretely, whereas 
value maximization provides corporate managers with a single objective, stakeholder 
theory directs corporate managers to serve ‘many masters’ and, to paraphrase the old 
adage, when there are many masters, all end up being shortchanged.  Without the clarity 
of mission provided by a single-valued objective function, companies embracing 
stakeholder theory will experience managerial confusion, conflict, inefficiency, and  
perhaps  even competitive failure.” (Jensen p.9)  Additionally, Jensen believes that it is 
impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, and therefore stakeholder theory is 
fundamentally flawed because it violates the proposition that a single-valued objective is 
a prerequisite for purposeful or rational behavior by any organization.  However, he does 
offer a proposal to clarify what he believes is the proper relation between value 
maximization and stakeholder theory. He calls this enlightened value maximization or 
‘enlightened stakeholder theory’.  He concludes that aspects of stakeholder theory can be 
embraced, but long run value of the firm must be the criterion for making the tradeoffs 
among stakeholders (Jensen, p 9). 
Sternberg (1999) also takes issue with stakeholder theory.  Sternberg argues that 
stakeholder theory is misguided, gives no guidance on how multiple benefits to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 This dilemma is also observed in the research by Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997 (discussed on page 71) 
where they provide possible solutions to this issue. 
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stakeholders should be balanced, or even how stakeholder groups should be defined.  
Additionally, she disagrees with the sense that stakeholder management not only must 
take all stakeholders into account, but that management must be accountable to these 
stakeholders (Sternberg, p. 7).  Additionally, she highlights a number of concerns with the 
stakeholder theory and particularly with stakeholder entitlements.  Sternberg believes that 
although it is correct and ethical to consider the effects of a firm’s actions on various 
stakeholders, it is impossible for firms to be accountable to all of its stakeholders.  
Sternberg goes further and argues that stakeholder theory is incompatible with good 
corporate governance because stakeholders as a class are too diverse in interest.  She 
writes that a key element of good corporate governance is accountability.  To be 
successful, according to Sternberg, good corporate governance must provide 
mechanisms for aggregating these accountabilities into measurements.  Without a clear 
set of guidance to whose benefits should be balanced, or how to balance their divergent 
needs, it is impossible to have an effective standard to which managers and directors can 
be measured. 
Heath and Norman (2004), set against a backdrop of corporate scandal including 
ENRON, argue that the breakdown of the governance relationship in the scandals of the 
Enron era was at heart a failure of these firms and their shareholders to protect 
themselves against agency problems.  By exploiting information asymmetries and 
conflicts of interests on the board, the agents (senior executives) were able to act against 
the interests of the principals (p. 248) Heath and Norman seek to determine whether 
corporations that conform to a stakeholder governance paradigm may be less likely to 
engage in such excesses because of a natural altruistic commitment to stakeholder 
rights.  Discussing the difficulty of stakeholder accountability they also discuss agency 
problems in modern firms, particularly the agency problems observed in corporate 
scandals such as Enron and whether stakeholder theory might offer a solution to these 
scandals.  The central question posed in their paper is whether governance relations in 
firms that assume primary obligations not just to shareholders but to other stakeholder 
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groups as well can be safeguarded from comparable agency problems (Heath and 
Norman, p 248).  They do not believe that other governance models result in a safeguard 
from agency problems.  They determine that while no single reason caused such 
scandals, the result of those scandals has been to strengthen accountability of executives 
to their boards and shareholders.  They conclude that the employees, managers and 
shareholders of a firm all have a common interest in the success of the enterprise.  
However, this common interest does not necessarily generate a natural alignment of 
individual interests.  Individuals can often derive personal advantage from actions that are 
contrary to the common interest.  (p 252)  They also determine that stakeholder 
management presents the management with the problem of multiple competing 
objectives.  There are trade-offs between different objectives; thereby managers can 
explain the failure to meet one target as the ‘‘cost’’ imposed by their attempts to meet 
some other. Revenue shortfalls can be explained as a necessary consequence of 
maintaining employment.  Layoffs can be justified as a necessary precondition for 
profitability.  This makes it impossible for the principal to lay down any unambiguous 
performance criteria for the evaluation of management, which in turn leads to very 
serious agency problems (p 252). 
Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1999) discuss the problem of balancing the often divergent 
interests of many heterogeneous stakeholders. They accept, as is highlighted by 
Sternberg, that there is a problem ranking the importance of stakeholders and their 
choices, however they believe that this is no reason to reject stakeholder theory as a 
legitimate management theory.  They believe that instead, what is needed is a 
mechanism for determining the importance of the varying stakeholders.  They suggest 
that the question of how managers prioritize competing stakeholder claims-goes beyond 
the question of how to identify all of the stakeholders, because the dynamics inherent in 
each relationship involve complex considerations that are not readily explained by the 
stakeholder framework as it currently stands.  Instead, they believe that a theory of 
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stakeholder salience can explain to whom and to what managers actually pay attention 
(Mitchell et al, p 854). 
Mitchell et al. discuss who is actually a stakeholder.  To lead this discussion, they present 
several characteristics.  These include: A) who are claimants versus influencers; B) which 
stakeholders have an actual relationship versus a potential relationship, C) the nature of 
the power, reciprocity and dependence of the relationship; and D) urgency of the need 
give the stakeholders immediate attention.  By identifying and using these, in their view, 
the manager becomes the moderator of these relationship considerations.  They 
recommend that stakeholders possess some combination of three critical attributes: 
power, legitimacy, and urgency.  They predict that the prominence of a particular 
stakeholder to the firm's management is low if only one attribute is present, moderate if 
two attributes are present, and high if all three attributes are present (Mitchell et al. p 
879). 
Figure 2.2: Critical Attributes of Stakeholders, Adapted from Mitchell et al. 
 
 (Mitchell et al. 1999 p 879). 
While stakeholder theory is concerned primarily with how to identify which stakeholder’s 
interest take precedence in firm decisions, there also remains the question of how 
managers and directors share power when making these decisions.  To determine who 
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has the ultimate power of decision-making is a question discussed within the context of 
stakeholder theory but also in stewardship theory.   
2.2.3 Stewardship Theory 
Agency theory, discussed above (page 50), says that agents or management will act in 
their own vested self-interest, if not governed by an entity assigned by the principal; 
therefore management actions will not maximize the profit to the owner.  This is the basis 
of the principal agent argument for agency theory.  Stakeholder theory argues that firms 
are accountable not only to shareholders, but also to other stakeholders of the firm.  
Stewardship theory is based on the assumption that organizational managers are 
essentially motivated to perform their tasks with the best interest of the firm in mind.  
Therefore, there are no apparent needs for any incentives or sanctions to get the 
managers to fulfill their tasks.17  The parties are described as principal and steward, 
where the principal delegates responsibility to the steward to act on the former’s behalf.  
In stewardship theory trust is considered to be its core (Mayer et al., 1995).  The 
stewardship theory purports that the board and management actually act as a single 
collective stewardship team.  The board’s role is to support and assist management in 
accomplishing the firm goals.  “The executive manager, under this theory, far from being 
an opportunistic shirker, essentially wants to do a good job, to be a good steward of the 
corporate assets.  Thus, stewardship theory holds that there is no inherent, general 
problem of executive motivation” (Donaldson and Davis, 1991, p 51).  Stewardship 
paradigms and their advocates argue that, management recognizes that its own interest 
and those of the firm are virtually the same: what is good for the firm is good for the 
manager.  Owners, by working towards the collective success of the firm; also meets the 
needs of the steward.  For stewardship theory, managers seek other ends besides 
financial ones; these include a sense of worth, commitment to firm goals, job satisfaction, 
and a sense of accomplishment.  Stewardship theory suggests that executives inherently 
seek to do a good job, maximize firm profits, and maximize shareholder returns.  Not 
necessarily for financial self-interest, but because of a sense of duty to the firm.  In an 
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17 See the discussion of Agency Theory previous in section 2.2.1 for a full discussion of agency theory. 
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examination of Fortune 500 corporations, Kesner (1987) found a significant positive 
relationship between the proportion of inside directors and returns to investors, lending 
support that management seeks to advance the firm in a manner that also benefits 
investors. 
Davis (1997) explains that in stewardship theory the underlying premise is that the 
behaviors of the executive are aligned with the interest of the owners.  Davis also states 
that in the stewardship model, the interests of most stakeholders are addressed, since 
successful performance of the organization adds value to most organization 
stakeholders.  This is in contrast to findings discussed in the review of the research by 
Sternberg, Jensen, Heath and Norman above, it is normal and quite likely that 
stakeholders can have competing interests.  Furthermore, who defines ‘successful 
performance’, and who is the best judge of performance since in the stewardship model 
the board and management act as a cohesive team.  For example, higher salaries for 
stake holding employees may cause the price of the firm’s products to increase.  This 
would not be in the best interest of customer stakeholders.  Similarly, closing a plant 
location in one location and consolidating to another location may be best for financial 
results, but may result in decreasing tax revenues for government entities.  Clearly, 
stewardship based structures may not correct the problem of competing accountabilities.    
The stewardship theory has been used to support arguments for the appropriateness of 
the single CEO/Chairman position.  “Specifically, as regards the role of the CEO, 
(stewardship) structures will assist them to attain superior performance by their 
corporations to the extent that the CEO exercises complete authority over the corporation 
and that their role is unambiguous and unchallenged.”  (Donaldson and Davis, p. 52)  
This situation is attained more readily where the CEO is also chair of the board, “Power 
and authority are concentrated in one person” (Donaldson and Davis, p 52).  The authors 
here seek to provide support for this view by examining the issue of CEO duality and 
specifically a hypothesis of “CEO duality leads to higher return to shareholders.”  In the 
study, corporations whose board structures had a dual CEO-chair were compared with 
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those where the chair was independent from the CEO.  The sample was a 1988 
convenience sample of 337 U.S. corporations.  Shareholder returns were measured by 
return on equity and gains to shareholder wealth by holding shares in the company.  After 
controlling for industry, the research found that dual CEO structures outperform 
independent chair structures.  Thus, contrary to agency theoretic expectations, CEO 
duality is associated with higher return to shareholders than is an independent chair of 
the corporate board.  The authors assert that both agency theory and stewardship theory 
may be valid for some phenomena but not for others.  Donaldson and Davis outlined 
contrasting approaches to the structure of corporate boards: agency theory and 
stewardship theory.  Their view is that agency theory emphasizes control of managerial 
“opportunism” by having a board chairman independent of the CEO and by using 
incentives, such as stock options to bind CEO interests to those of shareholders.  
Stewardship theory stresses the benefits on shareholder returns by having roles of CEO 
and chairman held by the same person.  The empirical evidence of their research is that 
the ROE returns to shareholders are improved by combining, rather than by separating, 
the role-holders of the chair and CEO positions.  Thus, their results fail to support agency 
theory and lend some support to stewardship theory.  In the conclusion, they indicate as 
follows, “The safeguarding of returns to shareholders may be along the track, not of 
placing management under greater control by owners, but of empowering managers to 
take autonomous executive action.”  (page 62) 
While the authors suggest that stewardship view will result in cooperation between the 
board and management as a cohesive team, one of the primary problems with the 
stewardship theory is the lack of clear accountability.  Specifically, if managers essentially 
report to themselves, who are they accountable to?  Without accountability, it hinders the 
board’s ability to perform its monitoring functions.  Additionally, there are many real world 
examples of corporate abuse that indicate a substantial level of management self-
interested behavior still exist in today’s firm.  Such examples are so rampant that 
countries have had to pass a variety of laws to protect against these transgressions.  
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These real world examples cannot be dismissed.  Furthermore, the stewardship theory 
speaks more to cooperation and management actions in theory rather than what appears 
to actually guide the actions of executives in this thesis.  
Stewardship theory focuses on management and director coordination, while agency 
theory, with it’s focus on oversight and independence, continues to be the most dominant 
framework when studying board governance. However, discussed next is a less explored 
theory (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, p. 383), resource dependency theory. 
2.2.4 Resource Dependency Theory 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that in order to survive, an organization must acquire 
needed resources.  Resource dependency theory explains that all organizations depend 
on other organizations for the provision of these resources, and seek ways to attain these 
resources while maintaining their autonomy.  In the context of boards, resource 
dependency theory is based on the assumption that director relationships with those 
outside of the board result in capital consisting of both human capital such as experience, 
expertise, reputation; as well as social (relational) capital such as the network of ties to 
other firms and external groups (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, p. 383).  Additionally, 
resource dependence theory examines how this type of firm capital, which is based on 
board relationships, should provide resources to the firm.  Board directors can be helpful 
in acquiring resources from important elements outside the firm, including financial 
capital, political capital, or various forms of influence being held by stakeholder groups 
(such as customers, suppliers, and communities). (p. 388)  According to resource 
dependency theory, directors serve as both providers of resources, as well as monitors of 
managers (agency view).   
Thus, in addition to their monitoring managers, directors provide expertise and resources 
including: (1) strategic advice and expertise; (2) communication channels to external 
organisations; (3) support from important elements outside the firm; and (4) legitimacy 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Resources, in this context, are defined as anything that 
could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a given firm (Wernerfelt, 1984 p 172).  
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Resource dependence suggests that a board’s provision of resources is directly related to 
firm performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, p. 386).  Zahra and Pearce (1989) describe 
the board’s role from the framework of resource dependency.  This includes company 
reputation, establishing contacts with the external environment, and giving advice and 
counsel to executives (p. 292).  According to resource dependency theory, one way that 
directors assist the board is by reducing external dependency.  Specifically, resource 
dependence literature argues that boards of directors are a primary method for absorbing 
critical elements of environmental uncertainty into the firm (Boyd, 1990).  Hillman (2005) 
provides an example of the way that directors may provide resources to the firm.  Hillman 
argues that because of the uncertainty government regulation creates for business; many 
firms have sought to “co-opt” government by creating linkages between the firm and 
politicians.  Hillman found that firms in heavily-regulated industries were more likely to 
have directors who were former politicians than firms in who were in less-regulated 
industries. Hillman argued that the four major resources derived from directors identified 
by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) also apply to directors who were also politicians.  She 
argued that government officials can provide valuable advice and counsel regarding the 
public policy environment of a firm, communication links to existing government officials, 
bureaucrats, and other political decision makers; influence over political decisions; and 
legitimacy.  Hillman compared two types of firms: a heavily-regulated group of firms and a 
less-regulated group of firms in terms of the number of politicians who were directors on 
corporate boards.  She argued that resource dependence logic would suggest that the 
more heavily-regulated group would have more political directors than the less-regulated 
group due to differences in their environment.  Hillman investigated whether the strength 
of the relationship between politicians on the board and heavily regulated industries 
would be magnified in the more heavily regulated firms.   
Hillman found that ex-politicians serve as conduits of information and offer access to 
important political resources that are extremely beneficial to firms operating in highly 
regulated environments.  Hillman’s findings support the view that firms with government 
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officials on their boards enjoy better financial performance than those lacking such 
directors.  This outcome not only supports resource dependency theory, but also 
supports the premise of social capital, and the resulting Research Question 4 in this 
thesis “Directors perceive that board members are chosen to improve board networks 
and board capital, and this enhances board social capital.”  Board capital can be helpful 
in acquiring resources from important elements outside the firm, such as financial capital 
influence and influence with political bodies or other important stakeholder groups (such 
as customers, suppliers, and communities). 
Additionally, Hillman et al.  (2007) found that women on corporate boards were consistent 
with the resource dependence theory. Specifically, large firms that face legitimacy 
pressures, companies operating in industries that are heavily dependent on female 
employees, and firms with ties to companies with female board members were likely to 
have women directors on their board.  Thus, the make-up of boards appeared to mirror 
the constraints faced by firms.  They argue that firms strategically select board members 
as a means to reduce environmental uncertainty.  This literature guides Research 
Question 1 of this thesis, “Directors perceive that board appointments are impacted by 
demographic factors such as their race, gender, age, or nationality”, and Research 
Question 4 of this thesis “Directors perceive that board members are chosen to improve 
board networks and board capital, and this enhances board social capital.”  Similarly, 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that prestigious or legitimate persons or organizations 
represented on the focal organization’s board provide confirmation to the rest of the world 
of the value and worth of the organization (p.145); this is an example of the legitimizing 
roll of the board as well as board signaling external stakeholders.  This is considered in 
this thesis as Research Question 3, “Directors perceive board diversity is an important 
signal of board values to the marketplace.” 
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2.3. Summary of Governance Theories 
The application of each of the considered theories has merit.  Each viewpoint results in a 
set of assumptions of how best to govern the firm.  For example, if one adopts an attitude 
of agency theory type governance, the emphasis of good governance may take a strong 
preference for diligent board oversight of management, an almost singular focus on 
shareholder value in their decision making (Smith 1776), directors who are motivated by 
establishing themselves as expert directors and have an incentive to develop reputations 
as experts in their decision control (monitoring) function (Fama and Jensen 1983, p 9)  
Conversely, if one adopts an attitude of stakeholder theory type governance, good 
governance may take a strong emphasis on how well the board manages the interests 
and needs of its many stakeholders.  Stakeholder governance would result in a board 
that is successfully able to prioritize competing stakeholder claims (Mitchell et al., Year).  
A resource dependency theory of governance would result in a board that places 
emphasis on connecting the firm to information and contacts that will help the firm reduce 
its external dependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Lastly, if one adopts a viewpoint 
of stewardship theory type governance, good governance may take a strong emphasis on 
board and management collaboration, an assumption of trust of management, no need to 
separate CEO and Chairman (Donaldson and Davis 1991), and an assumption that 
everyone is working for the firm’s best interest (Davis 1997). 
 The selection of these four theories for discussion does not seek to ignore the legitimacy 
of other theories, and provides an opportunity for subsequent research using these 
alternative frameworks.   
 “Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.  Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their 
companies. The shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and 
the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure is 
in place. The responsibilities of the board include setting the company’s strategic 
aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the 
management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their stewardship.” 
(Cadbury Report 1992, paragraph 2.5) 
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Further guidance on governance is provided by the more recent Walker Report (2009).  
“The role of corporate governance is to protect and advance the interests of 
shareholders through setting the strategic direction of a company and appointing 
and monitoring capable management to achieve this.”  (Walker Report 2009, 
paragraph 1.1) 
 
The corporate governance system a board adopts will influence the way the board 
operates  (for example stewardship cooperation versus agency oversight), and the 
responsibilities the directors seek to fulfill (resource providing, stakeholder 
accommodation, etc.).  However, the director’s impact may be more than just what 
actions he or she takes on the board, but could also involve what other benefits may be 
accrued to the firm based on their board membership.  One of these potential benefits is 
the social capital a board member may provide to the board based on their individual 
contacts.  The next section discusses how this social capital may be influenced by 
diversity, and how it may assist the board. 
2.4 The Theory of Social Capital as an Indirect Effect of Diversity 
The notion of social capital is a simple one.  It is the notion that belonging to a group can 
have benefits to the individual and community.  Therefore, the goal of this section of the 
literature review was to answer the question of what is social capital and how it is another 
measure of how firm diversity has an impact on firm governance.  It is within this context 
that the following literature is discussed.  Social Capital is described by various 
researchers in slightly different ways.  Bourdieu (1985) is credited with coining the term 
social capital, but many others have offered definitions of the term.  Cyert and March 
(1963) explain that social capital is a view that suggests the potential benefits of 
relationships, networks, and trust for economic and political advancement.  Firm 
executives and their experiences, values, specific knowledge, and preferences are 
reflected in firm-level decisions, which can influence firm strategic direction and outcomes 
(Cyert and March, 1963; Hambrick and Mason, 1984).  Other researchers have described 
social capital in the context of the goodwill provided by social contacts.  For example 
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Adler and Kwon (2002) explain that social capital is guided by a core intuition of goodwill.  
They explain it further as the sympathy, trust, and forgiveness offered by friends and 
acquaintances (Adler and Kwon pp 18), Lin et al. (1981) view social capital as the 
resources embedded within an individual’s social network and which are accessible 
through direct and indirect ties.  Portes (1998) defines social capital as “the ability of 
actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or social structures” 
(p. 6).  Social capital may be defined at the individual level, or at the group collective level 
such as a firm, organizational field, community or nation (Kilduff and Tsai, 2003). 
Grootaert (1998) says that in the mid-1990’s social capital became a popular theory to 
explain a capital asset, together with natural, physical, and human capital, which explains 
the causes of economic development.  What all of these definitions have in common is 
the position that in order to have social capital, an individual, group or organization must 
have relationships with others, and this relationship is the actual source of value of the 
social capital (Portes, 1998).  In addition, each of the researchers cited here also appear 
to agree that social capital both enhances trust between parties, as well as is enhanced 
by trust between the parties involved.  Trust has been discussed as a critical component 
in effective governance (Daily et al. 2003).  Additionally, “Virtually every commercial 
transaction has within itself an element of trust, certainly any transaction conducted over 
a period of time.  It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in 
the world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence.” (Arrow 1972, p. 357) 
Social Capital is different than human capital.  Social capital refers to "the sum of actual 
and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the 
network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit" (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998).  Human Capital, although similar and perhaps overlapping, refers specifically to 
expertise, experience, knowledge, reputation, and skills.  (Coleman, 1988)  Board 
governance can be impacted by both types of capital, as each may bring value to the 
firm. 
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2.4.1 Bourdieu, Coleman, and Loury 
As the origin of social capital research is often traced back to the work of Bourdieu, 
Coleman, and Loury (Portes, 1998, Walker et al. 1977, Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998), this 
researcher thought it important to discuss each of these researchers within the section.  
Loury (1977) is credited with helping to introduce the term social capital within community 
studies.  His early usage indicated the importance of social capital as a resource for the 
individual: these resources included those within family relationships and in community 
social organizations.  Loury argued that economic models were flawed in their focus on 
individual inputs.  He argued that the achievements of the individual were based on more 
than just his or her own efforts, accomplishments, and resulting human capital; but were 
also influenced by those relationships of the family and community.  Loury argued that 
economic models were overly focused on individual achievement, without corresponding 
focus on the capital both material and educational passed on to people by their parents.  
Additionally, Loury argued that the employment prospects of young black individuals were 
limited based on their poorer connections in the labor force.  While Loury’s research was 
not primarily focused on social capital, and subsequently he is often discussed only 
briefly in social capital literature; his work is as important as Bourdieu or Coleman for this 
study.  Loury discusses social capital in the context of racial discrimination and racial 
disparities, which has significant importance to this study regarding diversity.  Loury 
argues that race and family background have an impact on social capital; therefore 
supporting the premises of this study that diverse board members may have different 
types of social capital which can be brought to the board. 
Social capital has been defined in different ways; however, there is consistency in these 
definitions.  Bourdieu (1985) in his development of this theory sought to explain how the 
interaction of physical, cultural and human capital, as well as their different distributions, 
perpetuate social inequalities. Using sociality texts as the framework, he defined social 
capital as “the sum of resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an individual or a group 
by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
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mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bordieu 1985, p 249).  Bourdieu also defined 
social capital as “the aggregate of the actual and potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance and recognition” (p. 248).  According to Bourdieu (1985), social capital has 
two components: 1) the social relationship between individuals that allows these 
individuals to claim resources possessed by their associates, and 2) the amount and 
quality of those resources.  Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) further define social capital as 
follows, "social capital is the sum of the resources, actual or virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network of more or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992, p. 119).  Bourdieu also developed a theory regarding capital and 
fungibility.  He describes the types of capital as being economic capital (in its different 
kinds), cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic capital which is also referred to as 
prestige, reputation, renown, etc.  He argues that all types of capital can eventually be 
reduced to economic capital or “accumulated human labor.” 
One of the first articles to introduce the concept of social capital to management scholars 
was written by Coleman (1988).  Loury (reviewed above) is credited for paving the way 
for Coleman’s analysis of the same process, namely the role of social capital in the 
creation of human capital (Portes 1998).  Coleman established that relationships can 
have inherent value because of the access they provide to resources and opportunities.  
For Coleman, social capital has two main characteristics: structure and function.  The 
structure is a network of social relationships, where function is to increase the productivity 
of the persons within the nexus.  Essentially, Coleman (1988) sought to build a model of 
human action and rationality.  His guide was the economic theory of the rationale man, 
and social decision-making (rules, obligations, norms associated with action).  In his view 
social capitalization is not individualistic, but instead it involves a group.  Social capital is 
like other capital in that it is productive.  Coleman uses social capital to provide the bridge 
between economic theory of the rational man and sociology.  In his research he argues 
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that physical capital is the most tangible, financial capital is more tangible than human 
capital, human capital is less tangible than financial capital and the lowest level of 
tangibility is social capital.  All are a continuum of tangibility.  However, Coleman believes 
that the other forms of capital are not relationship dependent and that in contrast, social 
capital exists because there is a relationship between human beings. 
Social capital is a function of three important aspects:  
1) There is an obligation or expectation – A does something for B, therefore B has an 
obligation and A has an expectation   
2) Information channels – social structure implies/suggest there is some type of 
information  
3) Social norms – that there are social norms in place that promote the good and inhibits 
the bad in the social setting.  These social norms make social capital possible. 
Coleman said that social capital was a structure of social networks, of people socially 
connected through a common purpose or interest with a common goal.  Coleman’s 
analysis of the relationship between human capital and social capital considers them 
different yet complementary.  Human capital refers to the individual knowledge, skills and 
abilities of a person and social capital refers to the relations built between the individuals 
and their unique human capital.  Therefore, individual human capital contributes to the 
collective accumulation of social networks through social interaction relationships.    
Coleman argues that social capital refers to features of social structure that facilitate 
action.  Among these are systems of trust and obligations, networks disseminating 
information, norms accompanied by sanctioning systems, centralized authority structures 
arising through transfers of control, and "appropriable social organization" that may be 
used for purposes distinct from those that led to establishing it (Coleman, 1988, p S98).  
He argues that a high degree of trustworthiness among parties to a relationship is 
essential for the existence of social capital. 
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In addition to the social capital bestowed to individuals and groups are described by 
Coleman previous researchers have shown that social capital is important to firm 
outcomes (Baker, 1990; Hitt et al., 2002; Palmer and Barber, 2001).  One way that firms 
gain social capital with other firms is through individuals in those firms and their 
interaction with one another (Ireland et al., 2002).  These types of interactions can be 
business related, although business interactions are not mandatory.  The capital between 
firms can be influenced by the nature of the non-business connections between each 
firm’s agents as well (Knoke 1999). 
2.4.2. Portes 
The contributions of the three researchers discussed in this section: Loury, Bourdieu, and 
Coleman have been discussed by other researchers.  In a review article by Portes 
(1998), he provides a critical review of social capital research and findings.  Additionally, 
he offers his own conclusions of research by Bourdieu, Loury, and Coleman, among 
other authors, and he summarizes that current social capital literature emphasizes the 
similarities between financial capital and social capital.  Regarding the importance of 
social capital he states “nonmonetary forms can be important sources of power and 
influence, like the size of one’s stock holdings or bank account (Portes ,1998, p 2).  
“There appears to be a growing consensus in the literature that social capital stands for 
the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other 
social structures” (Portes, 1998)18.  These nonmonetary forms of capital are not based on 
monetary exchange, but instead on the exchange of favors, good will, or other beneficial 
exchanges that will bring value.  The currency of social capital is favors: Members of the 
network barter directly or indirectly in favors, banking good will. 
Portes suggests that it is plausible that when a board selects a woman or minority 
director, it is expecting to derive new types of social capital, and therefore experience 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 For a full discussion of the various definitions of social capital, see the discussion at section 2.4 page 72 in 
the section on social capital. 
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increased board benefits.  Are the backgrounds of these directors sufficiently different 
enough to realize social capital realized is different than a board that is non-diverse? 
The early portion of the Portes article is devoted to a comparison and discussion of early 
social capital writers.  He then distinguishes four sources of social capital and examines 
their dynamics.  These four sources were value introjection, bounded solidarity, 
reciprocity exchanges, and enforceable trust.  In addition to his review of the early writers 
of social capital, Portes provides his own theoretical basis for distinguishing between 
economic capital and social capital.  While he admits that contemporary literature focuses 
on the similarities between the two, he explains that there are two important differences.  
First, the repayment of obligations are sometimes in a currency different from that with 
which they were incurred in the first place, these methods of repayment may be 
intangible items (such as allegiance or approval).  Second, the timing of repayment is not 
specified.  He specifically suggests that if a repayment schedule exists, the transaction is 
more appropriately defined as market exchange than as one mediated by social capital 
(Portes, p. 7).   
Portes’s discussion of social capital as a ‘currency’ is important, because it reinforces an 
issue related to this thesis.  First, since social capital can be held and used by the 
individual just as physical currency, it is also plausible that the value of this currency may 
vary based on the environment.  For example, some individuals such as ethnic minorities 
may have uniquely valuable social capital (Loury, 1977) in their social circles; however, 
that social capital may not have value in other environments.  One reason unique types of 
social capital currency may not have value to the firm is based on resource dependency 
theory.  The social capital that an individual possesses may not assist the firm in reducing 
environmental uncertainties, or in gaining information of use to the firm.  Therefore, while 
diverse individuals may have different social capital, it is not necessarily a currency of 
value to the firm. 
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Portes also includes a discussion of the negative consequences of social capital.  He 
summarizes these as: exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, 
restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward leveling norms.  It is plausible that 
these negative consequences may create a decrease in social capital, if social capital of 
the firm is reduced by virtue of a change in a director.  For example, if a director with 
social capital connections to an elite group of potential customers exits the board, and is 
replaced with a director with connections who instead have excess needs and claims on 
the director, the overall social capital of the board may decrease. 
Related to the concept of social capital, resource dependence theory describes corporate 
boards as a critical link between the firm, its environment, and the diverse resources on 
which a company depends.  Terjesen et a. 2009 adopt a resource dependency lens 
which views firms as operating in an open system and needing to exchange and acquire 
certain resources in order to survive, creating a dependency between the firm and 
external units.  Within the corporate governance literature, firms seek linkages with the 
most beneficial resources, and structure membership on the corporate board on this 
basis.  
This link is necessary for good corporate performance.  Using the board of directors as a 
linkage mechanism with stakeholders provides companies with at least four benefits 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, p.145): 1) linkage may provide the organisation with useful 
information, 2) linkage provides a channel for communication purposes, 3) linkage is an 
important step in obtaining commitments of support from important elements of the 
environment and 4), linkage has a value in legitimizing organisations. 
A diverse group of board members may increase the diversity of social linkages and 
connections on the board given their unique and different network ties (Hagan 1988, 
Campbell 1988, Ibarra 1992).  For example, research suggests that the perception of 
human and social capital differ for gender and racially diverse boards.  Ibarra (1995), 
using qualitative interviews of managers, found that race has a stronger effect on the 
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perceptions of work related social networks than perceptions of gender-based networks.  
Race networks are perceived to be more diverse and therefore more beneficial to firms 
than gender networks.  Additionally, findings by Hilde (2009) indicated that more 
pronounced community heterogeneity is associated with lower levels of social capital.  
This might also apply to heterogeneity on boards.  According to Hansen (1999) and Uzzi 
(1997a), social capital networks provide access to new knowledge and facilitate the 
transmission of difficult-to-transfer knowledge.  Based the research shared above, 
diversity on the board could assist in acquiring new knowledge, unique social ties, and 
higher level of social capital.  However, it may be the case that these more diverse social 
connections may connect the board to new knowledge, unique social ties, and but 
reduced levels of social capital.  This perhaps could be caused by connections to people 
or groups which are not valuable currency to the firm’s business. 
Some researchers have argued that social capital increases the probability of success for 
inter-firm cooperative ventures as a result of the development of trust and a willingness to 
share resources (Bouty, 2000; Hitt et al., 2000, Walker, et al. (1997).  Additionally, 
stewardship theory, as discussed previously, argues that the relationship between 
managers and principals is one that should operate on trust.  Under stewardship, trust is 
the foundational structure and functional core (Mayer et al., 1995).  The board’s role is to 
support and assist management in accomplishing the firm’s goals.  Social ties can 
strengthen the trust between parties such as management and firm principles.  Coleman 
(1988) also argues that a high degree of trustworthiness among parties to a relationship 
is essential for the existence of social capital (p S97).  A group where there is extensive 
trustworthiness and extensive trust is able to accomplish much more than a comparable 
group without that trustworthiness and trust (Coleman 1988, p S101).  Research points 
out the direct benefits of trust, both to executives and to firms.  Trust between partners 
serves as a governance mechanism which promotes voluntary, rather than obligatory 
exchanges of resources (Uzzi, 1996).  For example, Gulati (1995) found that trust 
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resulting from multiple alliance experiences with partners decreases the likelihood of 
costly equity-based governance mechanisms.   
While the idea of building social capital through diversity has value to society as an 
information channel for social structures, to the corporate sector social capital has value 
as an information channel to improve firm corporate governance.  This potential value will 
vary according to governance structure.  In the public sector, for example, the emphasis 
will be on seeking social justice outcomes, while in the private sector the governance 
focus will be on board value creation in respect of organisational performance and 
shareholder return (Van der Walt et al., 2002).  In a review article that investigated 
empirical studies on diversity and social capital, Van der Walt and Ingley (2003) discuss 
18 different elements of diversity, these elements were chosen based on corporate 
governance literature identified by the authors (e.g. Smith, 2001a, 2001b; Wheeler, 2001; 
Cassell, 2000; McGregor, 2000).  These elements were studied to determine which 
elements were motivating factors to offering board positions to people of different 
backgrounds.  The motivating factors they found were categorized by their particular 
relevance to the type of organization listed.  Seven types of organizations were studied 
which included private companies, public listed companies, state owned enterprises, 
crown companies, cooperatives, charities/trusts, and local government trading 
enterprises. 
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Figure 2.3: Board Positions Motivators, Van der Walt (2003 p. 227) 
 
In the study, the authors explore the appointment of directors of different professional 
backgrounds, levels of independence, age, gender and ethnicity.  Van der Walt and 
Ingley develop a guide describing what is meant by diversity on the board and its 
implications for decision-making.  They place particular emphasis on how social capital 
considerations should encourage diverse boards.  These considerations also reflect an 
agreement with resource dependency theory.  Specifically, they say that as a group, a 
board of directors combines a mix of competencies and capabilities that collectively 
represents a pool of social capital for their organization.  They also conclude that board 
activities that link the board to its environment reduce uncertainty and secure from 
external constituencies resources critical to the organisation’s success (additional capital 
resources).  These resources include access to capital and also prestige and legitimacy.  
 
 
83 
The researchers assert that firms should create more diverse boards in order to establish 
and maintain linkages to other businesses, government and social organisations  (Van 
der Walt and Ingley 2003, pp. 229).  Some of the arguments they discuss are the 
theoretical arguments which support a stakeholder and agency theory viewpoint; moral 
obligation by boards, corporate philanthropy, stakeholder representation, and corporate 
reasons.   The authors purport, in a similar article, that the board is potentially an 
important strategic resource for the organization, especially in linking the firm to external 
resources, such as providing a linkage to a nation’s business elite, access to capital, 
connections to competitors, or market and industry intelligence (Ingley and Van der Walt, 
2001).  Diversity in this context argues for a broader range of backgrounds among 
external directors in providing this resource.  They conclude that while boards need to be 
reflective of their ownership and the wider social environment, diversity per se is 
insufficient criteria for building effective corporate boards.  The authors propose that 
when selecting directors, boards need to focus first on merit and then, ideally, on 
selecting qualified individuals with demographic and professional attributes 
underrepresented on the board.  They also recommend that boards need to recognize 
that social capital is a strategic resource and sufficiently diverse groups are more likely to 
contribute non-overlaping social capital networks, which may translate into greater 
external influence for the firm.  So while boards need to focus foremost on merit criteria 
for director selection, they should be cognizant of the potential to add value by utilizing 
the social capital contributed collectively by their directors as a strategic resource for their 
organisation.  The challenge for those representing minority voices in the boardroom, is 
to make their views heard.  The challenge for boards is to bring together in a cohesive 
manner the balance of expertise and perspectives required for effective functioning and 
decision-making on the board. 
Loury (1977) discussed the impact that race and income can have on the social and 
human capital attainment of individuals, but gender can also impact human capital 
attainment.  Singh ( 2008) in a study for the European Management Journal, researched 
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how men and women directors differed in their human capital.  While not specifically a 
social capital study, it does reveal some differences in directors which have social capital 
repercussions.  For example, more women than men fell into the community influential 
category, and over a quarter of the women in the business expert category were 
additionally community influential.  The study also found that women were significantly 
more likely than men to have a background in management consultancy and the public 
and voluntary sectors.  There were other professional differences; for example men were 
significantly more likely to report a background in engineering; and females somewhat 
more likely to have been in financial institutions and the legal professions.  These 
occupational differences represent differences in the human capital of the directors, but to 
this researcher they also may effect differences in the types of social networks that may 
be a part of the director’s experiences. If men and women directors have different 
community affiliations and different occupational experiences, it seems plausible that this 
may lead to different types of social capital.   
Fanto, et al. (2011) suggest that the social capital element of director selection is an 
important one.  They argue that a board member with numerous connections can be a 
valuable resource to a board.  They further explain, ‘A typical director,…. may be the 
CEO of another firm, a director of several other firms, and a director of nonprofit 
organizations.  These connections can be useful to the firm, for a director with them 
brings along knowledge of practices and strategies at other firms and can identify 
acquisition targets and financial options (Fanto et al. p 910).  Fanto et al. also explains 
that connections to government that arise from government service can be particularly 
important in highly regulated industries or for those doing business with the government.  
They purport that these governmental connections can be another avenue to board 
membership for women and ethnic and racial minorities who have not had the normal 
experience as a CEO to qualify them for service (Fanto et al. p 911).  Burt (2001), argues 
that social capital is the contextual complement to human capital that enables those who 
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are better connected to do better.  Additionally, Burt argues that strong network resources 
do not always translate into productive social capital. 
Network people or groups are connected to network members and groups, to whom they 
have an implicit obligation to the other members of the network, trust these certain others, 
are obligated to these certain others, and are dependent on exchange with certain others.  
Therefore, those who hold a position within these exchanges hold an asset (Burt, p. 32) 
which is social capital.  He states simply, “Better connected people enjoy higher returns” 
(Burt, p. 32).  However, Burt does not discuss that this may also be a liability.  For 
example, membership in a group may obligate the members to more responsibilities than 
it gains them advantages.  For example, a member of a non-profit community who is 
appointed to a corporate board may encounter constant requests from their community 
for donations and other favors.  If these requests are not met, the individual may lose 
social capital with the non-profit community.  However, if the requests are met, the firm 
may need to provide more charitable resources by virtue of the board member. 
The significant portion of this writing as it relates to this thesis is the discussion of 
structural holes.  According to Burt, the within group cohesion is stronger than between 
group cohesion.  In the absence of any relationship between two groups, a structural hole 
exists.  Structural holes can be filled by individuals who are members of both groups, or 
who are willing to serve as a go between or bridge between the two groups. Such 
individuals span the two groups and thereby often improve the social capital of both 
groups.  Holes in the social structure “structural holes” create a competitive advantage for 
those individuals whose relationships span those holes.  The theory describes social 
capital functioning as brokerage opportunities in a given network of relationships, or being 
the broker in relations between people or groups otherwise disconnected in social 
structure.  According to this view, the manager or entrepreneur who creates a bridge 
between otherwise disconnected contacts has a say in whose interests are served by the 
bridge.  Managers with contact networks rich in structural holes know about, are involved 
in, and exercise control over the more rewarding exchange opportunities.  Burt’s views 
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(1992) are that emphasis should be placed on the opportunities for entrepreneurs to 
exploit the "structural holes" between dense pockets of relationships in the network.  The 
structural constraints on what people know and can control, that have been created by 
the past relationships that presents the opportunities for brokers of these relationships.  
These brokers are thought to seek out partners with whom they can form unique, or "non-
redundant," relationships that bring new information and the possibility of negotiating 
between competing groups.  Through forming these new and unique relationships, 
entrepreneurs transform network structure.  An individual fills the structural hole between 
the two groups, either as a leader or as a member of both groups.  This individual then 
provides an opportunity of spanning of two individual closed networks, where they are 
now connected, and have enhanced social capital beyond what each group had 
separately.  The wider the structural hole that has been spanned, the more inclusive the 
potential social relationship could be created.  In this sense, an open network enhanced 
social capital, connecting a wider group of closed networks.   
This thesis was partly interested in discovering whether directors are selected for their 
unique social ties, therefore at least in part, spanning those holes between the firm and 
potentially new markets, thus producing a competitive advantage.  If this is the case, it is 
conceivable that diverse directors span different connections thereby spanning new and 
diverse structural holes.  Organizations are related through their members' professional 
connections, joint suppliers and customers, and industry associations.  These 
commonalities may be sources of information about competitor behavior, new 
technological developments, and other industry trends (Walker et al. 1997).  According to 
the structural holes concept (Burt 2001), it is feasible that if diverse directors enjoy 
different types of network ties and belong to different types of social or community 
groups, the firm should acquire (with their appointment) the ability to span some of these 
structural holes.  Burt asserts that contacts strongly connected to each other are likely to 
have similar and therefore redundant information.  In contrast a contact with connections 
to different groups provides a bridge to information available in other groups.  This gives 
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them an advantage in access to information.  He reaches a higher volume of information 
because he reaches more people indirectly.   
Consequently, this higher volume of information contains fewer redundant bits of 
information due to the diversity of contacts.  Burt refers to the two indicators of this 
redundancy.  He suggests that cohesive contacts (contacts strongly connected to each 
other) and equivalent contacts (contacts who link a manager to the same third parties) 
are likely to have similar information thereby providing similar benefits (Burt p.35).  He 
continues by stating that bridge connections to other groups give an advantage with 
respect to information access.  Burt does not suggest that information by itself is the 
value, but rather the information provides access to opportunities (resource dependency 
view) in a way that is faster and more efficient than those without the access to the same 
information.  
A similar insight was provided in governance research conducted by Moldoveanu and 
Martin (2001).  They identified three potential problems in firms that result in agency 
failings and consequently governance failures.  One of these include agents that do not 
have the right information or competence to reach optimal conclusions (Moldoveanu and 
Martin 2001, p.6).  This can be directly related to social capital.  If diversity improves the 
bridge connections to other groups thereby assisting in filling ‘structural holes, this may 
improve the problem identified by Moldoveanu and Martin regarding lack of the right 
information.  The absence of this knowledge may prevent optimal firm performance; 
thereby preventing true maximization of return to firm principals.  Assuming this as true, 
the firm should enjoy the benefit of the director’s ability to bridge, and in addition, the 
individual should enjoy greater individual opportunities.  This is an interesting 
consideration by Burt; and other researchers have also considered if diverse directors 
provide linkages or bridges to different types of groups.  Singh, et al. (2008) found that 
women directors had a higher level of community influence.  They found a statistically 
significant difference in the backgrounds of women and men directors.  For example, 
women were more likely to be community leaders, thus falling into his ‘community 
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influential category’, and over a quarter of the women in the business expert category 
were additionally community influentials.  In contrast, Fairfax (2005), when discussing the 
five rationales for board diversity, disagrees with this view point.  She asserts that race 
may not be an appropriate proxy for differences of opinions, viewpoints, or experiences.  
Therefore, it is also possible that diversity may not provide linkages to different types of 
groups. 
Not all studies have found social capital to provide significant advantages in the 
workplace.  Hayes (2000) in an empirical study, tested the non-race based factors that 
accounted for differences in work-related experiences and outcomes between blacks and 
whites (Hayes p. 493).  In the study, she tested racial disparity in human capital 
attainment and qualitative differences in an individual’s social capital (social network 
characteristics such as demographic similarity and tie strength) (Hayes, p. 493).  Results 
of the study indicated that black managers reported a slower rate of promotion and less 
promotion support than white managers.  Manager race had both a direct and an indirect 
effect on these outcomes.  Additionally, participation in company training and manager 
race significantly predicted reported promotion rates.  Her analysis revealed that race 
moderates the relationship between human capital and promotion rate and suggests a 
type of treatment discrimination against blacks.  Contrary to her predictions that social 
capital would be a prediction to promotion rate, social capital did not predict promotion 
rate.  Social capital mediated the relationship between race and psychosocial support. 
Black managers reported having less social capital than whites, and social capital, was 
positively related to the receipt of psychosocial support.  No differences were found 
between blacks and whites in their receipt of career-related support (Hayes, p. 493). 
Having reviewed literature which establishes the importance that social capital can have 
on the firm’s success; this researcher sought to establish if when a board selects a 
director, is it with an eye towards new social capital. Or is it the case that like the Danish 
study by Rose (2007), that because these diverse directors were chosen from a closely 
connected group, any abilities to bridge the firm to different groups and information is lost. 
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In this thesis, social capital was considered in two ways; first, if and to what extent was a 
director selected based on his or her ability to bring new or additional social capital to the 
firm by way of memberships in new or different organizations; secondly, after being 
selected to the board, did diverse directors bring different types of social capital to the 
board than non-diverse directors.  So while previous research has looked at whether 
human capital attributes (education level, expertise, etc.) differ for diverse candidates, 
this researcher wanted to determine if social capital attributes differ for diverse 
candidates, and whether these attributes make a difference in how they govern their 
boards.  These questions are considered as a means to determine if the social capital of 
diverse directors differs from that of majority directors.    
 
2.4.3 Social Capital -Selection Criteria 
Related to social capital and expectations is the subject of selection criteria and process.  
Literature on this subject is worth discussing due to the exploration of not only why 
directors are selected for the board, but also how they are selected for the board.  While 
the nominating committee19 of the board is often given the responsibility of identifying 
directors, for purposes of this thesis, the answer to the how question, can often be 
answered as with the help of a recruitment or executive search firm.  As will be discussed 
in the findings section of this paper, recruitment firms play a part in the selection of the 
directors interviewed for this study.  This researcher thought it would be helpful to include 
literature on the purpose of these firms and how they work.  While a detailed discussion 
on recruitment firms is somewhat peripheral to the subject of this study, some analysis is 
warranted as a consideration of how executive recruitment firms might influence the 
selection process thereby impacting firm governance and/or social capital.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 2. Nominating committees are charged with identifying individuals qualified to become board members, 
consistent with criteria approved by the board; developing and recommending a set of corporate governance 
guidelines applicable to the corporation; and overseeing the evaluation of the board and management 
(Peterson et al. 2007 p. 560) 
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The executive recruitment firm has been referred to in literature as a tertius gaudens or 
tertius iungens (Obstfeld, 2005, Burt, 1992).  The tertius gaudens is the  “third who 
laughs”, meaning that he/she is in a position to take advantage of the opportunities 
generated by having two alters who, without the involvement of the tertius gaudens, 
would be otherwise unconnected.  The agent who is tertius gaudens gains economic 
advantage because two agents in the network are in conflict.  The third agent gains 
economic advantage (payment) from bringing the other two parties together (Obstfeld, 
2005).  Tertius gaudens, are able to earn wages from the market by stepping into the 
conflict and creating value from other agents in the network. Burt (1992) identifies a 
second form of entrepreneurship associated with tertius gaudens: the broker/negotiator 
between the conflicting parties.  He says that the rents can be captured directly from the 
negotiations (both parties, presumably) or “to add value, strengthening the relations for 
later profit” (Burt, 1992 p 34.)  To perform this task successfully, an agent must 
successfully link two parties that would not necessarily have contact with each other.  
This activity performed by recruitment firms can also be considered a way to bridge the 
structural holes that exist between firms and director candidates.  However, it should be 
noted that recruitment firms also frequently perform services when the candidate is 
already known to the firm.  In these cases, the firm is employed to formally vet the 
candidate, as well as add a buffer between the candidate and the firm.  Simmel (1908) 
also explains the importance of brokerage including the concept of the tertius gaudens 
who acts as a brokers, play individuals off each other, and benefits from a structural 
position in the middle.  As well has Burt (1992) in the context of filling structural holes.  
Obstfeld (2005, p. 104) argues that a broker can engage in four types of action: 
1. Coordinating acting between two distant parties with no prospect of connection. 
2. Actively maintaining and exploiting a separation. 
3. Introduce or further facilitate pre-existing ties (which he calls brief iugens). 
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4. Introduce or facilitate interaction between parties while maintaining an essential 
coordinative role over time (which he calls sustained iugens). 
The opportunities available to the tertius gaudens stem from the information and control 
advantages offered by having two alters who can only access part of the information 
available in the network and have no direct link to share it, and therefore cannot bypass 
the tertius gaudens, who in effect controls what goes through. In that role, brokers can 
play their contacts against one another and, for example, get a better price for what they 
are buying without the two sellers being in a position to coordinate themselves to call a 
truce on price competition. Additionally, the broker is in a favourable position to extract 
knowledge from the two unlinked individuals and recombine it locally to come up with a 
new innovation (Vernet 2012, p 7).  
Because of their ability to bridge structural holes and connect individuals who otherwise 
would not know each other in the marketplace, recruitment firms enjoy significant power 
to shape placement decisions.  Findlay and Cloverdill (1998) refer to this power as the 
‘visible hand.  Since the recruitment firm or ‘headhunter’ is first hired by the firm, and 
candidates are first selected by the headhunter, the headhunter enjoys enormous control 
and acts as a visible hand in the selection process.  According to Findlay and Cloverdill, 
headhunters determine who the client will approve of based on ‘hot buttons’ and 
‘chemistry’.  “Hot buttons” are the work related skills and experiences that the client is 
seeking, but is often unable to articulate.  The client will recognize these skills in any 
potential client according to Findlay and Cloverdill.  Chemistry is how headhunters 
perceive a potentials candidate ability to mesh with the firm’s culture.  Since the 
headhunter will not be paid unless they successfully place the client, the headhunter will 
regularly recommend candidates they feel will have chemistry with the client based on 
how similar the candidate is to the client (p 35). Based on their interviews with executives 
and recruitment firms, they estimate as much as 80% of a hire is based on chemistry 
regardless of technical expertise (p 118).  If recruitment firms are looking for candidates 
that will be a good fit, then it may be their goal to find candidates who are most similar to 
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existing directors and therefore their placement methods could be potentially 
discriminatory and include factors such as race gender, age, appearance, and 
background.  Headhunters do not exclusively recruit socially similar candidates, but those 
who do not fit similar characteristics will receive fewer opportunities.   
Faulconbridge, et al. (2009) explores the topic of the gatekeeping role that executive 
search firms play in the labour market.  In the study, they purports that executive search 
firms act as new, powerful governance agents in the networks that influence the 
contemporary movement of talent.  Faulconbridge et al. give their outline of the process 
that executive search firms follow for candidates.  This chronology includes: 
• Mapping the market – using a researcher and consultant’s knowledge and 
contacts to list competing firms where suitable candidates could be found and to 
seek out background information on and contacts for suitable individuals.  
• Using the firm’s database to search for suitable candidates.  
• Sourcing – using known contacts and individuals in the firm’s database to elicit 
recommendations for possible candidates.  
(Faulconbridge, et al. p 802) 
The researcher’s chronology provides us with significant insight into those elements that 
that influence firms and their governance.  Firstly, a candidate must be known to the 
search firms, or those individuals who are known to the search firms in order to be 
considered.  The researchers call this the ‘reproductive’ quality of the search firm.  The 
researchers state, “headhunters have a reproductive role because in order to be 
successful in elite labour markets candidates need to be known to search consultants 
and/or part of their database and/or connected to individuals connected to headhunters.” 
(p. 802).  This phenomenon is often commonly described as “the old boys network.”  This 
has implication for governance, because directors are often selected with the assistance 
of a search firm, this may indicate that directors (whether diverse or non-diverse), may 
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very well have been a part of this exclusive network.  This being the case, it may 
strengthen the understanding of why they were selected, but also whether these 
individuals are likely to provide governance which displays outsider status.  It also 
reinforces the literature discussed above by Rose, that directors are selected from a 
small set of well-connected socially palatable candidates.  The literature suggests that 
being a part of the insider group may be important to being selected to a board, and 
perhaps just as important is having a good reputation within these circles.  Individuals 
gaining directorships are likely to have acquired reputations that signal competence and 
subsequently present a reduced risk to the oganizations who use their social networks to 
select and appoint new directors.  A noticeable factor in the profile of female directors, in 
the FTSE 100 since the 1980s is that significantly more women than men have titles, 
whether academic (Dr. or Professor), aristocratic (Lady, Honourable), civic (Dame, 
Baroness), political, or Lady as consort title of an honoured man (Singh et al., 2008 p 50).  
It is plausible based on the research, that if directors are chosen based on their 
connectedness within a small group, and based on their reputations, it is unlikely that an 
individual who is well known for having contrary viewpoint, or a reputation for alternative 
viewpoints would make the list of a palatable board member for any headhunting firm and 
its clients.  Additionally, since the directors are chosen based on this connectedness, it is 
possible that they would have similar social capital. 
2.5$Summary$of$Theory$Literature$
 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 may differ in the approach and viewpoint of the role 
of the board of directors; however, what is consistent in the literature is that boards make 
a difference in the oversight of firms.  In addition, some of the literature suggests that 
diversity may impact boards, but the reason for the impact depends greatly on the 
assumed theory of governance.  Table 2.4 provides a summary of the literature including 
the prominent theory assumed as well as the research question of this thesis that is 
influenced by the literature.  
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Comments /Findings 
Barclift, 2007 X X X               Argument is against agency because of its failure to 
consider the firm as a separate entity, suggests 
combining theories 
Bebchuk 2004 X           X     RQ2 Corporate governance exist because of the Agency 
problems, or conflict of interest that exist between owner 
and manager. 
Berle and Means 1932 X         X       RQ2 Discussed the problem on the separation of ownership 
and control 
Burt 2001       X X   X X   RQ4 Strong and weak network ties and how they bring entity 
value. 
Carter, Simkins, 
Simpson 
X X       X X X X RQ2 Empirical study examines board diversity and firm value 
Davis 1997   X                 Stewardship is valid successful performance of the 
organization adds value to most organization 
stakeholders 
Donaldson and Davis 
1991 
  X                 CEO Duality is beneficial to return on equity.  
Agency and stewardship are valid depending on 
the firm. 
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Comments /Findings 
Donaldson and Preston 
2005 
    X     X       RQ3 Describing the three aspects of stakeholder theory 
Fairfax 2005 X         X X     RQ1 Board diversity cannot be sought for issues of firm 
performance, but instead on issues of fairness and 
representation. 
Fama and Jensen 1983 X           X     RQ2 Discusses the classical elements of agency theory 
Fama and Jensen 1983 X           X     RQ2 Focus in on board oversight 
Faulconbridge et al X     X       X X RQ5 Selection firms act as governance agents by influence 
over management talent access. 
Fields and Keys 2003 X           X X X RQ2 Diversity increases firm value 
Freeman, 1984     X       X     RQ3 Defining and providing  guidelines for the use of 
stakeholder theory in management strategy. 
Hart 1995 X           X     RQ2 Explains the role of governance through the lens of 
Agency Theory 
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Comments /Findings 
Hays 2000       X   X   X X RQ4 Tested racial human capital attainment by race and 
promotion rates. 
Higgs Review 2003 X           X     RQ2 Emphasis on oversight to prevent management  abuse 
Hillman 2005     x X X         RQ 3, RQ 4 Boards seek ex-politicians to assist in reducing external 
dependency in highly regulated environments. 
Hillman et al., 2002         X X       X RQ1, RQ2 Minority and women directors differ in their education 
level, experience, and occupations. 
Hillman et al.  2007        x X   X x   RQ3, RQ4 Firms that face legitimacy pressures, companies 
operating in industries that are heavily dependent on 
female employees, and firms with ties to companies with 
female board members are likely to have women 
directors on their board. 
Jensen and Meckling 
1976 
X           X     RQ2 There will always be a conflict between the owners and 
managers. 
 Jensen, 2001 X   X               Discussion against Stakeholder 
Mitchell, Agle, Wood 
1999 
    X     X X     RQ3,RQ4 Guidelines for application of stakeholder theory.  Power, 
legitimacy, and urgency. 
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Comments /Findings 
Moldoveanu and Martin 
2001 
X           X       Limitations of Agency, and when it is likely to fail 
Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978 
      X X     x x RQ1, RQ3, 
RQ4 
External linkages should affect board composition. 
Also,the legitimizing roll of the board as well as board 
signaling external stakeholders. 
Portes 1998       X       X   RQ4 Literature review on the on social capital including 
discussion of similarities of financial capital and social 
capital. 
Ramirez 2003 X         X X X X RQ2 Diversity is a tool to prevent management abuse 
Rhode Packel 2010 X           X X X RQ1 Comparison of Board diversity research finding. 
Discusses the lack of critical mass and inconclusive 
results. 
Richard et al. 2004         X X         Cultural heterogeneity affects management performance. 
Singh 2008       X X     X X RQ4, RQ1 Examines the difference between men and women 
directors and their community influence  
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Comments /Findings 
Sternberg, 1999 X   X     X         Discussion against Stakeholder accountability, but 
stakeholder acknowledgement is accepted 
Van der Walt Ingley       X X X X X X RQ4 Social Capital reasons should encourage diverse boards 
to increase firm linkages 
Westphal et al. 2000 X     X X X     X RQ4 Prior experience on corporate boards increases 
reputation and influence.  Influence increases when 
minority board members serve a minority role on another 
board and when they have indirect social ties to the 
through common memberships on other boards. 
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The governance model that a board adopts can effect how it operates.  For example, 
when taking a traditional agency viewpoint, diversity is thought to increase oversight of 
management, and to quell management corruption   These types of general director 
governance roles inform Research Question 2: Directors perceive that board governance 
is positively impacted by having diverse members on the board.  However, when taking a 
stakeholder theory viewpoint, literature suggest that a board which is representative of its 
stakeholders is fair and most important to board governance.  Stakeholder directors may 
be knowledgeable about the interests of the stakeholder group that they are drawn from.  
Additionally, firms with stakeholders on their boards are signaling their commitment to 
stakeholders in a visible way (Ayuso and Argandona, 2007, p.10).  Therefore if 
stakeholder theory is assumed, boards must be diverse so that diverse stakeholders will 
be represented.  Additionally, while stakeholder directors have a direct say in the strategy 
of the firm, other stakeholders receive signals about who is on the board and how their 
needs are being represented.  The stakeholder viewpoint helps to inform Research 
Question 3, “Directors perceive board diversity is an important signal of board values to 
the marketplace.”  Resource Dependency, with its emphasis on director’s ability to secure 
resources which reduce a firm’s external dependencies, may suggest that board diversity 
is important to link the board to unique or different resources.  These resources may be 
because of the director’s social capital.  A variety of contacts can result in a greater 
number of resources to the board.  This viewpoint helps to inform Research Question 4, 
“Directors perceive that board members are chosen to improve board networks and 
board capital, and this enhances board social capital.”  These possibilities are discussed 
further in Chapter 3.  Chapter 3 provides additional literature on how diversity may 
specifically impact governance. 
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CHAPTER 3.  REVIEW OF BOARD DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE LITERATURE 
3.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter includes a discussion of the governance literature theories and their 
role in defining what we determine to be good governance.  This chapter is intended to 
provide an overview of literature that informs the thesis on how diversity is thought to 
impact board governance.  In discussing this related literature, this chapter seeks to 
present why board diversity could be important to firms, and if so what rationales do other 
researchers suggest make it important. 
Diversity of the board is the important element in this chapter of the literature review.  
Diversity is defined as the “representation, in one social system, of people with distinctly 
different group affiliations of cultural significance” (Aghazadeh, 2004, p. 522). 
Williams and O’Reilly (1998) view diversity as any factor that individuals use to classify 
themselves as different from others.  Diversity can also be described as differences in 
culture.  This definition (Azevedo et al., 2001; Shriberg and Kumari, 2008) includes 
nationality, gender, religion, socio economic position, generation, and regional diversity. 
The term diversity can also be divided in two different categories.  Forbes and Milliken 
(1999) and Milliken and Martins (1996) describe the categories as “visible” and “less 
visible.”  The visible types are those that can be observed and can be race, gender and 
age.  In contrast, less visible diversity is comprised of non-observable attributes of an 
individual such as experience, skills and knowledge (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Milliken 
and Martins, 1996).  Different researchers have emphasized different diversity variables. 
Common variables are age, education, experience (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), gender, 
professional background, career and ethnicity (Ingley and van der Walt, 2003).  
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Therefore, there are numerous variables to measure and study; in this thesis, the focus is 
on diversity of race and gender.   
3.2 Director Diversity Summary 
As the business environment becomes more diverse regarding visible diversity 
characteristics, there has been an increased emphasis on how diversity of the board of 
directors impacts board oversight, and as such helps to reduce governance problems.  
As an example, the Higgs report discussed above mentions ways to increase women 
directors, such as selecting from a wider range of work experience as one of its 
suggestions to boards.  In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission has recently 
increased the visibility of diversity initiatives relating to U.S. public company boards of 
directors.  In response to capital market requests for diversity disclosure, the SEC 
adopted a regulation, effective February 28, 2010, requiring public companies to disclose 
the following information: “[(1)] whether diversity is a factor in considering candidates for 
nomination to the board of directors, [(2)] how diversity is considered in that process, and 
[(3)] how the company assesses the effectiveness of its policy for considering diversity.” 
20 
A number of reasons for and against a diverse board of directors have been furthered in 
the existing research.  These arguments are divided between those who suggest that 
board diversity should be approached from a business case; and those who purport that 
board diversity is purely a function of fairness and equity.  For example, diversity is 
purported to help the board have a broad base of wisdom (Carver, 2002), additionally 
boards having qualified individuals who reflect a diversity of experience, gender and race 
may leverage these differences and work successfully together on behalf of the 
organisation (Andringa and Engstrom,1998). Selecting directors with different back 
grounds and skills offer different experiences and can make a valuable contribution to 
board decisions by providing unique perspectives on strategic issues (Bryan, 1995; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Taken from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Website. www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-
268.htm 
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Westphal and Milton, 2000).  Diverse directors can also help firms gain competitive 
advantage with strategic decision making that enhances the diversity in their products 
and employees (Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000).  Biggins (1999) argues: “Diverse boards 
help to better represent all shareholders, nurture better appreciation of ‘intangibles’ like 
work/life issues, and can help recruit and retain top executive women and minorities” 
(1999, p. 2).  
Those who argue that board diversity should not be pursued based on a business case 
model, argue that board diversity, like diversity in general, is a fairness issue.  For 
example, Loury (1987) writes that considering an individual’s race or gender in selections 
is necessary to overcome the economic consequences of private discriminatory practices 
(Loury, 1987 p. 277).  Mehri et al. (2004) suggest that firms must pursue actions that 
consider equality, and that the Securities and Exchange commission should require 
disclosures about corporate actions taken to establish greater board diversity including 
what policies and procedures a corporation has enacted to promote race and gender 
diversity in boards of directors.  These arguments may be supported by research by 
Lampkin et al. (2008) who found that board diversity is used by boards to signal to the 
marketplace that they firm is operating in a fair and equitable manner. 
These factors can be identified as motivators for seeking or failing to seek diversity on 
boards.  As an example, demographic trends and the available pool of qualified 
candidates are factors which motivate the appointment of diverse candidates to boards.  
Additionally, factors can include the individual characteristics of the directors and a 
variety of situational factors (Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000; Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; 
Burke, 2000; Mattis, 2000).  Burke (2000) argues specifically for several reasons to have 
more qualified women on boards.  These reasons concern board structure and CEOs as 
the preferred choice for director selection, CEOs or former CEOs are preferred for board 
selection based on the belief that these individuals have the unique work experience 
needed to provide high-level advice, and can better understand executive challenges and 
performance evaluation (Biggins, 1999).  As Discussed in chapter 2, according to Burke, 
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there are not enough qualified male CEOs to go around.  CEOs currently on boards 
decline board invitations three times as often as do directors who are not current or 
former CEOs.  Burke argues that to rely heavily on male CEOs results in lower quality 
men being selected for boards due to this small available pool of candidates.  In addition, 
states Burke, male CEOs serving on boards have indicated a variety of constraints on 
their ability to contribute, such as lack of expertise, little time for preparation and lack of 
information.  Given this research by Burke, the small pool of talent makes it essential for 
acceptable firm governance that appointment of board members go beyond the traditional 
pool of male CEO candidates. 
Selecting the members of the board primarily from current and former CEO’s often may 
make the board a homogeneous group of members.  The board of directors is a body 
selected by the owners to act in the best interest of the owners: but, can the best 
oversight be achieved with a board that is homogeneous and from a narrow group of 
candidates?  Some literature, as explained below, indicates that a homogeneous group is 
not the most effective group for optimal performance.  As discussed previously, Fondas 
(2000) found that boards with larger proportions of women on them were less inclined to 
let CEOs dominate proceedings and more likely to engage in “power sharing” and that 
boards with one or more female directors have significantly more influence over 
management decisions than boards without female directors.  According to Fondas, this 
may be due to a number of factors giving them a different “voice” or perspective, but in 
order for this perspective to have an impact on the board’s decisions it has to be voiced in 
a setting where norms of collegiality, equality, consensus and private decision making 
prevail.  In addition, women directors are usually outsiders (non-executives) and therefore 
more likely to be objective and independent.  This independence, she suggests, may 
partially explain why the presence of women enhances board influence over 
management (pp. 173).  Associated with the level of independence, a latent reason 
CEOs may resist appointing more women, according to Fondas (2000), is that doing so 
increases the number of outsiders on the board, thereby potentially diminishing the 
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CEO’s power.  It is not, however, discrimination against women per se, but a bias against 
independents and outsiders.  Fondas highlights the importance of power dynamics in the 
boardroom, noting also that inside directors are subordinates of the CEO in the firm’s 
management hierarchy and are thus subject to other power issues (pp 175). 
Gul et al. (2011) argue that gender diverse boards result in more corporate transparency.  
In their study of US firms, they used the voluntary and continuous disclosure of “other” 
events in 8-K reports as the measure of public information disclosure.  They found that 
gender diversity was associated with higher disclosure in both large and small firms. 
3.3 Work Team Diversity 
In group dynamics research, it has been indicated that homogeneous environments are 
not the best models for optimal performance.  Positive attributes of diversity in work 
teams include creativity, innovation, and problem solving, therefore generating more 
informed decisions.  (Gul et al. 2011,Roberson and Park 2007,Cox and Blake 1991, 
Hambrick et al. 1996).  Negative consequences of homogenous groups include a lack of 
independent thinking “groupthink”, lack of a diverse perspective, boards overly beholden 
to management, and boards which have not accessed a “deeper pool of human talent” 
(Ramirez 2003, p.849).  Alternatively, heterogeneous groups have many positive results 
on performance.  In this context, the word “groups” is referred to as a class of persons 
who share a common attribute in respect to either age, disability, gender, sexual 
orientation, race, religion or belief  (Equality Act of 2006 c.3 Part 1 Section 10) 
The literature on organizational demography and top management teams also suggests 
that diverse groups have the potential to generate original approaches to intellectual and 
decision-making tasks (Bantel 1994, Bantel and Jackson 1989; Williams and O’Reilly 
1997).  
Moldoveanu and Martin (2001) have identified three potential problems in firms which 
result in agency failings and consequently governance failures: 1.) agents that do not 
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have the right information or competence to reach optimal conclusions; 2.) agents that 
have incentives to act in a way that decreases firm value, or 3.) when decision making 
power, competence, and incentives are not aligned with each other (Moldoveanu and 
Martin 2001, p.6).  If we make the assumption that, in general, women and racial 
minorities are endowed with greater knowledge of minority or women’s groups; this 
enhanced knowledge would assist in increasing the competence of the board as it makes 
decisions which relate to these diverse groups. As the race and gender of the customers, 
employees, and suppliers that companies interact with become more diverse, this 
enhanced knowledge could assist with the board increasing its knowledge of these 
diverse groups.  Specifically, the absence of this knowledge may prevent optimal firm 
performance; thereby preventing true maximization of return to firm principals.  One 
related example of this potential benefit is sometimes referred to as the marketing 
rationale for board diversity (Fairfax, 2005).  The marketing rationale purports that 
companies with diverse boards will successfully reach a broad range of customers and 
clients thereby increasing their profitability. However, a critical assumption of the 
marketing rationale is that diverse directors have a greater knowledge of diverse 
consumers than non-diverse individuals.  It is also assumed that board members are 
active in management type functions such as marketing, which may not be the case in 
many firms.   
 
3.4 Board Diversity Literature 
There is a large body of literature related to board of director composition and its effect on 
corporate governance and or firm performance.  Bhagat and Black (1999, director 
independence), Van der Walt and Ingley (2003p, professional background), de Villiers et 
al. (2011, director expertise) and Westphal and Milton (2000, minority director prior 
experience).  A growing body of literature suggests that diverse boards of directors may 
govern differently than those boards that are homogeneous.  The impact of board 
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diversity on governance is studied in Campbell and Mınguez-Vera (2008), Adams and 
Ferreira (2009), Ahern and Ditmar (2012), and Elstad and Ladegard (2010).  In this cross-
section of governance literature, differences between the various attributes of directors 
have been widely studied.  Inclusive is literature that reviews the effects of elements such 
as demographic characteristics (Bantel 1994), board size (Dalton et al. 1999), percentage 
of outsiders on the board as compared to insiders (Beasley 1996), insider ownership 
percentage (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996), educational backgrounds (Hillman et al. 2002), 
gender and race (Brammer et al. 2007), community influence (Sing et al. 2008), etc.  In 
most instances, differences in these attributes have some impact on the firm’s 
governance.  Diverse attributes, such as those in the studies listed such as race or 
gender, have an influence on boards and therefore result in differences in the way these 
directors govern.  These differences are explored in literature which investigates board 
diversity, specifically related to women and or ethnic/racial minorities which make up the 
board of directors, and seeks to analyze the resulting effects of this diversity.  These 
studies include: Butler 2012, Luckerath-Rovers 2011, Rhode and Packel 2010, Broome 
2008, Singh et al. 2008, Rose 2007, Fields and Keys 2003, Carter et al. 2003, Ramirez 
2003, Hillman 2002, Francoeur, Labelle, and Sinclair-Desgagne 2007, and Westphal and 
Milton 2000.  Of particular relevance to this researcher’s planned study, is the body of 
literature that studies benefits of diversity on the directorate, and the theorized reasons 
for such benefits.  Critical study and empirical validation of the reasons cited for these 
benefits is crucial to establishing legitimacy of any resulting theories.  
Fairfax (2005) argues that diversifying the board should be done because it is the right 
thing to do, and that attempting to make economic benefit arguments is not necessary.  
Fairfax groups the arguments for board diversity into five rationales.  These include: the 
talent rationale, the market rationale, the litigation rationale, the employee relations 
rationale, and the governance rationale.  Each rationale is explored for weaknesses.  This 
discussion is important for this researcher’s thesis, as it reveals a discussion of the 
reasons diversity is thought to be a benefit to corporate governance with a substantial 
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discussion of an opposing viewpoint.  It is the further investigation of these rationales and 
comparison to other literature that this thesis seeks to accomplish. 
While articles are mounting that theorize the link between improved firm governance or 
firm value to diverse boards, not all links have shown improved performance. Additionally, 
where diversity is shown to improve governance, it is difficult to determine if more 
capable board members increase firm value through their improved governance or if 
better run firms simply attract knowledgeable board members.  This endogeneity 
problem21 makes it hard to differentiate which characteristics of boards and directors 
affect firm value.  So while this researcher acknowledges this problem, it is still important 
to consider the findings of these studies.   
Carter et al.’s (2003) study of diversity and corporate governance offers some of the first 
empirical evidence examining whether board diversity is associated with improved 
financial value.  The study uses the agency theory to explain the link between corporate 
governance and firm value.  The study also presents in detail what has been previously 
written on diversity and governance as conceptual, but also seeks to use empirical 
evidence to confirm measurable economic benefits.  The hypothesis tested in the study is 
“Board of Directors diversity does not affect firm value.”  In this study the authors find that 
there is a positive relationship between diversity and firm value. 
Carter et al. (2003) controlled for various categories which included firm size, industry, 
and others.  Using this model, the researchers were able to report findings based on 
various measures.  Their findings indicate a significant positive relationship between the 
fraction of women or minorities on the board and firm value.  Specifically they found a 
positive significant relationship between board diversity and firm value.  Their results 
were positive after controlling for size, industry, and other corporate governance 
measures.  One weakness of the work is that, although various studies are cited which 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 An endogeneity problem arises when there is something that is related to one variable that is also related 
to another variable, and you do not have that something in your model. These omitted variables can bias 
results (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003)  
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discuss the theoretical benefits of board diversity, the study does not seek to prove or 
disprove any of the advanced rationales, such as the five rationales, regarding the 
question of “why” firm value might be created.  Instead, the study only seeks to establish 
that economic value is created due to the diversity of the board.  This is a gap in the 
research that this thesis hoped to help fill.  
 
Carter et al. (2003), unlike Fairfax (2005), sought to demonstrate that economic value 
was created due to a diverse board.  However, other researchers have attempted to not 
only determine if value is created, but also to theorize why diverse boards may contribute 
to enhanced governance.  Ramirez (2003) puts forward the belief that the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act was of minimal assistance in correcting the governance abuses it was enacted 
to address.  He attributes the failings of Enron and others to a board plagued by 
groupthink.  Consequently he argues that the homogeneous Enron board of directors, 
and the resulting groupthink was the true problem and that diversity helps groups to avoid 
groupthink (Ramiez p 859).  Ramirez presents numerous explanations for the expected 
benefits of diversity in the boardroom.  This includes a reduction in groupthink, increased 
decision-making quality, and a quelling of corruption.  However, in addition to specific 
studies on governance, Ramirez furthers his case by discussing how groupthink is a 
substantial detriment to group success.  The reasons he cites are that groupthink results 
in a strong need for members of the group to go along with group decisions, mindless 
adherence to group norms, and a failure of group members to challenge implicit or 
explicit assumptions.  He argues that cultural diversity can enhance small group decision-
making processes and reduce the inclination of small groups to devolve into a groupthink 
approach to issues.  He also states that a groupthink dynamic plagues decision making 
within groups that share a high degree of similar experiences and characteristics.  The 
result is mindless adherence to group norms and a failure to challenge implicit or 
underlying assumptions.  Group members are seduced into compliant conduct by the 
need to achieve approval from the group as a whole (Ramirez p 840).  Additionally, he 
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discusses companies where board homogeneity was mentioned as possible reason for 
governance failings22.   
Ramirez attempts to summarize the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, using a 
historical narrative of the abusive actions which led to passage of the act.  He 
encourages the reader to see Sarbanes Oxley as a key to force fundamental change in 
the way that boards do business.  The narrative is also essential in assisting him in 
making the argument that the act does not address the perceived reason for the failings.  
His position is that boards fail due in part to a lack of independent thinking (groupthink) 
resulting in mindless adherence to group norms, lack of diverse perspectives, an excess 
of feeling beholding to management, and lack of access to a deeper pool of human talent.  
Ramirez’s arguments reflect an agreement with the governance rationale and the talent 
rationale for board diversity.  Ramirez’s argument that diversity can be used to increase 
independent thinking and reduce groupthink is based on the assumption that diverse 
individuals will (by virtue of their diversity) have thoughts and opinions that are different 
than other directors.  In contrast, Rose (2007) argues that women who rise to the position 
of board members may have similar social backgrounds and pedigree which moderate 
any potential impact of gender diversity.  Additionally, Fairfax (2005) argues that women 
and minorities who are appointed to boards may be hesitant to voice opposition due to a 
lack of critical mass of women or minority board members. 
Butler (2012) argues that the purpose of the board of directors is to monitor and evaluate 
senior management of the company.  Additionally, she states that most American state 
laws, which typically establish that the obligations of the board of directors to its 
shareholders, specifically expect that a part of the duties of the director are care and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 One such article that Ramirez (2003) mentions is Jyoti Thottam, Crashing the Boards, Time.com, Feb. 10, 
2003(statement of Harvard Business School Professor Rakesh Khurana), (showing that a variety of norms 
and social connections, including racial and gender homogeneity renders boards "high cohesion" groups, 
which leads to "a strong emphasis on politeness and courtesy, and an avoidance of direct conflict and 
confrontation"); and Susan S. Boren & Julie H. Daum, Raising the Bar in the Boardroom: New Expectations 
and Standards Warrant a Best Practices Review, Directors & Boards, June 22, 2002, at 55 ("The advantages 
of a board composed of directors who offer diversity of backgrounds, expertise, and outlook cannot be 
underestimated. Directors should not only bring a variety of knowledge and skills, but should differ enough 
intellectually from each other and management to encourage a culture of scrutiny and debate."). 
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loyalty towards shareholders.  Butler maintains that a diverse group of directors may be a 
way to assist directors in fulfilling their duties of care and loyalty (Butler p 67).  She 
describes the second prong of the board of directors’ fiduciary obligation is the duty of 
loyalty, which requires directors to act in good faith to advance the best interests of the 
corporation.  Acting in good faith includes: (1) not engaging in self–dealing and unlawful 
activity; (2) avoiding passiveness that enables the diversion of corporate assets and 
profits or causes other frauds upon the corporation; and (3) affirmatively acting with good 
intentions to monitor the corporation’s affairs and the corporation’s compliance with law 
(Butler p. 70). 
Other researchers have disagreed with the attempt to link enhanced governance to 
diversity, and instead propose that board diversity is solely a moral and ethical issue.  
The previously mentioned Fairfax (2005) discusses the potential benefits cited in the 
other papers on the topic, but takes issue with most.  She presents the potential benefits 
and her disagreement as five separate arguments.  The article purports that board 
diversity is an admirable goal; however, not for the reasons often cited.  Fairfax seeks to 
examine the viability of business rationales used to justify increasing board diversity.  She 
discusses the often--cited potential benefits, and suggests that minority board members 
could not possibly be expected to deliver them.  Fairfax believes that if companies 
increase their efforts to diversify their boards based on the assumed benefits, they will 
become disappointed when those benefits are not realized.   
Fairfax spends considerable length on the five arguments for board diversity based on 
economic rationale.  As mentioned previously they include: the talent rationale, the 
market rationale, the litigation rationale, the employee relations rationale, and the 
governance rationale.   There are three rationales, where Fairfax differs with the 
arguments made by Ramirez.  The first place they differ is the talent rationale.  Ramirez 
(2002, p. 849) argues that if the board membership does not reflect society’s 
demographics, and specifically the demographic mix of college educated individuals, then 
the board has not tapped into the greatest supply of talent in the marketplace for its 
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potential pool of directors.  Fairfax disagrees with this rationale for board diversity.  She 
points out that although firms gain a competitive advantage by acquiring talented 
employees and managers, any advantage to the firm by acquiring a diverse board is 
offset by directors who hold multiple board appointments.   Therefore, no one board gains 
a competitive advantage with a director appointment, potentially undermining its impact.  
Another reason she disagrees with the talent rationale is that it fails to consider that given 
the narrow criteria for board members, there may be a lack of qualified diverse 
candidates (and white candidates) that meet these criteria.  
The market rationale, discussed previously, is another rationale for diversity where 
Fairfax disagrees with other researchers (Dallas 2002, Catalyst 2004 p 3).  The rationale 
purports that companies that employ a diverse group of people will successfully reach a 
broad range of customer and clients thereby increasing their profitability.  Fairfax argues 
that this rationale is flawed, as firms do not need diverse directors to take advantage of 
the economic opportunities afforded by diversity.  Fairfax points out that there are 
marketing firms, including firms that employ diverse individuals, who may perform this 
task more successfully than a single director.   
One of the significant benefits of diverse boards assumed by researchers, such as 
Ramirez, is their willingness to express dissenting opinions, increase scrutiny, and 
consequently improve the quality of board decisions (Ramirez, 2002 p. 852).  Fairfax 
describes this as the governance rationale.  This rationale, which lies at the center of the 
Ramirez research, is that diversity on the board will lessen the risk of corruption by 
ensuring that there are directors who are “bold enough to ask the tough questions 
(Ramirez p. 842).  Fairfax questions whether diverse board members would be willing to 
exercise “super outsider”23 status, or assume the role of permanent Devil’s Advocate.  
Specifically, Fairfax states “corporate officials often only seek to promote those people of 
color who are racially palatable and demonstrate a willingness to subordinate their group 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 See above, Super outsider status is coined in the Fairfax paper to explain that minority board members are 
expected to be technical outsiders, but also outsiders socially; therefore this places them as the ultimate 
outsider with very different views.  
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identity for the good of the firm.” (Fairfax p 836)  This finding, if true, would weaken 
arguments put forth by Ramirez, Carter, as well as others that groupthink could be 
avoided by employing diverse boards.  Groupthink would remain a problem if minorities 
are just as likely to go along with group decisions, adhere to group norms, fail to 
challenge implicit or explicit assumptions.   Additionally, Fairfax suggests that this 
rationale fails to consider that even if diverse directors had views that were sufficiently 
different than others on the board, the governance rationale fails to consider the lack of a 
‘critical mass’24 of diverse directors which would allow these directors to feel confident 
enough to voice dissenting opinions.   
A Catalyst study (2006) of women directors found some support for the governance 
rationale when there is more than one woman on the board.  In their interviews with 
FTSE 100 women directors about the presence of more than one woman on the board, 
and whether it made any difference, of the twelve who responded, ten women said it 
made a difference, while two felt it made no impact at all.  Seven women said it made a 
big difference in terms of less stereotyping, three said it made some difference, ten 
women said it made a difference in the breadth of perspectives discussed, with a 
comment that this was particularly the case regarding corporate social responsibility and 
corporate communications.  Six women agreed that having more women made for a 
more friendly atmosphere in the boardroom, making it seem less “abnormal”, but it had 
no impact at all on their ability to make their contribution to the board (Catalyst 2006 p. 
24).  These results by Catalyst lends support to the governance rationale. 
Lending support to Fairfax’s argument against the governance rationale; Fanto et al. 
(2011) argue that candidates with significantly different opinions to the existing board 
members will in fact avoid board memberships with these firms.  They argue that during 
the vetting process, there are informal ‘go-betweens’ which are third parties who are 
acquainted with the officers and board members of the corporation who casually raise the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Studies show that minorities in a group feel more confident expressing meaningful views when there is a 
‘critical mass’ or other minority members present that may support their viewpoints (Rand and Light 2004 p. 
318, Fanto et al. p 929) 
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needed questions about the candidate’s understanding of the implicit belief structure and 
codes of conduct of the board.  A principled candidate who judges that the corporation 
cannot move far enough in the diversity direction, thereby putting his own reputation at 
risk, will gracefully withdraw from consideration. (Fanto et al., p 916)  If this argument is 
true, then not only will diverse members fail to vocalize issues of disagreement, but it is 
possible that based on the opinion of Fanto et al., these candidates may self-eliminate 
themselves from board membership in the first place.   
In the conclusion, Fairfax makes a normative view argument that a diverse board should 
be sought because of ethical reasons rather than an attempt to make an empirical 
argument based on improved firm performance.  She argues that diversifying the board 
based on expectations of economic improvement will inevitably lead to failure of these 
directors to meet those lofty goals.  Instead, she suggests that diversifying the board is 
simply the right thing to do, and that attempting to make economic arguments is futile.  
Fanto et al. (2011) also argue that justification of board diversity on the grounds of its 
contribution to shareholder value is flawed.  They argue that directors of a US public firm 
are busy executives from other firms who gather together monthly to approve broad 
strategic directions of the firm.  They suggest that the chief executive office and her team 
actually operate the firm; and that boards simply ratify their decisions and strategies.  
Fanto et al. believe that a board’s contribution to firm value is likely to be minimal and 
hard to establish.  They believe that diversity advocates should endorse justifications and 
normative frameworks other than shareholder value to support diverse boards.  This view 
point is shared by others (Wheeler 2009, Zhang and Zhu 2012).  As it relates to this 
thesis, questions were asked in the thesis to ascertain whether an acceptance or 
rejection of these rationales would be reflected in the answers given by the diverse 
directors under study. 
One study which also rejects the governance rationale discussed by Fairfax, Fanto, and 
others listed is Casper Rose (2007).  Rose sampled 1000 listed Danish firms to 
determine whether female board representation influenced firm performance.  Rose was 
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unable to determine any significant link between firm performance, as measured by 
Tobin’s Q and female representation.  Rose found that gender diversity does not seem to 
be important for firm financial performance.  A plausible reason stated is that “board 
members not originating from the traditional “old boy’s club” may have decided to 
assimilate into the traditional circles by suppressing any special feature stemming from 
the board members’ unconventional background. In other words, there might be a 
process of socialisation where the unconventional board members have adopted the 
behaviour and norms of the conventional board members/business leaders.”(Rose p 411)  
Rose found that Danish board candidates are recruited from a small closely connected 
group of business people.  To belong to this group of closely connected people, it is 
essential for women to be able to convince these members that they share the same 
norms and social values as members in the network.  In this process, outsiders to these 
norms would not be considered as potential board members.  The author of the study 
purports that due to the socialization that must occur for females to be accepted and 
promoted the male dominated Danish corporate environment, any potential performance 
enhancements due to gender advantages do not materialize.   
The Rose study suggested no conclusive effects from an increase of women on boards.  
The lack of any performance differences of these boards was attributed to these Dutch 
women being conformists and attempting to assimilate in a male-dominated board 
context by suppressing any differences in opinions or attitudes (Rose 2007); however, 
another study on Norwegian corporate boards found a slightly different result.  Elstad and 
Ladegard (2010) investigated how increasing the ratio of women directors on corporate 
boards is associated with decision-making dynamics; specifically they investigated the 
perceived participation and influence of the women on the board.  Elstad and Ladegard 
studied a sample of 458 women on Norwegian corporate boards.  They focus on the 
women directors’ perceptions and experiences.  Elstad and Ladegard suggest that 
women still tend to be perceived as an out-group in the board setting, which may pose a 
challenge to their participation and influence. 
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They argue that on the corporate board, women directors who are a minority may attempt 
to reduce their visibility by censoring their own opinions that are controversial or that may 
cause conflict.  They also theorized that a larger ratio of women on the board would result 
in these women feeling less pressure based on visibility and consequently perceived self-
censorship would diminish or disappear.  They hypothesize: “The ratio of women on a 
board is negatively associated with perceptions of self-censorship, such that the higher 
the ratio of women, the lower will be perceptions of self-censorship reported by individual 
women.” (Elstad and Ladegard p. 601)  They also theorized that as the ratio of women 
increase, they would feel less excluded and perceive to engage in social interaction to a 
greater extent.  They hypothesized, “The ratio of women on a board is positively 
associated with perceptions of social interaction with other board members outside the 
boardroom, such that the larger the ratio of women, the greater will be the perceptions of 
informal social interaction outside the boardroom reported by individual women.” (Elstad 
and Ladegard, 2010 p. 602) 
Their results indicated that women on boards perceived that they have good opportunities 
for contributing to board decisions, and they perceived a high level of influence on the 
decisions of the board.  They also reported that they practice very little self-censorship.  
These findings, consistent with the governance rationale, suggest that women directors, 
when they have divergent views on the board, actually express these views and actively 
engage in discussion.  Additionally, they found that the board members share information 
with each other.  Women in their sample perceive that they have the opportunity to 
contribute to board decisions by openly sharing their views, readily obtain access to 
important information, and ultimately influence board decisions (page 608). Thus, unlike 
the perspective of Rose, and Fairfax, the women directors in the Elstad and Ladegard 
study did not perceive that there were major social barriers to their board participation, or 
practice conformity.  Their findings did not support that women on the Norwegian boards 
seek to reduce their visibility by censoring their own opinions that are controversial. 
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Other studies (Gurin et al. 2006; Thomas 1993, Kunda 1999) have also argued that 
diverse individuals attempt to assimilate into the group and deemphasize their difference 
and emphasize their similarities.  There are two main strategies that minorities use to 
distance themselves from their minority group: decategorization and assimilation.  
According to Gurin et al. (2006), in decategorization, minorities attempt to ensure that the 
dominant group perceives them as individuals rather than members of the minority group 
to avoid negative stereotypes associated with that minority group.  Thomas (1993) found 
that black professionals may choose to stifle their racial identity by avoiding race-related 
discussions in their interactions with their white colleagues and supervisors. For example, 
Sinclair and Kunda (1999) found that Black professionals who have used 
decategorization are deemed more professional and are less likely to experience the 
negative racial stereotypes associated with their minority group.  However, the 
decategorization process can have a negative impact on teams because minority 
professionals lose a part of their cultural identity and may be less likely to draw attention 
to differences in a number of ways, such as contributing novel or innovative ideas within 
their work group (Dickens and Dickens, 1991; Swann et al.., 2003). 
This seems to possibly offer one explanation of why the Fama and Jensen ‘human capital 
devaluation’ deterrent may not be enough to prevent self-serving director behavior.  
Traditional agency theorist believe that in the owner/agent relationship, the agent is 
incentivized to develop an expert reputation.  Jensen and Fama hypothesize that outside 
directors have an incentive to develop reputations as experts in their decision control 
(monitoring) function.  They argue that the director’s human capital is devalued when 
monitoring breaks down, or when there is an outside takeover.  This risk of their own 
human capital devaluation is seen to be a sufficient incentive for directors to act in the 
principal’s interest, and deter collusion with management (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p. 
19).  Fundamental to human capital valuation is reputation.  However, if the perceived 
devaluation of human capital caused by outsider behavior is more risky to ones 
reputation than the devaluation of human capital caused by firm failure, the diverse 
 
 
117 
director may be encouraged to perform in accordance with group norms at the expense 
of the firm’s governance to secure their reputation and assimilation within the network.   
 
Literature above demonstrates that whether the five rationales for board diversity hold 
true is inconclusive.  It will be essential to learn from the board members if they believe 
that diversity impacts the governing process.  Moreover, another goal of the research is 
to determine if attributes such as race or gender, which continue to have a profound 
influence on individuals (no matter the level of socialization), result in differences in the 
ways these individuals govern.  Director background differences in race and gender has 
been studied by Hillman (2002), Siciliano (1996) and Catalyst (2006).  It has been 
published that the background of the white males who serve on boards and the women 
and minorities who serve on boards tend to be different (Hillman et al., 2002).  Women 
directors tend to be significantly younger than their male peers, with an average age of 
53.8, compared to 56.2 for male directors (Catalyst 2006 p 14).  Catalyst also found that 
UK FTSE 100 women directors had shorter tenure 3.2 years for women and 4.8 years for 
men (Catalyst 2006 p. 14).  We would expect that governance could differ for these 
boards, given the result of different demographic make ups and background experiences.  
Siciliano (1996) studied 240 YMCA organizations and determined that occupations 
diversity led to higher levels of social performance and that gender diversity compared 
favorably to the organization's level of social performance but a negatively on fundraising.  
The diversity in board member age groupings was linked to higher levels of donations.  
Hillman et al. (2002) determined that “Female and African-American directors are more 
likely to come from non-business backgrounds, are more likely to hold advanced 
degrees, and join multiple boards at a faster rate than white male directors.”  (Hillman et 
al. p.747)  Hillman states,  
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“Our results indicate that directors bring a wide range of resources to boards.  In 
our sample, female and racial minority directors bring more resources than the 
additional perspectives and legitimacy provided by their gender and/or race.  They 
bring a variety of occupational expertise and knowledge, advanced education, and 
accelerated ties to other organizations.”    
 
However, the question for this researcher was not only if there should be differences in 
governance due to background experiences, but whether directors believe and perform 
as if there actually are differences.  In a study by Westphal and Milton, their results show 
that the prior experience of minority directors in a minority role on other boards can 
enhance their ability to exert influence on the focal board (Westphal and Milton, 2000, 
p.366).  Additionally as discussed earlier, Jensen and Fama hypothesize that outside 
directors have an incentive to develop reputations as experts in their decision control 
(monitoring) function.  They argue that the director’s human capital is devalued when 
monitoring breaks down, or when there is an outside takeover.  This risk of their own 
human capital devaluation is seen to be a sufficient incentive for directors to act in the 
principal’s interest, and deter collusion with management (Fama and Jensen 1983, p. 19).   
Therefore a study, on board diversity should increase our understanding of whether this 
increased risk of reputation (human capital) results in minority directors who have an 
increased desire to fulfill their monitoring obligations well.  If a minority director has more 
capital at risk than a non-minority director, all else being equal, it is possible that a 
minority director’s investment towards the firm’s success will be greater.  If this is indeed 
true, the director’s efforts may increase the possibility of a successful firm, and increase 
his reputation as an expert monitor.    
Years of board experience, is another variable which has been shown to impact board 
performance.  This variable is important when discussing diversity, as diverse board 
members tend to have less years of board tenure, than their white male peers (Catalyst 
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2006).  In the UK and USA popular media, much has been made of the laws in Norway 
which require gender diversity on boards.  Norway required public-limited firms to have at 
least 40% of board seats filled by women in 2003.  Voluntary compliance in the country 
failed, so the law made it compulsory in 2006.  In one study which has sought to analyze 
the effectiveness of this law, results suggested that the value of the companies dropped.  
However, further analysis revealed that the 40% quota led firms to recruit women board 
members that were younger and had different career experiences than the existing 
directors (Ahern and Dittmar 2011).   
 
3.5 Diversity and Firm Performance Literature 
Direct effect of diversity on firms 
Existing diversity literature at other levels within the firm besides the board and firm 
performance indicates that diversity in the management ranks can also impact firm 
performance.  The impact of diversity in top management teams on firm value is also 
inconclusive.  However, whether management diversity is a positive or negative impact 
on firm value appears to be linked to the type of firm and what dynamic the firm operates 
within (Richard et al. 2004, Rhode and Packel 2010, Bantel and Jackson 1989, Richard 
2000).  Firms which operate in environments with high risk, and require high creativity 
appear to be impacted positively by heterogeneous management.  Firms which require 
low creativity and have a need for quick decision making ability appear to benefit more 
from homogeneous management (Richard et al.,2004).  Rhode and Packel (2010) 
perform an analysis on several studies that have attempted to understand the relationship 
between board diversity and firm performance, in an attempt to analyze the variable 
results.  In their study, they sought to evaluate the case for racial, ethnic, and gender 
diversity on corporate boards of directors in light of competing research findings.  They 
grouped the results of these boardroom diversity studies into distinct groups 1) Studies 
that show a positive relationship 2) Studies that show no relationship or a negative 
 
 
120 
relationship.  Additionally, the article includes a section that explains the recent trends of 
diversity on boards, including information on race in addition to gender.  They specifically 
identify trends of minority women, which are often missing in studies whose 
demographics include gender and race, but not break out of women minorities.  These 
include concerns that women and minorities chosen for board membership may be those 
least likely to challenge the status quo, and therefore any potential benefits of differing 
opinions and dissent may be loss.  Additionally, the lack of a “Critical Mass” of diverse 
directors on a board, which would allow those directors to function more as an integral 
part of the board fully empowered, rather than members who are seen as the ‘different’ 
person.  Lastly, for those studies that show a positive link, there remains the problem of 
knowing whether the improved performance can be attributed to diversity.  Moreover, 
there is a question of whether or not diverse boards help to make firms more profitable, or 
if more profitable firms tend to seek to diversity their boards25.  Rhode and Packel 
determine that the results of the studies are inconclusive, and attribute the varied findings 
to the methodological shortcomings of many of the studies, including small sample size, 
short-term observations of performance, and the difficulty of controlling for reverse 
causation, endogeneity, and other omitted variables that may be affecting both board 
diversity and firm performance (Rhode and Packel, p 8).  In addition to endogeneity and 
reverse causation problems, the researchers determined that there are numerous 
measures of firm performance with no one recognized measure making it difficult to 
argue a conclusive link between diversity and firm performance.  With so many different 
measures of firm performance from which to choose, researchers are likely to find some 
values that show a positive relationship with board diversity and others that show a 
negative relationship.  Based on their analysis of the study results, they find the link 
between board of director diversity and firm performance to be inconclusive.  Their review 
does, however, find some theoretical and empirical basis for believing that when diversity 
is well managed, it can improve decision-making and can enhance a corporation‘s public 
image by signaling commitments to equal opportunity and inclusion.  However, the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Endogeneity problem discussed in note 25 above. 
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researchers also qualify their recommendations to include the perspective that to achieve 
such benefits diversity must extend beyond tokenism, and corporations must be held 
more accountable for the firm’s progress. 
In an attempt to gain further insight into other types of diversity and potential impact on 
firm performance, this researcher sought to identify other research where other types of 
diversity has been studied by management scholars.  In addition to race and gender 
diversity, there are also cognitive diversity factors such as age, job tenure, and industry 
and occupational diversity.  When studying corporate governance, the concept of 
diversity relates to board composition and the varied attributes, characteristics and 
expertise contributed by individual board members.  The various types of diversity that 
may be represented among directors in the boardroom include age, gender, ethnicity, 
culture, religion, constituency representation, independence, professional background, 
knowledge, technical skills and expertise, commercial and industry experience, career 
and life experience (Milliken and Martins, 1996).  
Pitcher and Smith (2001) investigate the impact of diverse management teams on firm 
performance.  They investigate types of cognitive diversity with a focus on under what 
conditions diverse management teams may be beneficial to the firm.  Pitcher and Smith 
highlight key relationships between teams and three strategic outcomes.  These were 
identified as relationships between team heterogeneity and diversification, innovation, 
and performance.  Pitcher and Smith chose these relationships, because in their view 
diversification (where to compete) is widely accepted as a key strategic choice; 
innovation is viewed as a key intermediate link to performance, and performance itself is 
of direct importance (Pitcher and Smith 2001). 
Pitcher and Smith using a large study of strategic leadership based on eight years of 
close observation at the board and management committee levels inside one $20 billion 
global corporation.  The researchers used observational and archival data and informal 
meetings, two rounds (1986 and 1990) of fifty formal semi-structured interviews.  The 
 
 
122 
interviews explored views with respect to team functioning, strategy, structure, innovation, 
performance, and their potential relation to the personalities of the CEOs.  The 
researchers segmented the top management team into three distinct groups based on 
the make-up of the team at specific points of time, and performed an analysis of the 
cognitive diversity factors of the top management team such as age, tenure, experience, 
and personality heterogeneity.  In the study, one of the important findings of the research 
team was that personality traits, as well as power in the organization were very strong 
elements to consider when determining the impact of cognitive diversity on the firm.  In 
their research, the degree of heterogeneity at various points in the organizations life span 
was measured, and was then assessed for the appropriateness of the firm’s environment.  
The researchers found that the high heterogeneity team was correlated with a period of 
strategic creativity, specifically the top management team efforts to enter new markets 
and develop new products, and team heterogeneity seemed to be a winning combination 
in a turbulent, deregulating marketplace.  Conversely their case study supported the 
hypothesis that the homogenous team was inappropriate to the turbulent competitive 
environment in which it operated, and the organization ultimately disappeared. 
Simons, Pelled, and Smith (1999) investigate the effects of four types of demographic 
diversity on firm performance: functional background, education attainment, tenure, and 
age.  Of these demographic variables, they classify functional, education level, and 
tenure diversity are generally more job-related because they largely capture experiences, 
information, and perspectives relevant to cognitive tasks (Simons, Pelled and Smith, pp. 
663).  The study was conducted by mailing questionnaires to CEOs and other top 
managers in manufacturing companies asking a variety of questions regarding 
demographic variables, as well as questions assessing their level of debate such as “To 
what extent did the group weight multiple approaches against each other?” and “ …. 
Executives stated clear disagreement with each other.”  An important topic of this article, 
as it relates to this thesis, is the importance of group debate in being able to tap into any 
positive aspects of diversity.  A central conclusion from the analysis of this article is that 
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teams may need debate to make constructive use of diversity.  This need for debate is 
discussed as follows: 
“Quality of decision making is difficult to measure in real-world groups but may be 
estimated by decision comprehensiveness. Debate may increase the tendency for 
diversity to enhance decision comprehensiveness. Without debate, a team's 
diversity may remain an untapped resource, existing but never used. If team 
members debate each other, however, they are likely to draw on their diversity-
that is, on their divergent knowledge sets-to bolster their arguments. As they are 
confronted by new information from people with different backgrounds, members 
are forced to rethink their points of view and consider factors they had not 
previously considered. In this manner, the decision making process becomes 
more comprehensive.” (pp. 664) 
   
Their results indicated that debate increased the tendency for diversity to enhance top 
management team performance.  Further, debate-by-diversity interactive effects were 
strongest for more job-related forms of diversity.  They concluded their article by stating 
that for diversity to benefit a company's bottom line, there must be a process by which the 
positive aspects of diversity are brought to bear.  The researchers advocate fostering 
diversity in top management teams, because such diversity should help top management 
team members' debates become more constructive.  
The first two articles of this section (Richard, et al., and Pitcher and Smith) support the 
theory that diversity has a positive impact on the firm in situations where creativity, 
proactivity and innovation is needed.  The Simmons, Pelled, and Smith article purports 
that diversity is beneficial for corporate decision-making, but only primarily so when the 
diversity is task related and used to increase debate and enhance decision-making.   
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The group ‘conflict’ or debate that can result from the diversity is well suited to innovative 
ideas, and homogeneous groups may perform poorly in turbulent competitive 
environments.  In this present thesis, the competitive environment that the directors 
operated in was not a variable that was studied.  The element of governance, specifically 
oversight and selection were the identified elements of focus.  However, what can be 
taken away from the literature focusing on firm performance that relates to this thesis; is 
that diversity often increases the level of conflict, and therefore may directly impact board 
communication and the dynamics between directors. 
3.6 Summary of Literature 
The foundations of the research have been built in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 by important 
literature in governance research, diversity research, social capital, as well as literature 
which combines these works to study the relationship between diversity, director value, 
and board governance.  Additionally, many of the studies focus on explaining the reasons 
diversity is thought to enhance governance by linking traditional diversity research and 
assuming that these advantages are similar for directors.   Table 3.1 presents a summary 
of the key literature which focuses on director diversity and provides the link to the 
research questions. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of Board Diversity Literature 
Author Year Theory 
Framework 
Research 
Question 
Description 
Broome 2008 Stakeholder RQ3 Boards sometimes seek to communicate firm values such as equality, progressiveness, and 
equal opportunity by signaling with board of director diversity. 
Carter et al. 2003 Agency RQ1, RQ2 Studied firm performance and director diversity using calculation of Tobins Q and evaluating firm 
performance. 
Catalyst- industry 
report 
2006 n/a RQ1 Interviewed 12 Fortune 100 directors in their qualitative study of board diversity. 
Catalyst- industry 
repot 
2001 n/a RQ1 In-depth interviews with 35 minority women in senior management positions. 
Dalton et al. 1999 Resource 
Dependency 
RQ 4 Board size may be a measure of an organization's ability to form environmental links to secure 
critical resources. 
Elstad and 
Ladegard 
2010 Agency RQ1 Used mixed-method survey to document their study of board diversity. 
Fairfax 2005 Agency RQ2 Argues that economic rationales for board governance are flawed, and board diversity is 
important for fairness. 
Hillman et al. 2002 Resource 
Dependency 
RQ 4 There are a number of resources that directors bring to boards: expertise, different perspectives, 
ties to other firms, and legitimacy.  They study how directors differ beyond race and gender by 
exploring differences in occupation and education level in order to capture diversity of expertise. 
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Lampkin Broome 
and Krawiec 
2008 Agency RQ2 Used semi-structured interviews with corporate directors to analyze the impact diversity has on 
board effectiveness.  
Nielsen and Huse 2010 Agency RQ2 Studied women and leadership/strategic activities on the board using mixed-methods to study 
board composition and governance. 
Van der Walt and 
Ingley 
2003 Resource 
Dependency 
RQ4 Analyzed professional background of directors and industry ties. Argue that board activities that 
link the board to its environment reduce uncertainty and secure from external constituencies 
resources critical to the organisation’s success. 
Westphal and 
Milton  
2000 Resource 
Dependency 
RQ1,RQ4 Analyzed minority director prior experience using data collected from public databases. 
Wheeler 2011 Resource 
Dependency 
RQ4 Studied gender diversity using quantitative methods. 
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The literature in Chapter 3 does not provide a conclusive answer as to whether board 
diversity enhances governance, and if so how it may do so.  However, it provides a basis 
for the research questions (see table 3.1), and a basis from which to analyze the results 
of the study.  Several reasons are discussed in the literature that this study explores, but 
primary attention has been given to Fairfax (2005), and what she calls the five rationales 
for board governance.  While Fairfax does not agree with these rationales, her research 
provides a framework for a comparison and contrast to other researchers in the chapter, 
as well as a framework for analysis in further chapters.    
One such comparison has been made to Ramirez (2003).  Ramirez argues that board 
diversity can be a crucial tool to guard against ‘group-think” and the resulting cooperate 
ailments of corruption and abuse.  Ramirez’s position is most closely aligned to the 
Governance Rationale of board diversity that Fairfax describes.  Neither Fairfax nor 
Ramirez offer empirical data to substantiate their claims, but do offer evidence from 
diversity and work-term diversity to bolster their positions. 
Another area of disagreement in the literature, is whether any potential advantages of 
diversity are eliminated due to diverse directors modifying their positions in an attempt to 
assimilate into the majority group.  Rose (2007) suggests that there are no performance 
differences based on diversity, because women conform and attempt to assimilate in a 
male-dominated board setting.  This viewpoint is shared by others who argue that diverse 
individuals attempt to assimilate into the group and deemphasize their differences. (Gurin 
et al. 2006, Fairfax 2005, Thomas 1993, Kunda 1999) However research by Elstad and 
Ladegard (2010) indicated that women on boards perceived that they have high level of 
contributions, high levels of influence, and practice very little self-censorship.  This would 
seem at odds with a view that women were conforming and modifying their positions. 
My aim was to contribute to this literature by offering first person accounts of directors 
that attempt to acquire additional knowledge regarding their perceptions of diversity and 
thus compare their perceptions with the cited rationales in the literature.  Additionally, my 
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aim was to provide an analysis of the director responses in the UK and US, which would 
provide an opportunity to learn more about the similarities and differences that might be 
revealed from such a two country study.  By focusing on the reasons why the advantages 
may exist, and providing narrative interview data to support these reasons, this study 
hopes to make a stronger link between diversity and improved board governance, and a 
greater understanding of how these perceptions may differ between the UK and US. 
!  
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CHAPTER 4 – METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
4.1$Introduction$
This chapter presents a discussion of the approach used by this researcher to conduct 
this thesis research.  Somekh and Lewin (2005) argue that the approach taken to 
collecting, recording and analyzing data depends on the methodological framework for 
the research.  “How the researcher understands ‘being in the world’ (ontology) and the 
nature of knowledge (epistemology), will fundamentally shape both the observation 
process and analysis of the data collected” (p.141).  The ontological question under 
consideration in this dissertation pertains to the nature of the relationships between 
perceptions of members of boards of directors and diversity as embodied in race, gender, 
and social networks.  Of course, given the tenuous and often opaque relationships 
between human thoughts and behavior and between what a human says in an interview 
or survey and what he or she actually believes, how a researcher comes to understand 
what is real or true raises a series of at least three epistemological questions: 1) can the 
researcher ever know the truth in this situation? 2) If, the truth is knowable how can this 
researcher know it?  That is, 3) are there methodological approaches that will allow me to 
approach the truth about my subject matter?  My research sought to know about how 
board director perceive the value of racial and gender diversity as an influence on their, 
and other board members decision making..  Specifically, I came to know what they 
perceived based on interviews and survey, and the interpretation of that data.     
 This chapter will explain the methods and instruments used in this mixed-methods 
multiple study of board of director members and the opinions and perceptions of the how 
diversity impacts the board’s governance.  The purpose of this study as identified in 
Chapter 1 and developed in the literature review of Chapters 2 and 3, is to analyze the 
opinions and perceptions of directors on the influence of board diversity on governance 
and board of director social capital.  The result of this analysis provides an understanding 
of how directors perceive diversity impacts governance and how diversity may be one 
aspect of social capital.  Chapter 4 is divided into seven sections: 1) The Introduction 
 
 
130 
gives the reader an overview of the methods used to collect the data for this study and 
provides a brief summary of why the methodology was adopted; 2) Example of Methods 
by Others; 3) Mixed-Method Research Design provides a discussion of the advantages 
and disadvantages of mixed-methods research including qualitative and quantitative 
methods.  This section offers the reader an opportunity to understand why mixed-method 
is appropriate for answering the questions in this thesis; 4) Data Collection provides an 
explanation of data collection procedures for this thesis study; 5) Survey Construction –
This includes a description of the survey construction and the basis of how the questions 
were designed; 6) Survey Distribution Methods and Data Analysis; and lastly 7) 
Interviews include a description of interview methods including an explanation of the 
interview guide and interview protocol that was used.  This chapter, along with Chapter 5, 
provide an understanding of the complete methods used by this study to analyze board 
diversity, governance, and director perceptions. 
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4.2$Examples$of$the$Variety$of$Methods$Used$in$Board$Research$
It is apparent to this researcher that not one research method provides a clear best 
framework for studying board governance, and thus a mix of methods was the best 
choice for this thesis.  Therefore, this thesis incorporates the diversity of methods used in 
those studies reviewed throughout this thesis and other studies.  Using a variety of 
methods, as has been done is this thesis, is considered a mixed methods methodology or 
triangulation.  The table below provides a sample of board diversity research using a 
variety of methods. 
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Table 4.1: Methods Used in Board Research 
Author Year Quantitative  Qualitative Comments 
Dalton et al. 1998 X  Analyzed the correlation between director diversity 
and its effect on corporate governance and 
performance.  Conducted a meta-analysis of data 
from 85 studies. 
Hillman et al. 2002 X  Collected demographic information on directors 
using descriptive statistics to analyze their 
occupations and experience. 
Bhagat and Black 1999 X  Used regression and correlation of director data to 
study director independence and firm 
independence. 
Van der Walt and Ingley 2003  X Analyzed professional background of directors 
using theoretical arguments presented in a variety 
of previous research. 
Westphal and Milton  2000 X  Analyzed minority director prior experience using 
data collected from public databases. 
Carter et al. 2003 X  Studied firm performance and director diversity 
using calculation of Tobins Q and evaluating firm 
performance. 
Wheeler 2011 X  Studied gender diversity using quantitative 
methods. 
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Nielsen and Huse 2010 X  Studied women and leadership/strategic activities 
on the board using survey data to study board 
composition and governance. 
Lampkin Broome and Krawiec 2008  X Used semi-structured interviews with corporate 
directors to analyze the impact diversity has on 
board effectiveness.  
Catalyst 2006  X Interviewed 12 Fortune 100 directors in their 
qualitative study of board diversity. 
Elstad and Ladegard 2010 X X Used mixed-method survey to document their study 
of board diversity. 
Catalyst, Industry Report 2001  X In-depth interviews with 35 minority women in 
senior management positions. 
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Previous research (Westphal et al., 2000; Hillman et al., 2002; Ramirez, 2003; Rhode 
Packel 2010; Dalton et al. 1998) suggests that diverse boards of directors may govern 
differently than those boards that are homogeneous.  These studies employ a variety of 
research methods in an attempt to answer the questions surrounding board of director 
governance.  Dalton et al. (1998) analyzed the correlation between director diversity and 
its effect on corporate governance and firm performance.  They conducted a meta-
analysis of data from 85 studies and found no consistent evidence of a relationship 
between board structure and financial performance.  Those studies analyzed by Dalton et 
al. included a variety of quantitative studies that looked at the correlation between board 
structure and firm performance.  Hillman et al. (2002) studied diverse director education 
and perspectives using quantitative methods by collecting the demographic information 
on directors and using descriptive statistics to analyze their occupations and experience.  
Bhagat and Black (1999) used regression and correlation of director data to study director 
independence and firm performance.  Van der Walt and Ingley (2003) analyzed 
professional background of directors using theoretical argument presented in a variety of 
previous research.  Westphal and Milton (2000) analyzed minority director prior 
experience using data collected from public databases.  Carter et al. (2003) studied firm 
performance and director diversity using calculation of Tobins Q and evaluating firm 
performance.  Wheeler (2011) studying the business case for gender diversity using 
quantitative methods, Nielsen and Huse (2010) studying women and leadership/strategic 
activities on the board using mixed method survey data, and others research diversity of 
the board’s composition and governance using quantitative data.  Other studies have 
employed a variety of qualitative methods and mixed-methods to study board 
composition and governance.  Lampkin et al.(2008) used semi-structured interviews with 
corporate directors to analyze the impact diversity has on the board effectiveness. 
Catalyst (2006) interviewed 12 Fortune 100 directors in their qualitative study of board 
diversity, and Elstad and Ladegard (2010) used a mixed-method survey document in their 
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study of board diversity.  The research by Elstad and Ladegard, similar to this thesis, 
investigates diverse directors on corporate boards, and decision-making dynamics.  
Specifically they investigated the perceived participation and influence of the women on 
the board.  Elstad and Ladegard studied a sample of 458 women on Norwegian corporate 
boards, focusing on the women directors’ perceptions and experiences.  Their survey is 
considered mixed-methods, as it includes both likert scale and open ended questions.  
Given the similarity in the types of information this thesis sought; a similar survey (one 
using a likert scale and open-ended questions was designed for this thesis.  Key literature 
which shows the diversity of methods is found starting on page 134. 
A variety of criteria are offered as a basis for selecting one research method over 
another.  The next section details the advantages and disadvantages to this study and 
appropriateness of the mixed-method approach.  
4.3$Mixed$Method$Research$Design$
In research design literature, there are normally two methodological approaches 
discussed for data collection and analysis: qualitative and quantitative.  The results from 
qualitative analysis can vary to a considerable degree from the knowledge gained 
through quantitative inquiry.  Morse (1991) indicates that in choosing a research method, 
it is important to determine the characteristics of the research problem.  The key issue is 
whether the theory is developed inductively from the research, thus making it primarily 
qualitative, or used deductively as in quantitative inquiry.  McCracken (1988) describes 
the differences between the two types of methods as a difference in how the categories 
are defined.  He argues that the quantitative goal is to isolate and define categories as 
precisely as possible before the study is undertaken, and then precisely determine the 
relationship between them.  In contrast he argues that the qualitative researcher expects 
the nature and definition of the analytic categories to change during the course of the 
project.  He concludes that for a quantitative study, well-defined categories are the means 
of the research and for a qualitative study they are merely the objects of the research 
(McCracken, p.16). 
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It is not necessary that these two paradigms compete against one another; hence the 
purpose of utilizing mixed methods.  Some researchers believe that qualitative and 
quantitative research can be effectively mixed in the same research project (Corbin and 
Strauss, 1990; Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Patton, 1990; Morse 1991).  According 
to Morse (1991), the process of using at least two methods to investigate a research 
question is called triangulation.  Triangulation is used when a single research method is 
inadequate.  It is used to ensure that the most comprehensive approach is taken to solve 
a research problem or to ensure the validity of the instruments used (p 120).  Additionally, 
according to McCracken (1998), the interview should not be used in isolation since it can 
be unreliable and sometimes misleading.  He argues that in addition to the interview, the 
researcher must be prepared to take full advantage of quantitative methodologies.  This 
section will attempt to describe the fit of the method with an overview of the methods and 
describe the reason that mixed-methods were chosen for this study.  
This thesis was conducted using the across stage-mixed-model design because the 
mixing took place across the stages of the research process (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 
2004, p 20).   
Figure 4.1: Stages of the Thesis Research Model 
 
analyze&&the&population&of&UK&directors&in&order&to&population&from&which&the&survey&participants&were&selected.&&
Research&instrument&mailed&to&collect&data&both&qualitative&(short&descriptive&answer),&and&quantitative&(Likert&scale&answers)&from&UK&directors.&&&&
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This thesis is also considered within-stage-mixed-model design, as a questionnaire was 
used which included a rating scale (quantitative data collection) and several open-ended 
questions (qualitative data collection) (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, p 20).  This 
thesis has three stages: First, this researcher gained access to director information from 
the Manifest Database, then used statistical (quantitative) methods to analyze information 
about the population of UK directors in order to learn more about the population from 
which the survey participants were selected.  Second, a quantitative and qualitative 
research phase in which a research instrument was designed and mailed to collect data 
from corporate directors.  These data were analyzed to answer questions of director 
perceptions about board governance, diversity, and social capital.  This stage was 
followed by a second, qualitative stage.  In this stage a sub-set of directors were 
interviewed in person and on the phone to collect their opinions and their perceptions on 
board diversity, governance, and social capital.  The details of each of these stages are in 
both this Methodology Chapter and Chapter 5, which discuss the full dataset of 3066 
FTSE 350 directors that was accessed for this project as opposed to only those 
interviewed or submitting a survey. 
4.3.1 Qualitative Research Methods Discussion 
The methods traditionally categorized as qualitative include interviewing, action research, 
grounded theory, observation, and case study research.  When using these methods, 
usually the goal is to seek a deeper insight into the problem than is available from other 
more quantitative methods.  Very often the goal of qualitative research is to seek the 
answer to questions such as the following: “Why did a subject act in a specific way?”  
“How did the subject feel about an event or problem?”  “What were the results of those 
actions?”  While quantitative methods could be characterized as being based on numbers 
and surveys to accept or reject a hypothesis, qualitative methods are focused on seeking 
discovery.  In some cases they are meant to formulate a hypothesis rather than accept or 
reject a hypothesis.  According to Morse (1991 p. 120), characteristics of a qualitative 
research problem are: (a) the concept is “immature,” due to a conspicuous lack of theory 
and previous research; (b) a notion that the available theory may be inaccurate, incorrect, 
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or biased; (c) a need exists to explore and describe the phenomena and to develop 
theory; or (d) the nature of the phenomenon may not be suited to quantitative measures.  
When making the distinction between quantitative research and qualitative research, 
Cooper and Schindlerf 2006 explain it as follows: “Qualitative research – sometimes 
labeled interpretive research because it seeks to develop understanding through detailed 
description – often builds theory but rarely tests it” (Cooper and Schindler, p.198). In 
some ways the researcher discovers the hypothesis during the process of the research 
using the inductive reasoning method.   
Advantages and Disadvantages of Qualitative Study 
Many of the advantages of qualitative methods can be realized when using the case 
study, interview, or observation methods.  For example, in this thesis, further information 
was sought about perspectives of directors regarding diversity.  Using qualitative 
methods allowed this researcher to look deeply into the answers of each particular 
director’s interview, or open-ended survey response in a way that the director quantitative 
survey questions were incapable of capturing.  These qualitative responses allowed the 
directors to give answers or alternatives that were not pre-determined and thus allowed 
for answers which did not conform to a specific set of alternatives. Webb (1995) argues 
specific preferential outcomes:  
• It is possible to ascribe the views to individual respondents, allowing for 
more precise interpretation;  
• It affords the opportunity to build a close rapport and a high degree of 
trust, thus improving the quality of the data;  
• It allows for easier expression of non-conformity.26 
 
Therefore, this researcher determined that because this study included a need to study 
relationships between directors it would be advantageous to use some qualitative 
techniques to possibly capture non-conforming information.  Previous research on board 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Taken from Stokes, David and Bergin, Richard (2006) Methodology or "methodolatry"? An evaluation of 
focus groups and depth interviews. Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal, 9(1), pp. 26-3. 
ISSN (print) 1352-2752 
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of director diversity, such as that described in the introduction of this chapter, has used 
qualitative techniques to determine the influence that diversity may have on the board.  
Qualitative research methods are thought to be best suited for building or extending 
theory versus testing theory.  In prior studies on diversity, other researchers have sought 
to test a hypothesis of whether or not diversity improves board performance27.  This 
thesis builds further theory about which rationales given for board diversity appear valid 
from the perspectives of directors.  The thesis is designed to understand director attitudes 
towards diversity and governance.  An advantage of qualitative over quantitative methods 
is that they are better at evaluating attitudes and prejudices and how they affect or do not 
affect actions (Strauss and Corbin 1998, p. 10).  In this thesis, it was important that 
issues involving attitudes, thoughts, and emotions be assessed.  Accordingly qualitative 
methods, specifically qualitative interviews, were conducted and other inductive 
information sought in the open-ended survey questions in an attempt to obtain intricate 
details about these types of phenomenon.   
Miles and Huberman (1994) discuss some of the disadvantages of qualitative studies.  
These disadvantages are labor intensiveness, frequent data overload, distinct possibility 
of researcher bias, time demands of processing and coding data, the adequacy of 
sampling when only a few cases can be managed, the generalizability of findings, and the 
credibility and quality of conclusions (Miles and Huberman, p. 2). 
Another disadvantage that is often discussed is cost.  A qualitative study uses many 
methods that require the researcher’s time on each occasion that data are collected.  
While many surveys were mailed at one time using quantitative techniques, each time an 
interview was performed, this researcher was present to conduct it.  Because of the close 
geographical proximity of UK interviewees most of the interviews were conducted in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 A number of these articles are discussed in chapters 2, page 47 and 3, page 100 of this thesis study 
including Field and Keys 2003, Burke 2000, Fondas 2000, and others. 
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person rather than by telephone28, the lodging and transportation costs were nonetheless 
substantial.  US directors were widely disbursed. Hence, two interviews were performed 
in person and the remaining eight interviews were conducted over the telephone in order 
to minimize the cost of the thesis. 
One possible qualitative method, observation, was not used in the completion of this 
study.  This researcher considered that it would be helpful to observe boards in the 
course of their work in an effort to observe anything that could possibly be learned.  
However, observational techniques can be extremely time-consuming, as most 
observation methods are performed over extensive lengths of time.  The time constraints 
and access requirements of an observation study of directors would have been 
impractical for this dual-country PhD study, in addition, due to the confidential nature of 
board meetings, board observation would have been impractical as well. 
Another disadvantage of qualitative methods can be the inability to make generalities or 
causal statements.  Shaughnessy et al. (2006) argue that it is difficult to infer causality 
using qualitative methods because extraneous variables are generally not controlled.  
Additionally, because replicating the results on different populations often proves difficult 
to accomplish, they argue it can be difficult to generalize (Shaughnessy et al. 2006, p. 
334).  The goal of this study was to discover new knowledge; however, using qualitative 
methods these findings are not always reproducible, and therefore the application or 
extension of the findings to a larger population is questionable.  In this thesis, though it is 
agreed that the inability of generalizing the results over a large population is a 
shortcoming, the depth of the information gained from the interviews provides additional 
insights that could not have been determined from the survey questionnaire alone.  
Winter (2000) argues the merits of qualitative research, even without the ability to 
generalize. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Sturges and Hanrahan (2004) argue that telephone interviews can be used successfully in qualitative 
research. 
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“In a very general sense, qualitative research concerns itself with the 
meanings and experiences of the 'whole' person, or localised culture. On 
the other hand, quantitative research attempts to fragment and delimit 
phenomena into measurable or 'common' categories that can be applied to 
all of the subjects or wider and similar situations. Hence, quantitative 
research, whilst able to claim validity for wider populations and not just 
merely samples, is restricted to measuring those elements that, by 
definition and distortion, are common to all. This raises the question of 'at 
what cost' are we exchanging accuracy for generalisability”  
(Winter 2000, 58 paragraphs) 
As a way to combat some of the disadvantages of the inability to generalize the interview 
findings, it was determined that self-reported questionnaire type surveys would be 
included as well thereby triangulating and strengthening the results.  The survey used in 
this thesis was comprised of a number of quantitative type closed-end questions with a 
small number of open-ended optional qualitative questions (Billot, 2013).  For purposes of 
simplicity, the survey used in this thesis is considered largely quantitative and discussed 
as a quantitative instrument. 
4.3.2 Quantitative Research Methods Discussion 
In quantitative methods, the researcher locates an instrument to use in measuring or 
observing attitudes or behaviors of participants in a study.  Scores are collected on these 
instruments to confirm or disconfirm the theory (Creswell, 2003, p. 127).  Survey 
instruments such as questionnaires or tests can be used to measure attributes such as 
race, age, etc., or to measure opinions and attitudes through scales.  Often the scores 
are collected via survey and other numbers based instruments.  Pinsonneault and 
Kraemer (1993) provide a definition and information on research based on surveys.  They 
explain that the purpose of a survey is to produce quantitative descriptions of some 
aspects of the study population (p 6).  Survey research is a quantitative method requiring 
standardized information from and/or about the subjects being studied.   
Advantages 
Two important advantages of quantitative methods are low cost and ease of analysis.  
The use of a survey is ideal for obtaining information from large numbers of the 
population and gathering demographic data (Lewin, 2005).  Many surveys can be sent 
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inexpensively by post or electronically.  This is in contrast to the time and expense of 
training and sending interviewers to each participant.  Self-completed questionnaires 
were an inexpensive way of collecting data from a widely dispersed group of board 
directors.  Surveys are considered to require minimal investment to develop and 
administer (Glasow, 2005), specifically costing less than interviews (Pinsonneault and 
Kraemer, 1993, p 14). 
Quantitative methods are usually based on numerical values to questions.  Because of 
this, a quantitative method is likely to have an advantage in the ease of making 
observations and deciphering information.  While qualitative methods, which allow the 
respondent to elaborate on questions and may allow flexibility, closed-end survey 
questions can be answered more easily and create fewer scoring problems (Shaughness 
et al., 2006, p. 178).   
Other quantitative methods include experimental designs, where at least one 
independent variable is manipulated to see whether or not it has an impact on the 
dependent variable.  Pre-test can be conducted before the experiment begins and a post-
test after it has been completed.  These data are used to identify differences between two 
or more groups on measurements of the dependent variable (Lewin, 2005, p. 216).  
Cross-sectional design is often used in survey research and involves the collection of 
quantitative data on at least two variables at one point in time and from a number of 
cases (Lewin, p. 16.) These data are then used to look for group or entire case 
associations or relationships or in subgroups sharing characteristics such as females and 
males in this thesis (Lewin, p. 16).  
Babbie (2010) lists a number of specific strengths of using quantitative methods: 
• Allows for a broader study, involving a greater number of subjects, and enhancing 
the generalization of the results; 
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• Allows for greater objectivity and accuracy of results.  Generally, quantitative 
methods are designed to provide summaries of data that support generalizations 
about the phenomenon under study. In order to accomplish this, quantitative 
research usually involves few variables and many cases, and employs prescribed 
procedures to ensure validity and reliability; 
• Applying well-establshed standards means that the research can be replicated, 
and then analyzed and compared with similar studies; 
• You can summarize vast sources of information and make comparisons across 
categories and over time; and, 
• Personal bias can be avoided by researchers by keeping a 'distance' from 
participating subjects and employing subjects unknown to them. 
 
Disadvantages of Quantitative Methodology 
Pinsonneault and Kraemer (1993) argue that there are a number of problems that plague 
quantitative research such as survey research (1) single method designs where multiple 
methods are needed, (2) unsystematic and often inadequate sampling procedures, (3) 
low response rates, (4) weak linkages between units of analysis and respondents, and (5) 
over reliance on cross-sectional surveys where longitudinal surveys are really needed (p 
77).  In addition, they warn that surveys may be inappropriate than other methods such 
as case studies and naturalistic observation when detailed understanding of context and 
history is desired.  Another disadvantage of using quantitative methods is the difficulty in 
finding out why individuals choose to act in a certain way, which is at the core of this 
thesis.  Bell ( 1993, p. 11) argues “Surveys can provide answers to What When Where 
and How, but it is not so easy to find out why.” 
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Other disadvantages of quantitative methods have been discussed by other researchers 
(Brians, 2011; McNabb, 2008; Sharpe, 2008) These disadvantages include: 
• Quantitative data is more efficient and able to test hypotheses, but may miss 
contextual detail; 
• Uses a static and rigid approach and so employs an inflexible process of 
discovery; 
• The development of standard questions by researchers can lead to "structural 
bias" and false representation, where the data actually reflects the view of the 
researcher instead of the participating subject; 
• Results provide less detail on behavior, attitudes, and motivation; 
• Researcher may collect a much narrower and sometimes superficial dataset; 
• Results are limited as they provide numerical descriptions rather than detailed 
narrative and generally provide less elaborate accounts of human perception; 
• The research is often carried out in an unnatural, artificial environment so that a 
level of control can be applied to the exercise. This level of control might not 
normally be in place in the real world thus yielding "laboratory results" as opposed 
to "real world results"; and, 
• Preset answers will not necessarily reflect how people really feel about a subject 
and in some cases might just be the closest match to preconceived hypothesis. 
(Taken from Babbie, 2010) 
4.4 Data Collection Process 
The first step in the data collection process was to determine the best way to access 
corporate directors.  This initial concern was accessibility to a list of the names of 
corporate directors and their relevant contact information.  The first step was to contact 
 
 
145 
those organizations that could possibly provide access to director contact information and 
interaction opportunities with directors.  This researcher used internet search engines to 
identify industry groups and organizations that provided services to directors, particularly 
those organizations servicing women and non-white directors.  Through those means, 
several industry groups were identified that provide such services.  Two such 
organizations that seemed promising were the National Association of Corporate 
Directors (NACD) and the Alliance for Board Diversity (ABD).  The NACD is a US based 
nationally recognized organization with 13,000 US corporate directors in its membership.  
Its focus is on director development, director education, director resources, and director 
connections29.  The ABD is a collaboration of three organizations focused on increasing 
management diversity both in the US and abroad.  The organizations represented in the 
ABD are Catalyst (see p 134), The Executive Leadership Council, and the Hispanic 
Association on Corporate Responsibility.  These organizations’ focus is supporting and 
advancing the interests of executive women and minorities in the workplace, including 
increased diversity and fair representation on corporate boards.30 
By contacting both the ABD and NACD, this researcher was able to get a list of their 
activities and meetings that were open to the public.  The ABD conferences and meetings 
proved difficult to attend.  The timing of the ABD annual meeting did not allow for 
sufficient time to meet the data gathering deadlines, and it was held a great distance 
away from this researcher’s home.  Additionally, after contacting the organization, this 
researcher learned that opportunities to contact directors within their membership would 
be limited by their privacy policies.  The NACD proved to be a more useful for contacting 
directors because there were meetings close enough to attend and thereby meet 
directors.  The NACD has chapters throughout the US, including a chapter in the Raleigh, 
North Carolina area, which is a city within a three-hour drive of this researcher’s office.  
When speaking to the NACD representative, the representative told this researcher that it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 The information and focus of the NACD was found on their website at 
http://www.nacdonline.org/AboutUs/?navItemNumber=556 
30 The focus of the ABD was taken from the Catalyst website at http://www.catalyst.org/media/alliance-
board-diversity-fact-sheet. 
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was permissible to join and attend the meetings.  During the course of the data collection, 
this researcher joined the organization as an academic and was able to attend three 
meetings of the NACD, resulting in several director interviews. However, because of 
privacy constraints, the NACD was not able to provide a contact list or database of 
directors.  
The second option pursued in an attempt to secure contact information for directors and 
access to directors was to approach research centers that specialized in research on 
senior management or directors.  This option was pursued in hopes that one of the 
organizations would be willing to share their contact list or director database.  Contact 
was made with the Catalyst Organization in the US and its UK counterpart, the University 
of North Carolina Chapel Hill Center for Banking and Finance, and Cranfield University’s 
International Centre for Women Leaders.  None of the contacted organizations was 
willing to share director information or databases.  These contacts, however were helpful 
for learning of scholarly conferences in academic fields, which overlap with gender, race, 
and corporate governance, which provided additional insights by way of conference 
attendances and resulting exposure to other researchers.  This researcher attended two 
scholarly conferences on Director Diversity, using the opportunity to listen to other 
researchers, as well as to directors.  The information gained at the conferences allowed 
the researcher to attain a greater understanding of the research issues surrounding the 
subject of board of director diversity and governance.  Additionally, this researcher was 
made aware of issues confronting directors as they perform their duties, as well as of the 
potential impediments confronting researchers as they conduct diversity research.  One 
major impediment is that the limited number of blacks and other non-white board 
members makes the access problem even more daunting, as there are less directors 
available in this pool of directors to contact.  A second major impediment is the lack of 
ethnic and racial information collected by public access databases.  These conferences 
also gave the participants awareness of the different kinds of diversity issues being 
studied and to discuss coordinating future research with international academics with 
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similar interests. 
This researcher initially felt it would be beneficial to be able to categorize directors by 
race or ethnicity as well as gender.  A search through available databases revealed that 
no independent database existed that captured director race or ethnicity.  In consultations 
with the thesis supervisor, it was decided that a possible method for collecting racial 
attributes of directors would be to download the annual reports for US Fortune 500 
companies and UK FTSE 350 and to review the director photos.  This researcher thought 
that race could be determined by viewing the photographs and developing a database of 
the results.  Over 50 company annual reports were downloaded; however, it became 
clear that the poor quality of photographs made phenotypic identification impossible.  
Additionally, even when it was obvious that a director was not white, this researcher was 
not familiar enough with the subtle differences in appearance that may sometimes 
distinguish the race of one person of color from another.  After downloading more than 50 
company annual reports and searching each one for photographs of directors, it became 
clear that it would require a substantial amount time to download the reports and search 
for photographs.  In addition, this investment in time and effort would not result in a 
thorough assignment of director race.  Without knowing which racial group a director 
belonged to, and given the amount of time to look and evaluate photographs, the 
researcher, in consultation with the advisor, abandoned the activity. 
Through discussions with thesis supervisors, it was decided that the contact information 
and some demographic information for the UK directors was accessible in the Manifest 
Database.  Manifest Ltd is a proxy-voting agency based in the UK that collects data on 
many aspects of firms, including their board of director members, governance 
information, composition of the boards of directors, biographical director and officer 
information, executive and director compensation, and ownership structure.  There were 
no identified cost-effective means of acquiring the contact information of the US directors; 
therefore, it was decided that for the questionnaire survey portion of the study only the 
UK directors would be contacted.  The qualitative portion of the study, which would 
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consist of interviewing both UK and US directors, would provide opportunities for 
comparisons and allow for some insights based on analyzing how the US directors 
interviewed may have different perspectives from the UK directors interviewed. 
4.5 Survey Questionnaire Construction 
Literature indicates that surveys have been used to gather board director perceptions and 
opinions in other board of director related research.  For example, survey data have been 
used to gather perceptions of chief executives and chairmen on women directors (Ragins 
et al., 1998; Nielsen and Huse, 2010; Elstad and Ladegard, 2010; Catalyst/Opportunity 
Now, 2000, Catalyst, 2006).  This researcher determined that a survey could provide 
perspectives from directors and thus sought to develop the survey that could best provide 
answers to the research questions.  The survey questions were developed using theories 
from board diversity rationales.   
The literature review significantly influenced the questions included in this survey.  
Particularly important was research from Fairfax (2005) and Ramirez (2003).  Fairfax 
argues against what she sees as the cost-benefit business rationales for diversity on 
corporate boards.  Fairfax argues that many of the cost-benefit analysis are faulty.  
Ramirez argues that many of the same analysis are sound and benefit corporate 
governance. 31  These divergent viewpoints encouraged this researcher to seek input 
from directors and find out their viewpoints and perceptions of board diversity, including 
many of the rationales discussed in the Fairfax and Ramirez research.  For example 
survey questions were developed to assess if diversity benefits things such as social 
capital to the board, benefit relationships with stakeholders, or goodwill with diverse 
employees.  
In addition to the research of Fairfax (2005) and Ramirez (2003), other researchers 
Forbes and Milliken (1999), Pettigrew and McNulty (1995), and Roberts et al. (2005) also 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 A full review of Fairfax and Ramirez is available in the Chapter 3 Literature Review section 3.4 of this 
thesis. 
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triggered theories concerning board diversity and governance.  The literature was 
analyzed to identify theories on board diversity as well as governance and social capital.  
As this analysis took place, it became clear that there are numerous theories that have 
been put forth regarding board diversity and governance as well as theories on social 
capital and diversity.  Therefore, after much consideration, a series of questions were 
designed that would assist in determining why board diversity may be important for the 
governance of boards.  The first section of the survey included demographic questions 
about the director’s age, years on the board, race, education, and number of other 
directors on the board (McIntyre 1999, p. 74).  The second section of the survey was 
designed to capture director perceptions on the selection process.  The third section was 
designed to capture perceptions on diversity.  The fourth section was designed to capture 
director perceptions on employee relations matters. 
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Table 4.2: Literature Supporting Survey Questions 
Question Topic Question Links to Theory Literature 
Selection 
Process 
Do you believe that the following attributes were 
an asset, hindrance, or not relevant in terms of 
your appointment to the board: 
Race? 
Nationality? 
Age? 
Gender? 
 
 
Sealy et al. 2007.  UK based study. Women directors have 
different demographic characteristics. 
Sheridan and Milgate, 2005.  Australian study -Women 
directors partly attribute their selection to high visibility. 
Fairfax, 2006. – US study - White women, appear to be faring 
better than any other disadvantaged group with respect to 
boards Minority women only account for 3% of the total 
available board seats.  Thus, the vast majority of women board 
members are white.  In addition, women appear to be better 
represented on corporate boards than all minority directors 
combined. 
Selection 
Process 
Influence that I have in organizations comprised 
mostly of those of my: 
1.) Race 
2.) Gender 
was very important in my being appointed for this 
board. 
 Social Capital 
Resource 
Dependency 
Sheridan, 2001. Australian study.  Women who successfully 
obtain board positions have long- standing, close relationships 
with other female directors. 
Catalyst, 1995. US study- Women directors are good at 
networking with other women. 
Singh et al., 2006.  UK study Women often act as speakers at 
networking events, which women find very inspiring, and an 
opportunity to gain encouragement. 
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Table 4.2: Literature Supporting Survey Questions 
Question Topic Question Links to Theory Literature 
Selection 
Process 
Prior to your appointment to this company's 
board, how many other boards did you sit on with 
an existing director of this company? 
 
Social Capital Pfeffer and Salacik, 1978.  US study. Board linkages provide 
advice/counsel, legitimacy and communication channels. 
Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella, 2007. US study. Women’s 
appointment to boards is linked to organization size, industry 
type, firm diversification strategy and the network effects of 
linkages to other boards with female directors. 
Westphal and Milton 2000.  US study. Minority directors are 
more influential on the board if they have direct or indirect 
social network ties to majority directors through common 
memberships on other boards. 
Diversity (impact 
on 
independence) 
Questions about the number of the board, and the 
number of executive versus non-executives on 
the board. 
Agency Singh et al., 2008. UK study, Women are significantly less likely 
to be Executive Directors. 
Diversity What is your assessment of your relationship with 
the CEO of this company? 
 
Agency Westphal and Sterns, 2006.  US study.  Managers who display 
ingratiatory behaviour toward their CEO are more likely to be 
appointed to boards of other firms where their CEO is a director 
or is indirectly connected through a board interlock network.  
This behaviour can help overcome the barrier of demographic 
minority status such as gender. 
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Table 4.2: Literature Supporting Survey Questions 
Question Topic Question Links to Theory Literature 
Diversity Normally, how often do you agree (without much 
debate) with most board members on important 
company issues. 
 
Agency Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004.US study.  Women have 
different experiences of the workplace, marketplace, public 
services and community, and therefore women directors bring a 
different voice to debates and decision-making. 
Ramirez, 2003.  US study. Presents numerous explanations for 
the expected benefits of diversity in the boardroom including 
reduction in groupthink. 
Diversity The types and nature of community group 
memberships I hold seem very different as 
compared to others on the board. 
 
Social Capital 
 
Harper, 2002. UK study. Dimension of social networks may be 
understood by evaluating the number of cultural, leisure, social 
groups belonged to.   
Diversity My appointment to the board provided linkages 
between the company and new demographic 
groups. 
Social Capital 
Resource 
Dependency 
Hillman et al., 2002 US study. Examine how firms seek to 
increase their resources and survival by becoming more central 
in networks and linkages to other firms. 
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Table 4.2: Literature Supporting Survey Questions 
Question Topic Question Links to Theory Literature 
Diversity I have strong relationships with important 
company stakeholders (customers, bankers, 
special interest groups,  
Social Capital, 
Stakeholder 
Bilimoria, 2000.  Important US groups, such as union pension 
funds with many female members, voice concerns about the 
lack of diverse boards. This would increases pressure on 
Chairs and CEOs to appoint female directors. 
Brammer et al. 2007.  UK study. Close proximity to consumers 
plays a more significant role in affecting board diversity than 
does industry workforce, reflecting the influence of a firm’s 
external business environment. 
Diversity Please select how often your opinion is sought 
primarily because of the following: 
race? 
gender?  
nationality?  
age? 
Stakeholder 
 
 
Mattis, 2000. US study. CEOs fear appointing a women to the 
board due to a belief that women are unqualified and a concern 
that they will have a “women’s agenda.” 
Daily et al. 1999. US study. Women are the primary decision 
makers when it comes to major consumer purchases.  Women 
directors may suggest new ways of bringing products to market, 
based on their personal experience as female consumers. 
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Table 4.2: Literature Supporting Survey Questions 
Question Topic Question Links to Theory Literature 
Employee 
Relations 
It is absolutely essential to have a diverse board if 
the company wants to send a message that it is: 
Socially responsible. 
 
Providing equal opportunity. 
 
Complying with equal opportunity laws. 
Progressive 
Concerned about the product needs of certain 
demographic groups. 
Stakeholder Catalyst, 1995. US study. Having women on the board, 
particularly in executive positions, makes it more difficult to 
claim that there is significant sex discrimination in the firm. 
Terjesen et al., 2009. Cross country study. Indicate that some 
firms address the visible lack of diversity by appointing a single 
non-executive/outside director, rather than addressing the 
longer-term issue of an underdeveloped talent pool 
Broome et al. 2008.  US study. Adding female and minority 
partners to a law firm or female and minority members to a 
corporation’s senior management team are considered credible 
signals of the absence of a glass ceiling, 
Employee 
Relations 
The composition of this board sends a message 
to the employees regarding workplace equality. 
Stakeholder Bilimoria, 2000. US study. Female board member presence 
signals that a corporation values the success of its women. 
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Table 4.2: Literature Supporting Survey Questions 
Question Topic Question Links to Theory Literature 
Employee 
Relations 
It is important to senior female management at 
this company that there be diversity on the board. 
 
 Bilimoria, 2006. US study. Find a positive relationship between 
female corporate board members and, number of women 
officers, number of women officers holding line jobs, presence 
of a critical mass of women officers, women officers with high-
ranking or clout titles and women among the top corporate 
earners. 
Sealy, 2008.  UK study. Determines whether roe models are 
important for senior women, and investigates how organizations 
select and profile top women, including FTSE 350 non-
executive directors. 
Employee 
Relations 
This company board has pursued activities which 
make directors visible to the employees. 
Stakeholder Broome 2008.  US study. Signaling justification for board 
diversity must demonstrate that board diversity is sufficiently 
costly and visible, as compared to other potential signaling 
mechanisms available to firms, such as affirmative action 
programs, community service, advertising campaigns, and the 
like. 
Employee 
Relations 
My presence on the board is beneficial for 
employee morale. 
 Singh, 2008.  UK study. Senior women reported feeling very 
optimistic about their careers if there were women directors on 
their board, rising to 69% when there are female executive 
directors. 
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Table 4.2: Literature Supporting Survey Questions 
Question Topic Question Links to Theory Literature 
Employee 
Relations 
There are vocal external special interest groups 
that monitor board diversity levels at this 
company. 
 
Stakeholder Bilimoria, 2000.  Important US groups, such as union pension 
funds with many female members, voice concerns about the 
lack of diverse boards.  This would increases pressure on 
Chairs and CEOs to appoint female directors. 
Brown, et al. 2002.  Canadian institutional shareholders are 
interested in board diversity, as they seek to invest in firms with 
good governance. 
Employee 
Relations 
My opinion is sought on issues that would affect 
the organization's level of staff diversity? 
Stewardship Burke, 1997.  Canadian study. Women directors feel that their 
presence makes the board more sensitive to women’s issues. 
Employee 
Relations 
It is important to senior racial or ethnic minority 
managers at this company that there be diversity 
on the board. 
 Singh, 2008.  UK Senior women reported feeling very optimistic 
about their careers if there were women directors on their 
board, rising to 69% when there are female executive directors. 
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Table 4.2: Literature Supporting Survey Questions 
Question Topic Question Links to Theory Literature 
Employee 
Relations 
Had your company experienced any 
discrimination claims or lawsuits filed against it 
within 3 years prior to the appointment of a 
woman or ethnic minority to the board (to the best 
of your knowledge)? 
 Catalyst, 1995.  US study. Having women on the board, 
particularly in executive positions, makes it more difficult to 
claim that there is significant sex discrimination in the firm. 
Keys et al., 2003 US study. Analyze the market reaction to 
discrimination lawsuit filings for which publicly traded 
corporations are defendants. 
Cox and Blake, 1991. US study. A diverse workforce helps to 
dispel negative publicity that arises from discrimination lawsuits 
that otherwise would be likely to drive away potential 
employees and customers. 
Employee 
Relations 
In your opinion, how important is your 
performance on this board to your professional 
reputation in other business settings and/or 
boards? 
 
Stewardship Westphal and Sterns, 2006.  US study. Managers who display 
ingratiatory behaviour toward their CEO are more likely to be 
appointed to boards of other firms where their CEO is a director 
or is indirectly connected through a board interlock network. 
Employee 
Relations 
Does your company mention diversity or equality 
specifically in its mission statement? 
 
Stakeholder Bartkus and Glassman, 2008. US study. Inclusion of specific 
stakeholder groups in missions is likely the result of institutional 
pressures, while specifying social issues such as diversity and 
the environment in missions is related to policy decisions. 
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Additionally, during the initial development of the survey, literature was explored to 
evaluate aspects of diversity that were less studied.  Specifically, the issues of social 
network impact and social capital expectations were explored based on this review, as 
they impact the capital resources available to the board.  For example, Harper (2002) 
suggests that understanding certain information may help to identify a person’s social 
networks.  “Dimension of social networks may be understood by evaluating the number of 
cultural, leisure, social groups belonged to.  This includes frequency and intensity of 
involvement, and involvement with voluntary organizations” (Harper 2002). In this thesis, 
research questions were asked that would assess whether the director had different 
types of social networks from others on the board thereby helping the researcher to 
understand if the director brought new social capital to the board. 
This literature was consulted in conjunction with director feedback in the pilot interviews 
to design survey questions.  This researcher sought director input in the design of the 
survey.  Director input was also sought to glean whether there were additional rationale 
for diverse boards that could be included as survey questions.  For example, in April 
2009, this researcher conducted a pilot study with two interviews of US American 
directors to help develop, pilot, and finalize the survey.  These directors were interviewed 
face-to-face at a banking industry conference in Salzburg, Austria.  One of the directors 
was a US white female and the other a US African-American male.  Both directors gave 
interviews and feedback on the draft survey questions.  These interviews assisted in 
identifying areas needing clarification, eliminating some of the questions to make the 
survey less time consuming, and adding the social capital aspect to the inquiry.  Both 
directors indicated social capital related reasons that diversity would be a benefit to the 
board; so this area was added to the questionnaire. 
Based on the literature describing the potential rationales for board diversity (Fairfax, 
2005; Catalyst, 2004; Ramirez, 2003) and initial director feedback, a six-page survey 
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consisting of twenty-nine questions (three of which were comment sections) was 
developed (see appendix).  The survey was further checked for grammatical accuracy 
and designed to conform with the standard British English grammatically. 
The survey was divided into four categories of questions: demographic and board 
membership, selection criteria, diversity, and employee relations.  The first series of 
questions were related to individual and company demographics.  These demographic 
questions included32: 
1. What is your age? 
2. What is your nationality? 
3. How would you describe your racial ethnic group? 
4. What is your highest level of education obtained? 
5. How many boards other than this one do you currently serve on? 
6. How many years of professional work experience do you have? 
7. How long have you served as a board member of any company? 
8. How long have you served as a board member of this company 
Gender was not asked of the respondents33, since this researcher was attempting to limit 
the number of questions, and gender was provided in the Manifest Database. 
The second series of questions was related to selection criteria used in their own board 
appointment by their board at the time they joined the board.  The second series of 
questions also explored their perceptions about their interactions on the board.  All 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 A commonly held assumption of board selectors is that women lack adequate human capital for board 
positions (Burke, 2000), Demographic information was sought to assist in gathering information such as 
board experience, educational attainment, and amount of professional experience.  (Singh, Terjesen and 
Vinnicombe 2008) 
 
 
33 This later became a problem. The file downloaded from the Manifest Database was unreliable. 
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questions, except for the general information questions and open-ended questions, 
captured responses using a five- point Likert scale (Lewis, 2005).  A Likert scale was 
developed to scale the answers (Lewis, 2005).  The goal was to capture attitudes, and a 
Likert scale is thought to be an excellent method of capturing present attitudes of the 
respondents.  Likert (1932) indicates that in dealing with expressions of desired behavior 
rather than expressions of fact the Likert scale statement is appropriate for measuring 
present attitude (Likert, 1932).  Responses ranged from “strongly agree” to “strongly 
disagree.”   
The third series of questions was designed to answer questions about the impact of 
diversity on board governance, and the fourth category of questions asked about the 
impact of the director’s board membership on employees. 
Once the list of questions was developed based on literature, feedback from directors, 
and agreed upon with the supervisors of this project; a survey cover letter was developed 
by the researcher and approved by supervisors.  The questionnaire, accompanied by this 
cover letter on Aston University letterhead, was sent to 3066 directors.  The salutation of 
the cover letter addressed to each director by name (see Appendix 1).  The cover letter 
asked for the director’s cooperation in completing the questionnaire and returning it in a 
post-paid return envelope.  The letter contained a personalized color signature of both the 
researcher and the primary supervisor.  The cover letter explained that the survey was a 
multi-country research project studying board of director diversity.  Contact information for 
this researcher, as well as one of the thesis supervisors, was provided in the cover letter.  
This researcher consulted survey response rate literature to guide the specifics of the 
survey printing and mailing in hopes that this would improve response rates.  Greer et al. 
(2000), investigating survey response rates, found that the most important factor 
influencing survey response rate was the content (subject matter) of the study, followed 
by survey sponsorship (university versus commercial entities), and postage paid return 
envelopes.  A postage paid return envelope was provided for the director to encourage 
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completion and return.  Greer and Lohtia (1994) found that mean response rates for a 
university or academic honor society are significantly higher than those for a marketing 
research firm or an unidentified sponsor.  Therefore, the cover letter included university 
letterhead as well as the logo of the US institution, Benedict College, where this 
researcher is employed.  The survey was printed on colored paper, which has been 
shown in some studies to increase response rates (LaGarce and Kuhn 1995). 
4.6 Survey Distribution and Data Analysis!
The first step in the survey data collection process was to download database listings of 
all 4767 directors from Manifest Database of 462 of the largest UK companies.  The firms 
in the database were ranked according to their 2009 market value as reported by the 
London Stock Exchange. Once all UK directors were downloaded from the database, this 
researcher needed to determine how many of the directors would be contacted and by 
which method.  From this initial list of 4767 directors, there were 932 directors of trusts 
and private companies that were eliminated.  This left 3835 traded firm directors.  From 
this list, the researcher decided to restrict the study just to the top 350 firms as ranked by 
the London Stock Exchange or the “FTSE 350.”  There were 3066 names of directors 
representing these firms.  This researcher restricted the analysis to major FTSE 350 
companies because they were large multinationals and were subject to the rules, market 
expectations, and regulations of the corporate governance systems.  In this thesis, this 
researcher was interested in ascertaining director perceptions on diversity, what factors 
were associated with diverse directors being selected by boards of top tier of firms, and 
how these things impact governance.  Additionally, the FTSE 350 is often used in 
research to define large UK firms (McKnight and Weir, 2009, Sridhar Arcot et al., 2010). 
The 3066 names, which were based on the FTSE 350, included duplicates for those 
directors sitting on multiple boards on the list.  This researcher considered removing 
duplicates.  However, it was decided that board dynamics and specifics would be 
different for each board.  Therefore, the decision was made to retain the list including 
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duplicates, so that each director of the FTSE 350 boards would be contacted and director 
data collected with respect to each board. 
As discussed above, surveys were sent to 3066 directors in the UK post.  In the cover 
letter, the directors were given the option of either completing the survey on-line using the 
Internet based survey tool called “Survey Monkey”, or returning the survey in the postage 
paid envelope.  Fourteen of the seventy-three respondents completed the on-line version 
of the survey.  The computer IP addresses of these inputs were collected via the Survey 
Monkey system.  Fifty-nine responses were returned via the UK post to the Aston 
University Business School.  Each survey that was returned via post was entered into 
Survey Monkey as mentioned above.  Once all of the data were in the Survey Monkey 
system, the data were downloaded into an Excel spreadsheet which was then loaded into 
SPSS Statistics.  The response rate on the survey was 2.34%.  While this researcher had 
hoped for a larger response rate; given the high profile positions, and busy schedules of 
most FSTE 350 board of director members, it was a relief to have enough surveys 
returned to be able to perform an analysis.  This researcher considered whether a 
reminder or other attempt of contacting the non-responsive directors might be helpful.  
However, due to the cost of sending another correspondence via post this was not done. 
The survey questionnaire was sent by post to each board member using the company’s 
address as listed in the Manifest Database.  As stated above, some directors received 
more than one survey because they sat on boards of more than one of the corporation 
included in the mailing of the FTSE 350.  The survey and cover letter (Appendix) were 
mailed with instructions to return the survey by April 30th.  The materials were mailed to 
the corporate address listed in the Manifest Database.  The researcher generated a 
unique five-digit number which was printed and affixed to the top of the survey. 
Additionally this resulted in the same director being assigned multiple five-digit director 
numbers.  The returned surveys were reviewed for duplicate submissions.  No director 
completed multiple surveys.  Directors were invited to complete either the enclosed 
survey and return it to Aston University, to return it via a free fax number provided, or to 
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complete the survey on-line electronically using a program created in “Survey Monkey.”  
The on-line version of the survey required the five-digit director number in order for the 
respondent to access the survey, while the surveys returned in the post included the pre-
printed number on the first page.  Seventy-three surveys were returned: the fifty-nine by 
post discussed above and fourteen on-line.  No surveys were returned via fax.  Because 
of the large numbers of directors, and cost associated with postal mailing, a follow-up 
mailing was not done. 
Each survey that was returned via post was entered into the Survey Monkey, which as 
noted earlier, housed those survey’s completed online.  This was done to ensure a single 
medium where all surveys would be collected.  After all surveys were entered into Survey 
Monkey and checked for accuracy, the data were downloaded into SPSS statistics for 
analysis.  Additionally, the open-ended survey responses were analyzed, and those 
directors who on the survey had indicated their willingness to be interviewed were 
entered into a tracking sheet.  The tracking sheet included columns with the following 
information:  Unique five-digit identifier, date of meeting, or dates of attempted contact, 
contact phone number provided, email provided, name and title of director, director 
company/companies, headquarters location, and agreed meeting location.  The original 
tracking sheet is not included in the study due to confidentially concerns; however, the 
original is made available to the supervising parties of this study, and a sample of this 
document is included in the Appendix. 
The twenty-six survey questions collected a variety of demographic, quantitative, and 
qualitative information.  However, many of the questions were multi-part questions, and 
those sections asking for additional comments were not numbered.  Therefore, the actual 
questions that directors were asked to answer was actually 71.  SPSS Statistics created 
a variable for each defined question.  The result of the twenty-six questions was 71 
variables.  In addition to the 71 variables created by the SPSS database from the 26 
questions, this researcher added a gender variable for each respondent.  Performing a 
merge function between the full 3066 directors in the dataset and the dataset created 
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from the survey populated the gender variable.  To merge the gender data into the survey 
file, the respondent ID variable was used as the key since it was a unique identifier in 
both data files. 
Once the data file of the survey information was loaded into SPSS, and the gender 
variable added, the data were validated for accuracy.  The data were validated by visual 
inspection to determine if any fields were improperly input or loaded incorrectly.  This 
inspection led to the deletion of one director or SPSS “case,” which was empty except for 
the respondent ID.  The director apparently signed on to survey monkey system, input the 
respondent ID from the survey, but then elected to answer no other questions.  As this 
case was blank with the exception of the respondent ID field, the decision was made to 
eliminate this case from the dataset.  Additionally, a visual inspection was performed to 
ensure that all empty fields were assigned the ‘missing value’ sign from the SPSS 
statistics system.   
On several places in the survey, the answers allowed the director to select “other” as an 
option and then allowed an open input field for the answer.  These open input fields were 
used for the qualitative analysis (Billot et al., 2013 p. 51), but were not helpful for the 
SPSS statistics analysis.  For the SPSS statistics program, these answers for “other” 
were coded as 9999 to make sure that they were distinguishable as answers selected as 
“other”. 
Several new variables were created by recoding variables into rankings or groupings that 
might be helpful in an attempt to understand the profile of the 3066 directors.  These 
variables were recoded and given the code of “R” at the end.  Kachigan argues that when 
contending with variables which have a large number of values, little is accomplished by 
making a frequency distribution of each value (Kachigan, 1986 p. 33).  Consequently, he 
suggests that the solution is to create intervals of values of the variable in question and 
then make a frequency tally of the number of observations falling within each interval (p. 
33).  Once the variables in this thesis were recoded, these recoded variables allowed this 
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researcher to study the impact of the variables in groupings that would assist in the 
analysis. 
Open-ended Data response collection 
Open-ended responses from the surveys were reviewed in the Excel database and 
analyzed.  The demographic data were quantified and the open-ended written responses 
were identified through analytical deduction and were organized and coded according to 
the themes (Billot et al., 2013 p. 52).  The interviews guide notes were also coded and 
organized into the themes and resulting key issues.  Comparisons were made with the 
themes and key issues on the open-ended survey responses and interview data.  
In addition to the perceptions gained from the survey data, the survey responses served 
as the primary medium to secure participants for the interview portion of the study in the 
UK.  The UK directors that were interviewed were self-selected based on their positive 
response to a survey question asking that they consider being interviewed for further 
feedback. 
4.7 Interviews 
In order to gain the advantages of using qualitative and quantitative research methods, 
this researcher supplemented data from self-report questionnaires with semi-structured 
interviews for more in-depth analysis.  The benefit of this multi-study, mixed-
methodological approach to research is that in aggregate it may provide a consistent set 
of findings and knowledge thereby providing evidence which is together stronger than it 
would have been individually using a single method.  According to Jick (1979), 
triangulation allows researchers to be more confident of their results.  This is the overall 
strength of the multi-method design.  “Triangulation has vital strengths and encourages 
productive research.  It heightens qualitative methods to their deserved prominence and, 
at the same time, demonstrates that quantitative methods can and should be utilized in 
complementary fashion” (Jick p 609). 
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Interviews were performed in a semi-structured manner, thereby giving the director 
narrative space to amplify or develop her or his response.  This type of interview 
exchange is often referred to as collecting a narrative.  Holstein and Gubrium (1995) 
suggest that the goal of the interview should be to encourage the interviewee to offer 
narrative accounts.  They argue that the aim of an interviewer should be to ‘activate 
narrative production’ by ‘indicating – even suggesting – narrative positions, resources, 
orientations, and precedents”  (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995 p. 39). Narratives assist in 
communicating people’s lives and experiences.  “Narrative is the discourse form which 
can express the diachronic perspective of human actions.  It retains their temporal 
dimension by exhibiting them as occurring before, at the same time, or after other actions 
or events” (Polkinghorne, 1997, p.9).  Gause (2008) asserts the most appropriate form for 
describing human interaction and engagement is through narrative and that human 
behavior and socialization are at the basic level communicated through a series of stories 
and events.  Narratives are the natural mode in which human beings make sense of their 
lives in time.  “Perhaps the most essential ingredient of narrative accounting (or 
storytelling) is its capability to structure events in such a way that they demonstrate…a 
sense of movement of direction through time” (Gergen and Gergen, 1986, as quoted in 
Polkinghorne, 1997, p.9).  “People do not deal with the world event by event or with text 
sentence by sentence.  They frame events and sentences in larger structures” (Bruner, 
1990. p.64, as cited in Polkinghorne, 1997 p. 12).  Polkinghorne (1997) states, “A 
narrative report however displays the acceptability of a claim rather than argues for 
it…researchers speak with the voice of the storyteller…they speak in the first person as 
the teller of their own tale” (pp.15-16).  The analysis of the resulting data is the process of 
working inductively to find commonalities among the participants.  An advantage of using 
narratives is to help solve the difficulty in finding out why individuals choose to act in a 
certain way (Bell, p.11). It can be difficult to gather information on diversity perceptions 
with a survey.  One reason such difficulty exists is that subjects may not answer 
questions about race and gender in a truthful manner on a survey.  One reason is the 
concept of social desirability, especially as it relates to race and sex (Shaughnessy et al., 
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2006, p.181).  Respondents tend to answer questions in the way that they feel that it is 
appropriate to answer rather than the way they actually feel.  Surveys have a risk of such 
behavior because behavior observation and non-verbal signals, which give additional 
clues about attitudes is not possible.  Quantitative methods are assumed to be objective 
but only if participants are honest.  The advantage to narrative/interview methods is that 
the interviewer can use observation techniques to gauge the honesty of the participants 
and any obvious discomfort the participants may encounter.  However, neither 
methodology can ensure that respondents` beliefs are consistent with reality.  
Specifically, research (Kahan et al., 2007 p. 129) indicates that individuals insensitivity or 
oversensitivity is influenced by race and gender. 
Given this narrative strategy, many of the discussion questions within the interviews 
conducted can be analyzed for the potential information that answers the question asked, 
but also the selection of key issues that begins to reveal itself to the researcher from 
director narratives during the interview itself.     
4.7.1 The Interview Guide 
On the final question of the UK survey directors where asked if they would be willing to be 
interviewed in addition to the survey submission.  Those that agreed were contacted 
using their preferred method of contact.  Sixteen of the directors responded positively to 
this request.  This researcher contacted all sixteen of the directors who had responded 
positively to this request.  Of the sixteen UK directors who responded positively, ten were 
able to be interviewed. Eight of the directors were interviewed in person, and due to 
scheduling limitations on the part of the director, two were interviewed via telephone.   
Two of the six who were not interviewed declined to be interviewed, and four did not 
respond to repeated efforts to contact them by the contact information they provided on 
their survey.   
A survey was not distributed in the US, and therefore the method used in the UK study to 
secure directors could not be used in the US.  In the US, directors were recruited 
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primarily at NACD conferences, and by referrals from individuals within the business 
community.  This process was extremely difficult due to a lack of access to directors and 
time consuming.  This researcher found that there is a considerable gate keeping system 
for Fortune 500 directors.  Calls to the company secretary of the firms resulted in rare 
returned calls and no positive responses to be interviewed.  This researcher had to rely 
on professional contacts as well as the NACD conferences.  Additionally, once there was 
a successful interview contact, this researcher asked the interviewed director for any 
referrals of other directors.  This method is referred to in the literature as snowball 
sampling (Atkinson and Flint, 2004).  Using the snowball method, with NACD conference 
contacts, this researcher was able to secure 10 US interviews. 
 
Due to all survey and interviews being voluntary, the researcher could not ensure a 
cross-section of male and female, white and non-white, experienced and inexperienced 
directors.  The planned sample was to consist of 20 directors in the US and 20 directors 
in the UK.  The sample was reduced in size to 10 UK directors and 10 US directors due 
to the high degree of difficulty in securing large company board directors for research 
activities.  The final UK interviewees included eight white males and two white women.  
The final US interviewees consisted of two white men, three white women, one black 
woman, and four black men.  The experience level of the UK directors interviewed 
included two chairmen of top UK boards, five executive directors, and five non-executive 
directors.  The experience level of the US directors interviewed included three chairmen 
of top US boards.  All directors in the US were non-executive34.   
While all directors volunteered to be interviewed, this researcher acknowledges the 
difference in the nature of selection between the UK directors and the US directors.  The 
UK directors were contacted based on their positive response to the researchers survey 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 The terms executive and non-executive in the context of directors is a UK category.  In the US, the 
terminology most often used for directors employed by the company is “inside” directors, and those 
directors who are not employed by the company are referred to as “outside” directors. 
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that was sent to all FTSE 350 directors.  In contrast, three of the US directors interviewed 
were met at a NACD meeting.  Therefore these three directors, by virtue of their 
attendance at the meeting, had shown an interest in director education.  The listing of the 
directors is included as Table 4.3; however, the confidential full list of names and 
companies of the directors is contained in an appendix of the study at the Aston 
University School of Business, as well as with the researcher.  The anonymity of the 
directors has been preserved while providing the reader an understanding of the 
participants by providing a general description and positions held of the directors in Table 
4.3.  As some of the directors held multiple board positions, the individuals represented 
fifteen different public boards in the United Kingdom, and thirteen different public boards 
in the United States.  The boards that these directors sit on represent a cross section of 
industries.  The interviewees had sufficient experiences and responsibilities to speak with 
authority about their experience on boards and/or their selection to the board.  As this 
study focuses on the perceptions of directors rather than the organizations themselves, it 
did not limit interviews to one individual from a company.  Nonetheless, no single 
company was represented by more than one of its directors. 
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Table 4.3: Table of Interviewed Directors and Selected Demographics 
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Male White Chairman N 6/24/10 11583  67  UK 
  
Female White Executive Director E 7/21/10 12069  54  UK 
  
Male White Director E 7/1/10 12778  52  UK 
  
Male White Non-executive Director N 6/24/10 12806  53  UK 
  
Male White Executive Director E 6/2/10 10929  52  UK 
  
Female White Non-executive Director N 6/22/10 12018  48 UK 
  
Male White Executive Director E 6/30/10 12512  44  UK 
  
Male White 
Director & Company 
Secretary E 6/25/10 12427  60  
UK 
  
Male White Chairman N 6/29/10 12982  60  UK 
  
Male White 
Senior Non-executive 
Director N 6/28/10 10963  61  
UK 
  
Total Market Value of Firms represented 
Over $13 
billion   
Male Black Chairman N 4/22/09 25151  71  US 
  
Male White Chairman N 9/2/09 23851  69  US 
  
Female White Director N 4/21/09 24161  74  US 
  
Male Black Director N 9/9/09 29602  61  US 
  
Female White Director E 3/16/10 28772  61  US 
  
Male Black Director N 3/1/10 26082  48  US 
  
Female Black Director N 12/9/09 29290  60  US 
  
Male Black Director N 4/12/11 27242  66  US 
  
Male White Chairman E 8/1/01 22152  73  US 
  
Female White Chairman N 9/16/10 23690  68  US 
  
Total Market Value of Firms represented 
* “N” indicates a non-executive and “E” indicates an executive. 
 $356 
billion   
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An interview guide was developed to provide some structure for the interview.  The 
template of the Interview Guide was presented to the thesis advisor and approved prior to 
the interviews.  All directors were questioned using the interview guide as a starting point.  
The interview guide included questions of the directors on the method of their selection to 
the board, social ties, professional ties, and other board experiences.  The questions 
were chosen based on the diversity literature (see literature table on page 150), as well 
as general governance literature.  Governance literature discusses agency, stakeholder, 
and stewardship, as the three primary theories of governance.  As discussed previously 
in Chapter 2, no one system of governance is agreed upon as the best method for every 
company.  As such, the interview questions were designed to represent the perspectives 
of all three theories35.   
Questions in the first section of the guide were asked to gain an understanding of the 
respondents’ perception of the decision-making process that lead to their appointment to 
the board (Sealy et al., 2007; Sheridan and Milgate, 2005, Sheridan, 2001).  Additionally, 
these questions addressed the perceived value of social networks in their own selection 
to the board (Harper, 2002).  The second series of questions were selected to ascertain 
the director’s attitude about his or her qualification for the board as well as any self-
imposed pressure they felt regarding their own board performance (Elstad and Ladegard, 
2010; Westphal and Sterns, 2006).  The third section of questions was designed to elicit 
the director’s involvement and feelings about their participation on the board and board 
dynamics (Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004).  Specifically, these questions were 
designed to initiate discussion of how director diversity may impact interaction with other 
directors.  In addition, these questions were designed to assess how the director of his or 
her board feels about diversity on the board.  Lastly, a set of questions were asked to 
ascertain the director’s perception of his or her impact on the employees and executives 
in the firm (Singh, 2008).  All questions on the interview guide were asked of all directors 
regardless of gender or race, and provided a starting point for the interview. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Interview questions based on specific governance theory literature is listed in table 4.4 below. 
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Table&4.4:&Interview&Guide&Questions&and&Comments&on&Literature&
Selection Process Questions Comments 
1. How were you selected to be a board director?  What was the course of events? Several industry governance reports give guidance on the best way 
to select new directors.  These include selection of independent 
directors (Cadbury, 1992), directors from outside of the personal 
connections of incumbents, and directors who may not have former 
PLC board experience (Higgs, 2003). 
2. Do you feel that race or gender was a factor in your being appointed to the 
board? 
Sheridan and Milgate (2005) argue that high visibility women are 
more likely to be appointed to boards. 
3. Was the company specifically looking for a minority or woman director at the 
time of your selection? 
The Higgs report (2003) suggests that boards should seek to 
increase women and ethnic minority members by considering 
backgrounds other than former PLC directors.  Additionally, Ramirez 
(2003) argues many benefits of intentionally diversifying the board. 
4. Was your race or gender an added advantage to your being selected? Broom and Krawiec (2008) argue that boards intentionally select 
women and minorities to signal to the marketplace that the firm is 
providing equal opportunity. 
5. Has race or gender been a factor of consideration in the appointment of other 
female or minority members of the board? 
Broom and Krawiec (2008) and Higgs (2003), see above. 
6. If your board is diverse, were there any events preceding the board diversifying 
that helped explain a willingness to diversify (market focus change, public 
relations)? 
Higgs Report (2003) Says that the board’s composition sends 
important signals about the values of the company to its external 
stakeholders about firm equality.  Catalyst (2005) argues that having 
women on the board, in executive positions, makes it more difficult to 
claim that there is significant sex discrimination at the firm.  Cox and 
Black (1991) argue that a diverse workforce helps to dispel negative 
publicity that arises from discrimination lawsuits that otherwise would 
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drive away potential employees and customers.  A diverse board 
may serve in a similar role. 
7. Did you have connections through your primary current or past employer that 
were helpful in being selected for the board?  How important were they? 
Hilllman et al. (2007) argue that women’s appointments to boards is 
influenced by linkages to other boards with female directors. 
8. Was there a perception that your influence in clubs and civic activities would be 
important to the board? 
Hillman et al. (2002) examine how firms seek to increase their 
resources and survival by becoming more central in networks and 
linkages to other firms. 
9. Did you have connections with board members that were helpful in being 
selected for the board?  How important were they? 
The Higgs Report (2003) argues that selecting board members from 
personal contacts results in new directors that are very similar to 
incumbents.  However Pfeffer and Salacik (1978) argue that board 
linkages are helpful for advice, counsel, and communication.  
Westphal (2000) argue that minority directors are more influential on 
boards if they have social network ties to majority directors on other 
boards. 
10. Did you have connections with the CEO that were helpful in being selected for 
the board?  How important were they? 
The Cadbury Report (1992) recommended that the majority of 
directors be independent of management and free from any business 
or other relationship which could materially interfere with their 
independent judgement (Cadbury Report 1992). 
11. Was a search firm used for your appointment to the board? Faulconbridge, et al. (2009) purports that executive search firms act 
as powerful governance agents in their director selection role. 
Qualifications Questions  
1. What steps have you taken to ensure you are qualified for the board (formal 
education, director classes, etc.)? 
The Sarbanes –Oxley Act suggest that directors follow guidelines 
from the NYSE requiring continuing education and training of 
directors. (Lander 2004, p 68) 
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2. How important was your board performance in your being asked to sit on other 
boards? 
Agency theory explains that risk of director self-serving behavior is 
reduced by fear of their own human-capital devaluation when 
monitoring breaks down (Jensen and Fama 1983).  The fear of this 
devaluation acts as a self-regulating factor on performance and thus 
governance. 
3. Do you feel like you have more pressure to perform your duties as a director well 
than others may feel on the board?  Why? 
Fama and Jensen argue that directors perform their monitoring duties 
well because of market pressure to perform well (Jensen and Fama 
1983)  
Diversity’s Impact on Board Capital Questions  
1. Have you seen tangible benefits to diversity on the board? Researchers, as well as Industry reports have argued benefits to 
diversity on the board including Higgs (2003), Zelechowski and 
Bilimoria (2004), Catalyst (1995), Bilimoria (2006), and Singh (2006). 
2. What is your assessment of your relationship with the CEO? Agency Theory argues for a board that is independent of 
management influence therefore encouraging monitoring of 
executives.  Dobbins and Jung (2010) argue that firms have not 
applied principles that bolster monitoring and executive self-restraint.   
Stewardship theory argues that there is no apparent need for 
executives and the board to be independent (Donaldson and Davis, 
1991).   
3. What is your assessment of your relationship with other directors? Stewardship theory suggests that good governance includes a strong 
emphasis on board and management collaboration (Donaldson and 
Davis 1991).  The Higgs Report (2003) supports some stewardship 
behavior’s such as strong collaboration between executive and 
independent directors. 
4. How agreeable are you with other board members?  Do you normally find much The Higgs Report  (2003) says that directors should constructively 
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debate with other directors, or normally agree right away? challenge and contribute to the development of strategy.  
Additionally, it instructs non-executive directors to scrutinize the 
performance of management.  The Walker report (2009) says 
Challenging the executive needs to be embedded, a responsibility 
laid at the door of non-executive directors 
5. Has your being appointed to the board provided a link from the board to new and 
different demographic groups? 
Hillman et al. (2002) determine that firms increase resources by 
becoming more central in networks and linkages. 
6. How often is your opinion sought because of your race or gender? Daily et al. (1999) argue that women are primary household products 
decision makers and therefore women directors may suggest new 
ways of bringing products to market based on experiences as female 
consumers. 
Employee Relations Questions  
1.  What is the impact of your appointment on employees? Higgs Report (2003) Says that the board’s composition sends 
important signals about the values of the company such as a 
commitment to equal opportunities which can be of motivational. 
2.  What is the impact of your appointment on senior executives? Bilmoria (2000) argues that female board member presence signals 
that the corporation values the success of its women. 
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4.7.2 Interviews - Interview Protocol 
Each interview was conducted using a series of confidential, semi-structured questions 
and lasted of 40 to 60 minutes in length.  This researcher conducted each interview 
personally.  In conducting the study, the researcher maintained professionalism, and 
confidentiality, assured each director of anonymity, and did no harm or in any way took 
advantage of the study participants.  At the beginning of the interview, the director was 
read the confidentiality agreement and ethics guidelines and asked if he or she 
understood.  Each director verbally accepted the terms of the agreement.  The 
researcher then explained the purpose of the interview and gave a brief description of the 
research topic.  The focus was articulated to the interviewees as a chance to hear from 
the directors about their perceptions on governance, diversity, director selection process, 
and various elements of board dynamics.  These semi-structured interviews were 
conducted according to an interview guide and designed to reveal the inner-workings of 
the board and its members.  Interviews were not restricted to the Interview Guide, and 
directors were free to elaborate and offer additional information.  The intent was to gather 
a ‘richer’ set of data by proving a mix of open and closed ended questions.  All director 
answers were collected by taking written notes.  Literature recognises that tape-recorded 
interviews can be a source of angst for those who are taped because recorded data is 
undeniable (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006).  Therefore, a tape recorder was not 
used in order to create a more relaxed, informal setting and to encourage honesty in the 
director responses.  It was decided that a tape recorder would have been detrimental to a 
director discussing any sensitive topics and perhaps impacting the richness of the data 
(Opdenakker, R 2006, paragraph 10; ).  Furthermore given the sensitivity of some of the 
questions and the high profile of the interviewees, it is likely that tape recording would 
have negatively impacted director participation.  Therefore the resulting answers from 
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these interviews in chapter 7 were recorded in the researchers notes are reported as 
closely as possible to the statements made by the directors. 
During the interview, deeper understanding was sought by asking probing questions such 
as “why,” “please explain further,” and “what is your opinion on that.”  At the conclusion of 
the interview, each director was asked an open-ended question designed to provide 
additional insight into pertinent areas not discussed during the interview.  Additionally, 
they were asked to provide any additional information not covered in the interview that 
they thought might be helpful for the study or that might enhance the study of 
governance.   
Each interview was accompanied by meticulous note taking.  This allowed the researcher 
to immediately capture the full interview in a way that would assist in analysis.  The 
director’s answers were copied from the interviewer’s notes into Microsoft Word before 
any subtle elements of the interview could be forgotten.  This step assisted in making 
sure that valuable insights were not lost later due to mistakes such as not being able to 
read the handwritten notes or forgetting elements of the interview.  Once these notes 
were transcribed into Microsoft Word, they were read and reread to perform a content 
analysis (Elo and Kyngas, 200 p. 109), added to or compared to the analysis of board 
diversity, and categorized into patterns and themes.  The lists of categories were grouped 
under eventual key issues (McCain 1988, Burnard 1991).  The aim of grouping data was 
to reduce the number of categories by collapsing those that are similar or dissimilar into 
broader higher order categories (Burnard 1991, Dey 1993).  This researcher began 
cross-interview analysis by creating a meta-matrix in an Excel database, assembling data 
from each director, to verify themes and pattern clarification.  Using the variable-oriented 
analysis (Miles and Huberman, p 130), this researcher once again used the variables 
specified in the central research question: “corporate board culture,” “perspectives 
regarding diversity,” and “social capital.”  Looking across blocks of columns I was able to 
make comparisons and contrasts across categories.  A conceptual framework emerged 
that showed the representation of the common perceptions and opinions regarding the 
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themes that will be described in the key issues of the results section.  The insights that 
were provided are discussed in the results section of this thesis.  As is the expected case 
in qualitative studies, these open-ended questions were also helpful in forming future 
research questions and helping to identify gaps in existing literature. 
After each interview, the researcher constantly analyzed data gained from observations 
and interactions with the participants.  This researcher began using a form of analytic 
induction (LeCompte and Preissle, 1993), reviewing the data looking for categories and 
relationships among the categories.  After each interview this researcher documented 
and classified incidents, observations, and comments and made continual comparisons 
with perspectives from other directors.  
4.8$Summary$
This chapter has explained the methods and instruments used in this mixed-methods 
multiple study of board of director members and their opinions and perceptions of the 
how diversity impacts the board’s governance.  Research methods and procedures were 
outlined.  While there is some concern that the information may not be reliable (when 
repeated similar results may not be achieved).  The strong evidence suggesting 
differences in director perceptions discussed in the Conclusion, Section 9.1 suggests a 
robustness that may be the same if the study was repeated again with different directors.  
There is also a validity problem (Heckman, 1979).  Firstly, the study did not use a random 
sample of directors.  Secondly, the US directors were solicited at governance 
conferences, so there is selection bias.  Thirdly, there is a selectivity bias in that people 
who were more likely to discriminate were less likely to respond the request to complete 
the survey or be interviewed (p.153). 
 The next chapter presents a description of the full dataset of directors [for the UK section 
of the study] and the Manifest Database from which respondents` details were collected.  
This will include demographic information on the directors and make-up of the boards this 
thesis studies.  This chapter, along with Chapter 5 describing the full dataset, together 
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form an understanding of the complete methods used by this study.  The chapters are 
designed to be combined for a full view of the methods. 
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CHAPTER 5 – FULL DIRECTOR DATASET PROFILE 
5.1$Introduction$
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the methods used to develop the full director 
dataset used for board director analysis.  The chapter includes a description of variables 
used, and details of all of the directors in the dataset.  Demographic details are 
discussed, as to provide an understanding of the directors who were mailed a survey.  
Together, with Chapter 4, this chapter serves to explain the methodology of the thesis 
study. 
 
Figure 5.1: Process to Develop Full Director Dataset 
 
5.2$Method$for$Developing$Director$Profile$Dataset$
As described in Chapter 4 in the description of the survey data collection, the first step in 
the data collection process was to download database listings of all 4767 directors from 
Manifest’s database consisting of 462 largest UK companies.  From this initial list of 4767 
directors there were 932 directors of trusts and private companies that were eliminated 
from further study.  This left 3835 directors of traded firms.  From this list, the researcher 
decided to restrict the study just to the top 350 firms as ranked by the London Stock 
Manifest)Database)of)4767)Directors)Downloaded)into)Excel)
Excel)File)of)Directors)Sorted,)FTSE350)Identi?ied,)and)Gender)Codes)Corrected)as)needed)
Excel)?ile)uploaded)into)SPSS)Database)for)analysis)
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Exchange, or the “FTSE 350.”  There were 3066 names of directors representing these 
FTSE 350 firms.  The Manifest director information was not only used for director contact 
information, but was also used to analyze UK directors and their boards.  This researcher 
hoped that by analyzing various characteristics of the directors in the full dataset of firms 
such as their age, board tenure, position, and industry; as well as the various 
characteristics of the firms including size, industry, and gender diversity, it would be 
possible to understand any important characteristics of the full set of directors thereby 
helping to understand the resulting 72 directors who returned their surveys. 
 
The first step in this analysis was to validate the gender code of each of the 3066 
directors.  Once all of the data were download from the Manifest database into the Excel 
spreadsheet, this researcher reviewed the gender code of the directors in the following 
way.  First, the gender was reviewed by performing an Excel sort on all directors by the 
gender field.  This resulted in a list of directors by gender, with the names of those 
missing a Manifest database gender code being sorted to the bottom of the list.  There 
were 228 directors missing gender.  By doing a visual inspection of the first names of the 
directors, gender was identified for 180 of the originally missing 228 directors.  Where 
names were androgynous, an internet Google search on both the director name and firm 
name was done to determine the gender of the director.  Using this method, the gender 
was able to be determined for all 228 directors missing gender code.   
The second step was to validate the gender codes of the remaining 2778 directors to 
ensure that they were correct.  By performing a visual comparison of the gender code to 
the first names, there were 19 names of the 2778 that appeared to have been assigned 
an incorrect gender by the Manifest database.  The gender of these 19 directors was 
validated by performing a Google search on both the director name and firm name 
together.  This resulted in correcting the gender of 16 directors, and validating that the 
three names that appeared incorrect were in fact correct.  
The contents of the Excel spreadsheet were then loaded into SPSS.  This created a 
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SPSS dataset with 3066 records, each with 29 variables.  Six of these variables had no 
observations, leaving 23 variables.  In addition to these variables, this researcher created 
another 26 variables needed for either analysis, data validation, or other calculations.   
Analysis of the firms began once the data were downloaded into SPSS, existing variables 
validated, and any needed variables created.  For any numerical variables, the mean 
values and standard deviations were calculated.  The data were analyzed by Chi-square 
test in an attempt to get a profile of the firms that the surveys were mailed to.  
5.3$Variables$for$Full$Dataset$
The important downloaded variables and their descriptions are listed below: 
Table 5.1: Variables in the Dataset Analysis 
Variable Description 
Rank The company rank by market value in 2009 
Manid The ID of the company used in the Manifest system 
Gender Female or male 
Ref The five digit code assigned by this researcher to identify each director 
who would choose to later return a survey 
Name Company name 
First_name The first name of the director 
Surname The surname of the director 
Position The position of the director in the company if an executive director, or 
the position of the director on the board if a non-executive director. 
Executive Whether the director was executive or non-executive.  Executive was 
indicated by “-1” and non-executive indicated by “0” 
Firstdirdate The date the director was appointed to the board 
Date_of_birth The director’s date of birth 
Sector_def The sector or “Industrial code” of the company 
 
In addition to the variables above that were generated by SPSS software after the Excel 
spreadsheet upload, this researcher also created 23 variables that were needed in the 
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analysis, and created 3 recoded variables to capture specific ranges of information from 
the original variables.36  The relevant researcher-created variables and their descriptions 
are listed below: 
 
Table 5.2: Researcher-Created Variables in the Dataset Analysis 
Variable Name Description 
Data_inputyr The date the information was downloaded from the Manifest database.  
All cases were 17-Mar-2010. 
Age A variable created in SPSS using the SPSS date and time function. 37 
Oil_energy Variable created for oil_energy companies.  1 if oil industry, 0 
otherwise. 
Construction Variable created for construction companies.  1 if construction 
industry, 0 otherwise. 
Industrial_other Variable created for industrial companies.  1 if industrial_other, 0 
otherwise. 
Business_serv Variable created for business services companies.  1 if business 
services, 0 otherwise. 
Consumer_gd Variable created for consumer goods companies.  1 if consumer_gd, 0 
otherwise. 
Bld_man Variable created for building and manufacturing companies.  1 if 
building and manufacturing, 0 otherwise. 
Medical Variable created for medical companies.  1 if medical 0 otherwise. 
Rec_ent Variable created for recreation and entertainment companies.  1 if 
recreation and entertainment, 0 otherwise. 
Utilities Variable created for utility companies.  1 if utilities, 0 otherwise. 
Banking_fin Variable created for banking and finance companies.  1 if banking and 
finance, 0 otherwise. 
Tech Variable created for technology companies.  1 if technology, 0 
otherwise. 
RankR A variable created to rank companies into groups of similar sizes.38 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 See Kachigan, 1986 p. 33.  A full discussion of grouping variables is available in the Methods chapter 
beginning on page 133. 
37 This!function!calculates!the!number!of!time!units!between!two!dates.!!Director!age!was!calculated!with!
the!date_of_birth!variable!which!was!subtracted!from!the!Data_inputyr!variable.!!This!resulted!in!the!age!if!
the!director!when!this!data!were!collected. 
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FemaleperR A variable to recode and group percentage of female directors into six 
subsets, from 0-6.   
0 if percentage of female directors = 0 
1 if 0<percentage female <10% 
2 if 10%<percentage female <20% 
3 if 20%<percentage female <30% 
4 if 30%<percentage female <40% 
5 if 40%<percentage female 
AgeR A variable created to recode the age variable into five subsets.  These 
subsets also match the age groupings in the questionnaire answers.   
1 if 21< age < 35 
2 if 36 < age < 45 
3 if 46 < age < 55 
4 if 56 < age < 65 
5 if 66 < age 
Boardtenure A variable created in SPSS using the SPSS date and time function.  39 
 
5.4$Details$of$the$Full$Dataset$of$Directors$
As stated previously, ethnic diversity was not an aspect of diversity that this researcher 
could capture from Manifest.  Therefore it became important to focus on gender as the 
studied aspect of diversity in the firms.  Various crosstabs using gender as one of the 
variables were analyzed to seek information about how gender affected other variables.  
One of the first tasks in analyzing the firm data was to determine the percentage level of 
gender diversity of each firm in the dataset. The first step was to analyze crosstabs on 
the two variables, the firm name variable and gender variable.  This provided an output 
with the list of firms, and the number of males and the number of females.  This output 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 The!rankings!were!based!on!market!value!of!the!company.!!The!groups!were!created!with!50!companies!
in!each!group,!resulting!in!seven!groups.!!The!companies!were!assigned!a!value!of!1@7!based!on!their!size!
and!these!groupings.38 
39 This!function!calculates!the!number!of!time!units!between!two!dates.!!Director!board!tenure!was!
calculated!with!the!dateappointed!variable!which!was!subtracted!from!the!Data_inputyr!variable.!!This!
resulted!in!the!board!tenure!as!of!the!date!of!download. 
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was then used to calculate the percentage of women at each firm.  It was possible to 
assign each firm a percentage reflecting the number of women directors of the firm.  This 
variable was assigned the name femaleper.  This variable was checked for accuracy in 
two ways.  First, the list of percentages was compared to the original crosstab to make 
sure that the number of women in a particular firm was correct.  Second, using the syntax 
editor the list of percentages was checked to make sure that every firm was assigned the 
correct percentage.  The new variable created, femaleper, was used to analyze firm 
diversity and variable characteristics of the firms in the FTSE 350.   
5.4.1 Grouping director of firm characteristics for analysis 
Since gender was determined to be the aspect of diversity that this researcher could 
access and therefore could study, various crosstabs mentioned above were run in SPSS 
to gain insight into how gender might have impacted the study results.  By acquiring an 
understanding of relationship between gender and various aspects of the board, it was 
possible to assess how these relationships might influence the results of data collected 
for this thesis.  All of the following analyses and their results are based on the 3066 
directors that comprised the FTSE 350.  
Firm Rank Groupings 
As the original Rank variable was based on market size, the firms were first recoded40 
into equal size intervals for ease in understanding what aspects of market size might 
impact diversity.  FTSE rank 1 thru 50 were ranked as group 1; FTSE rank 51 thru 100 
were ranked as group 2; FTSE group 101 thru 150 were ranked as group 3; FTSE group 
151 thru 200 were ranked as group 4; FTSE group 201 thru 250 were ranked as group 5; 
FTSE group 251 thru 300 were ranked as group 6; and FTSE group 301 thru 350 were 
ranked as group 7.  
In addition to the ranking of the firms by market size, the firms were also recoded into 
ranges based on their level of gender diversity.  This ranking allowed the researcher to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 See Kachigan, 1986 p. 33.  A full discussion of grouping variables is available in the Methods chapter on 
page 133.  
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study how firms with similar levels of diversity may or may not have other similar 
characteristics.  The Femaleper variable was recoded into FemaleR.  Consistent with the 
rankings and ranges used in previous diversity literature (Alliance for Board Diversity, 
2008), firms that had no (0%) gender diversity were given a value of 0.  Firms that had 
gender diversity percentages ranging from 0.1 to10% were assigned a 1.  Firms that had 
gender diversity percentage ranging from 10.01% to 20% were assigned a 2.  Firms that 
had gender diversity percentages ranging from 20.01% to 30 % were assigned a 3.  
Firms that had gender diversity percentage ranging from 30.01% to 40% were assigned a 
4.  Firms that had gender diversity percentage over 40% were assigned a 5 (Alliance for 
Board Diversity, p. 8). 
Director age groupings 
Previously Hillman et al. (2002) and Catalyst (2006) found that there was a significant 
difference in the ages of female and male directors.  In addition to the ranking of the firms 
by size and level of gender diversity, director age was another variable that this 
researcher sought to understand whether there were relationships between age and level 
of diversity.  In this thesis analysis, Director age was calculated as of the date of survey 
completion.  After calculating the ages of the directors, the resulting ages were recoded 
into groups (Kachigan, 1986 p. 33).  This recoding allowed the researcher to study the 
age information in ranges that paralleled the age grouping on the survey questionnaire 
that the directors were mailed.  An analysis of director age, or average age of the entire 
board performed to determine if age was somehow related to gender diversity of the full 
group of firms; specifically are diverse boards in the dataset any older or younger than 
non-diverse boards in the dataset.  To accomplish this analysis, a variable was created to 
recode the age variable into five subsets.  These subsets also match the age groupings 
in the questionnaire survey mailed to all the directors.  The value of “1” was assigned for 
ages of 21-35; the value of “2” was assigned for ages of 36-45, the value of “3” was 
assigned for ages of 46-55; the value of “4” was assigned for ages of 56-65; and the 
value of “5” was assigned for ages over 65. 
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A number of studies show that industry type and percentage of female directors are 
coorelated.  For example: retail, finance, media, banking, and health care (Brammer et al, 
2007; Hillman et al, 2007; Sealy et al, 2007) were shown to have a larger percentage of 
female directors than other types of firms.  This researcher also determined that it would 
be helpful to analyze if the type of industry was somehow related to the level of board 
gender diversity.41  To accomplish this analysis, the forty-four original Industry 
Classification Benchmarks (ICB’s)42 were group into eleven industry groups (Catalyst, 
2004; Spenser 2006).  These industries were:  Oil and Energy, Construction, Industrial 
and other, Business Services, Consumer Goods, Building and Manufacturing, Medical, 
Recreation and Entertainment, Utilities, Banking and Finance, and Technology firms.  
The table above lists the variable names of each of these sectors.   
Lastly, this researcher sought to determine if there was a difference in board tenure 
between male and female directors.  Catalyst (2006) found a significant difference in 
board tenure between female and male directors.  Director board tenure was calculated 
with the date appointed variable which was subtracted from the Data_inputyr variable.  
This resulted in the board tenure as of the date of the survey. 
5.5$Gender$Diversity$
One of the first analyzes was performed in order to find the numbers and percentage of 
gender diversity for all directors in the 350 firms studied, as well as the level of diversity in 
the 350 firms.  The results indicate that there were 252 women, and 2814 men serving as 
directors on UK boards.  Women made up a total 8.2% of all board members, and men 
make up 91.78% of board members.  Additionally, there were still a large number of UK 
firms with no gender diversity on their boards.  By running the crosstab on the femaleper 
variable, this researcher was able to assess the level of diversity in UK firms.  In the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
• 41!Firm!industry!was!mentioned!as!being!related!to!level!of!firm!diversity!in!an!article!by!Jeff!
Green,!Women Lose Out on U.S. Boards as Europeans Get Quota Help,!BLOOMBERG,!June!
16,!2011,!http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011@06@16/women@!losing@out@on@u@s@
boards@as@europe@gets@help@from@quotas.html?cmpid=msnbc. 
 
42 The ICB is an industry classification system is maintained by FTSE International Limited.  More 
information on the ICB classifications are available at http://www.icbenchmark.com. 
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group of FTSE 350 firms, 44.6% of firms had no women directors. 
Table 5.3: Gender of Directors in Dataset 
Number of Directors in  
Full Dataset of Firms 
Percent 
Female 252 8.2% 
Male 2814 91.8% 
Total 3066 100.0% 
 
The following table shows the distribution of percentages of female directors as well as 
the correlation distribution.  Perhaps the most striking finding is that there are almost 45% 
of the 350 firms without any females, which is almost as many as those with females 
(55%).  There were 44.5% of firms that had no gender diversity.  Additionally 15% of firms 
had between 1% and 10% of their boards made up of females, and 31.8% of the firms 
had between 10.01% and 20% female directors.  Lastly 9.2% of firms had between 
20.01% and 50% female directors. 
  
 
 
189 
 
Table 5.4: Level of Diversity in Full Dataset of Firms 
% of women directors 
at the company 
No.  of directors 
with the gender % 
on their board43 
Percent  Cumulative % 
 
.00 1365 44.5 44.5 
6.30 16 .5 45.0 
6.70 30 1.0 46.0 
7.10 70 2.3 48.3 
7.70 78 2.5 50.8 
8.30 48 1.6 52.4 
9.10 66 2.2 54.6 
10.00 150 4.9 59.5 
11.10 225 7.3 66.8 
11.80 17 .6 67.4 
12.50 240 7.8 75.2 
13.30 15 .5 75.7 
14.30 175 5.7 81.4 
15.40 26 .8 82.2 
16.70 102 3.3 85.6 
17.60 17 .6 86.1 
18.20 44 1.4 87.5 
20.00 100 3.3 90.8 
21.40 28 .9 91.7 
22.20 45 1.5 93.2 
25.00 108 3.5 96.7 
27.30 22 .7 97.4 
30.00 30 1.0 98.4 
33.30 27 .9 99.3 
42.90 14 .5 99.7 
50.00 8 .3 100.0 
Total 3066 100.0  
 
5.6$Positions$Held$by$the$Directors$
A crosstab was run on gender and board position to observe the types of positions that 
UK women directors hold on their boards relative to their male colleagues.  The position 
designation was taken from the position field in the Manifest database and was the 
position of the director in the company if an executive director, or the position of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Measure the % of directors who encounter this level of diversity at their firms.  This information is 
intended to assist the reader in understanding the level of diversity the directors in the population are 
exposed to.  For example, while women make up over 8% of directors, there remains over 44% of directors 
with no diversity on their boards.   
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director on the board if a non-executive director.  This field is a company input field, and 
the company is free to write their own position name; therefore the position names varied 
significantly by firm.  There were a total of 46 unique positions listed within the field, 
however it was evident that many of these positions reflect the same position with slightly 
different versions of the name.  For example, Chairman was sometimes listed as Board 
Chair.  To assist in analyzing the types of positions held by directors, these 46 position 
titles were analyzed and collapsed by this researcher into similar categories resulting in 9 
positions.  They were Non-executive Director and Senior Non-Executive Director, 
Chairman, Director, CEO, Chairman and CEO, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Financial 
Officer, Finance Director, and Other Executive Directors.  
The results indicated that 4 women, or 1.1% of Chairman were women.  In comparison, 
women made up 8.2% of the directors.  In contrast, men made up 98.8% of Chairman 
while making up 91.8% of the directors.  The Cadbury Code, as well as other UK 
governance reports44, discourages the appointment of joint CEO and Chairman roles.  
The results of the database analysis indicate that 12 men have joint Chairman/CEO’s 
roles, and no women directors held the joint position of Chairman and CEO. 
  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 For a full discussion of these codes, please see page 31 in the Literature Review in this thesis study. 
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Table 5.5: Distribution of Board Position by Gender 
!   
  Women Percentages 
% of 
Chairmen
* 
Men % 
% of 
Chairman
* 
Non-executive or senior 
non-executive director 210 83%  1397 50% 
!Chairman 4 2% 1.14% 334 12% 98.857%!
Director 16 6%   365 13%   
Non-Exec roles 230 91%   2096 74%   
Chief Executive Officer 10 4%   315 11%   
Chairman and CEO 0 0%   12 0%   
Chief Operating Officer 2 1%   41 1%   
Chief Financial Officer 0     8 0%   
Finance Director 9 4%   301 11%   
Other Executive 
Directors 1 0%   41 1%   
Executive roles 22 9%   718 26%   
Total Positions 252 100%   2814 100%   
Total!Director!Roles! !3066!
 
As the table above shows, a higher percentage of women (91%) than men (74%) are 
non-executive directors, thereby supporting literature (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; 
Singh et al., 2008) which indicated that women are more likely to fulfill non-executive 
board roles rather than executive board roles.  
5.6.2 Director Age 
A crosstab was run on gender and age ranges to observe whether there was a difference 
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in age ranges between the men and women directors.  The results indicated that women 
directors in the dataset are younger.  The average age of women directors was 54.6, 
versus an average age of men directors of 57.4.  Additionally the Chi-square 2-tailed t-
test indicates that the difference in age between men and women directors is statistically 
significant at the 5% level.  This result supports literature by Catalyst (2006) indicating 
that women directors tend to be significantly younger than their male peers, with an 
average age of 53.8, compared to 56.2 for male directors (p 14). 
Table 5.6: Director Age By Gender!
Gender 
N Mean 
Age 
Std. 
Deviation 
 
Female 232 54.58 6.584 
Male 2654 57.43 8.236 
 
5.6.3 Board Tenure 
The dataset was also analyzed to determine if there was a difference in board tenure 
between the women and men directors.  Catalyst (2006) found a significant difference in 
board tenure between female and male directors.  The results of this thesis supported the 
Catalyst results, as the analysis indicated that women had a mean tenure of 3.66 years 
on their boards, while the men had a mean tenure of 4.80 years of experience.  A 
Difference of Means t-test found that males and females have significantly different 
numbers of years of board experience.  Males have more experience than females.  
Similarly, Catalyst found that UK FTSE 100 women directors had shorter tenure 3.2 years 
for women and 4.8 years for men (Catalyst 2006, p.14).  
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Table 5.7: Board Tenure by Gender and T-Test 
Gender 
Number Mean years of 
Board Tenure 
 
Women 237 3.66 
Men 2701 4.80 
 
Board&Tenure&and&
Gender&
!
Means!t@test!!
T! Df! Sig.!(2@tailed)!Mean!
Difference!
Std.!Error!
Difference!
95%!Confidence!
Interval!of!the!
Difference!
Lower! Upper!
Board!
Tenure!
Equal!
variances!
assumed!
@3.819! 2936! .000! @1.135! .297! @1.717! @.552!
Equal!
variances!
not!
assumed!
@6.467! 410.931! .000! @1.135! .175! @1.480! @.790!
 
5.5.4 Firm Size and Gender Diversity 
Another analysis was performed in order to find whether firm size was related to diversity.  
Catalyst (2006) indicated that as firm size increases diversity increases.  Additionally, the 
Research Institute of Credit Suisse indicated that companies with three or more women 
on the board have a market capitalization three times greater than that of companies with 
no women board members (Credit Suisse p10 45).  The Chi-square t-test indicated that 
there was a statistically significant difference at the 5% level between firm size and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 This Thesis includes a number of references to the Credit Suisse study.  It is noted for this and other 
references to Credit Suisse, that while the study provides an extensive review of thirteen existing peer 
reviewed journal articles including; Goldin and Rouse 1997, Bohnet, van Geen and Bazerman 2012, Adams 
and Ferreira 2009, Beaman 2009; it is not peer reviewed academic journal research. 
 
 
194 
percentage of women on the board thereby providing support for the Catalyst and Credit 
Suisse studies.  Additionally, by running a crosstab on the femaleper variable, and market 
size using the market range variable (RankR), this researcher was able to determine if 
firm size seemed to influence gender diversity.  The results indicated that in 5 out of 7 
categories, the higher the market capitalization, the higher percentage of women 
directors at those firms.  Range 1, comprised of the FTSE 50, averaged 12.4% women on 
their boards compared with Range 2 (FTSE 51-100) having 10.3% women directors, 
Range 3 (FTSE 101-150) 7.3% of women directors, and Range 4 (FTSE 151-200) 5.1% 
of women directors.  However in Range 5 and range 6, the percentage does not 
decrease.  Range 5 (FTSE 201-250) 8.5% women directors, Range 6 (FTSE 251-300) 
7.5% women directors, and Range 7 (FTSE 301-350) 3.6% women directors.  These 
results of a crosstab run on gender and market size of the firm (the gender variable and 
RankR variable) indicated that generally speaking, as firms in the database decrease in 
size, the percentage of women directors on their board decreased.  
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Table 5.8: Women Directors and Firm Size 
 Total Percentage 
of women 
directors 
Number of 
women 
directors 
Percentage 
of men 
directors 
Number 
of men 
directors 
Percentage 
of women 
in range 
FTSE 50 / 
Range 1  
587 12.4% 73 87.6% 514 28.9% 
FTSE 51-100 
/ Range 2  
484 10.3% 50 89.7 434 19.8% 
FTSE 101-
150 / Range 3 
450 7.3% 33 92.7% 417 13.1% 
FTSE 151-
200/Range 4 
408 5.1% 21 94.9% 387 8.3% 
FTSE 201-
251 / Range 5 
386 8.5% 33 91.5% 353 13.1% 
FTSE 251-
300 / Range 6 
387 7.5% 29 92.5% 358 11.5% 
FTSE 301-
350/Range 7 
364 3.6% 13 96.4% 351 5.2% 
 
Table 5.9: Chi-Square Tests – Firm Size and Board Diversity 
 Value Df Asymp. Sig. (2-
sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 33.019a 6 .000 
 
 
5.6.5 Board Size 
A consistent finding is that the larger the board, the greater the number of female 
directors (Sealy et al, 2007; Brammer et al, 2007; Singh, 2008).  Another analysis was 
done in order to find the whether board size was related to diversity.  Catalyst (2006) 
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indicated that as board size increases, diversity increases.  This thesis research also 
found a correlation of board size and the percentage of women directors.  Board size and 
women on the board were found to be statistically significant at the 5% level for a Chi-
square 2-tailed t-test.   
5.6.6 Director Exposure to Diversity 
The dataset was analyzed to access the degree to which directors are members of 
boards that are diverse.  This is a slightly different issue from determining the number of 
women who serve on boards.  By determining the degree to which directors are members 
of diverse boards, the researcher was able to get a better idea of the number of directors 
in the dataset who do not serve on boards with women, or with few women.  For 
example, while women make up a total of 8.2% of all directors, there are still 44.5% of 
directors who serve on boards without any women.  The number of directors who do not 
sit on diverse boards could have negatively affected the number of respondents to the 
survey, as well as how the directors answered the survey.  In addition, 14.9% of directors 
serve on boards where women make up less than 10% of the members.  Consequently, 
59.4% of directors serve on boards where women make up less than 10% of the 
members.  This was an important insight for this research, as it provided data that 
suggested that many of the directors who were being sent the survey would have limited 
experience with diversity on their boards.  In addition, those directors who did serve on 
diverse boards; do not have experience on a board where women make up a significant 
percentage of directors.  There were 31.3% of directors who served on boards with 
between 10%-19.9% of women on their boards, 7.6% of directors who served on boards 
with between 20%-29.99% of women on their boards, and .9% of directors who served on 
boards with between 30%-39.99%.  Lastly, although several European Union Countries 
have adopted a diversity goal of 40% women directors, only 0.7% of UK directors served 
on boards with 40% or more women directors. 
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Table 5.10: Director Exposure to Diversity 
 Percentage of Directors 
who serve on these 
types of boards 
Number of Directors 
who serve on these 
types of boards 
No women on the board 44.5% 1365 
0 < % women on board≤10% 14.9% 458 
10%< % women on board≤20% 31.3% 961 
20%< % women on board ≤ 30% 7.6% 233 
30%< % women on board≤40% 0.9% 27 
40%< % women on board 0.7% 22 
 
The lack of firms with boards that are comprised of 40% or more women is of concern.  
There have been recent actions in European Countries that have instituted quotas for 
women directors.  The Norway requirement of 40% women directors is discussed in the 
Literature Review of this thesis.  Additionally, more recently, the European Union 
Commission proposed a European Union law which aims to attain a 40% objective of 
women in non-executive board member positions in large publicly listed companies by 
2020.  Norway, Spain and France, have introduced mandatory quotas (Credit Suisse 
2012 p 25) for women directors in addition to the European Commission’s proposal for a 
40% objective.  The low numbers of UK women directors, especially the lack of boards 
with women making up over 40% of the board is of greater concern given the direction of 
the rest of the European Union; however, UK MP’s overall are not supportive of the 
measure46. 
5.6.7 Industry 
An analysis of the number of women directors as compared to males for each firm 
industry was performed on the database to determine if board diversity might be 
influenced by the industry of the firm.  Research by the Research Institute of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 Reported by the BBC on 12 March 2013 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21755429 
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CreditSuisse, of MSCI ACWI firms,47 reported that industries whose products or services 
are closer to final consumer demand (such as healthcare and financials) had a higher 
proportion of women on the board.  In contrast heavy industry and technology (IT) had a 
much lower proportion of women directors.  More than 50% of the IT and Materials 
companies in their sample have no women on the board (p 9).  The database used for 
this thesis had similar attributes.  The boards with the largest number of women, which 
was three, were Astra Zeneca (pharmaceuticals), AVIVA plc (insurance), British Airways 
(airlines), British American Tobacco (tobacco), Diageo plc (alcoholic beverages), ITV plc 
(television and media), HSBC Holdings plc (banking and finance), J D Wetherspoon plc 
(Pub chain), J Sainsbury PLC (supermarkets), MITIE Group plc (outsourcing), Pearson 
PLC (publishing and education), Prudential plc (Insurance), Quintain Estates and 
Development plc (property and development), Southern Cross Healthcare Group plc 
(health and social services), and Unilever plc (consumer goods).   
An industry analysis was performed on the firms in the dataset for this thesis research.  
The industry with the largest percentage of women directors was consumer goods at 
12.6%, followed by building firms at 12.1%, recreation and entertainment firms of 11.9% 
women directors, and medical of approximately 11.3% women directors.  Utilities firms 
had 11.2% women directors, and construction had 9.1%.  Banking and finance firms had 
7.6% women directors, and business services had 6.6% women directors.  Similar to the 
Credit Suisse study technology firms, industrial firms, and other firms further from direct 
consumer demand had lower percentages of women director.  Technical firms had 5.2% 
women, oil and energy firms had 4.7% women directors, and industrial firms had 2.4% 
women directors.  The Chi-square t-test revealed that several of the industries analyzed 
had differences between the percentages of female and male directors that were 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  These industries included Oils and Energy, and 
Industrial Other which both had statistically significant lower rates of women directors, as 
well as Consumer Goods, and Recreation and Entertainment which both had statistically 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 MSCI ACWI IMI covers over 9,000 securities across large, mid and small cap size segments and across 
sector segments in 46 Developed and Emerging Markets. 
 
 
199 
significant higher rates of women directors. 
Table 5.11: Women Directors by Industry 
Industry& Number!
of!
Females!
Total!Number!of!
Directors!in!
Industry!
Percentage!of!
Industry!Female!
Directors!
Significance!
Level!
Recreation!and!
Entertainment!
49! 363! 11.9%! .004!
Consumer!Goods! 51! 353! 12.6%! .001!
Oil!and!Energy! 19! 389! 4.7%! .002!
Industrial! 6!! 243! 2.4%! .000!
 
5.7$Summary$
This chapter has provided a summary of the total population of directors that were sent a 
survey for this thesis.  The profile of the directors provides a view of selected 
characteristics of the full dataset, thereby providing further data on the types of directors 
in the total population of survey recipients, and the types of boards that these directors 
serve on.  This knowledge is important as a framework for viewing the results of the 
thesis survey and interviews, as it provides an overview of diversity as it relates to some 
UK board demographics such as gender and age, position of directors by gender, 
industry, firm size, and board tenure.  For example, the results of this analysis indicate 
that almost half of the 350 firm directors were on boards with no female board members.  
This result suggest that many of the directors in the population, and therefore amongst 
the respondents, may have little exposure to diversity in the boardroom.  Additionally, 
less than 2% of FTSE 350 firms had 30% or more women directors.  Given the small 
number of firms with more than 30% women, it is plausible that most of the boards of the 
respondents do not have a critical mass48 of female directors on their boards.  This may 
have resulted in boards where the female members made no significant impact on the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Rand and Light (2004 p. 318), and Fanto et al. (p 929) argue that minorities in a group feel more confident 
expressing meaningful views when there is a ‘critical mass’ or other minority members present that may 
support their viewpoints. 
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board, and thus the directors saw no benefit to diversity.  Lastly, only 1% of female 
directors in this group held the title of Chairman.  This would suggest that the directors in 
the population, and thus the respondents, were on boards where women were not in the 
top leadership role.  This could have also influenced the ability of the women directors to 
substantially influence board dynamics. 
Women who were directors were more likely than male directors to serve as non-
executive directors, with 91% of women versus 74% of men directors serving as non-
executives; however the results were not significant at the .05 level.  Additionally, no 
statistical significance was found between the number of non-executive directors on 
boards and the level of board diversity. 
There was a significant difference in director age, with an average age of female directors 
of 54.6 versus and average age of male directors of 57.4.  Additionally female board 
members had less board experience.  The average numbers of years on the board for 
women was 3.66 years, versus men at 4.80 years of experience. 
Firm size appears to have affected the level of diversity.  Generally, as firms in the 
database increased in market size, the percentage of women directors on the boards 
increased, with almost 50% of all women directors sitting on the top 100 firms of the 
FTSE 350.  Additionally, board size appears to have influenced diversity, as the 
correlation between board size and the percentage of women directors shows a positive 
statistically significant correlation.  Industry appears to affect board diversity.  Women are 
more likely to serve on boards in Consumer Goods and Recreation and Entertainment, 
and less likely to serve on boards in Oil and Energy and Industrial industries. 
!  
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CHAPTER 6 –RESULTS OF SURVEY RESPONSES 
6.0$Introduction$
The previous chapter provided a detailed view of the demographic attributes of all 
directors that were mailed the survey.  This chapter will describe the responses of the 
thesis survey.  First, the demographic section will provide a detailed view of the 
demographic attributes of the responding directors such as gender, race, age, nationality, 
education, and years of experience.  Second, it will provide an analysis of the survey 
responses, and will provide a brief statement of the findings.  Lastly, the third section will 
provide a detailed discussion of the findings and links to existing literature.  
The directors were given the option of returning the survey via post, fax, or completing it 
online.  Of the 3066 surveys mailed to the directors, seventy-three surveys were returned.  
Fifty-nine surveys were returned in the post and fourteen were completed on-line.  One of 
the on-line surveys was essentially blank, so it was eliminated from the analysis.  No 
surveys were returned via fax. A follow-up mailing was not done. 
The survey was organized into four sections.  The results are organized and presented 
based upon these four sections of the survey, and the resulting six “Key Issues”. 
• 6.1 Demographic Results – Survey Section 1: “About Me”  
• 6.2 Key Issue 1:  Director Perceptions of Diversity in the Selection Process: How 
and Why are Board Members Selected? - Survey Section 2: “Selection 
Considerations” 
• 6.3 Key Issue 2:  Director Perception of Benefits of Diversity to Firm Governance 
– Survey Section 3: “Diversity” 
• 6.4 Key Issue 3:  Director Perception of Social Capital -  – Continued Survey 
Section 3: “Diversity” 
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• 6.5 Key Issues and Themes of Director Perception of Diversity, Employee 
Relations, and Other Issues – Survey Section 4: “Board Diversity and Employee 
Relations”  
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Table 6.1: Summary of Survey Key Findings 
Section 
Number 
Key 
Issue 
Finding Statistical Result 
6.1 N/A Women directors are younger than their male counterparts. Director age and Director gender are strongly correlated at the 
two-tailed 0.05 level. 
6.2 1 Most directors did not believe that their selection to the board was 
impacted by demographic characteristics such as gender, or race. 
Varied by characteristic 
6.2 1 Nationality was one demographic factor where some directors 
believed there was an impact to selection. 
23% of British Directors believed that their nationality was an 
asset.  
25% of non-British perceived that their nationality was a 
hindrance. 
6.2 1 Some younger directors were more likely to believe that age was 
an asset to their selection. 
42% of directors between the ages 36-55 felt that their age 
was an asset to selection. 
6.3  Directors did not believe that demographic factors such as gender 
and race had an impact on board governance. 
Varied by characteristic 
6.4  Directors disagreed that personal connections with other board 
members were important in their being appointed to the board. 
Over 65% of men and 66% of women either disagreed or 
strongly disagreed 
6.4  The majority of directors perceived that consulting firms were 
important to their appointment.  
52% of males and 67% of females agreed that a consulting 
firm was important to their appointment 
6.3 2 Male directors perceived themselves as having better 
relationships with the CEO than did female directors. 
83% of male directors reported a very good or good 
relationship with their CEO.  
42% of female directors reported having a very good or good 
relationship with their CEO. 
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Results indicated that at the time of the survey, a large number of UK boards had little or 
no diversity.  Thirty boards or 41.7% of the boards represented by responding directors 
had no female directors.   
Overall, directors do not believe demographic attributes such as gender, race, age, or 
nationality were a factor in their own selection for the Board.  No racially diverse directors 
believed that their race was an attribute or hindrance to their board selection; however, a 
small number of Non-British directors believed that their nationality was a hindrance to 
their selection, and a small number of British directors felt that their nationality was an 
asset.  Some younger directors felt their age was an attribute to their selection, and some 
women felt that their gender was an attribute to their selection.  Additionally, the 
demographic data gathered from the survey indicated that women directors are younger 
than their male counterparts. 
Male directors appear to have better relationships with the CEO than do female directors.  
Eighty-three percent of male directors reported good or very good relationships with the 
CEO versus 42% of women.  These results may indicate that female directors do not 
form strong relationships with the company CEO to the extent that male directors form 
them.  
Results also indicate that male directors do not perceive that the diversity of the board is 
essential to signaling that the board is providing equal opportunity, is progressive, and is 
concerned about the needs of certain demographic groups.  Female directors were more 
likely to agree or strongly agree that board diversity provides a signal to stakeholders 
about board values. 
Where possible, results that lend support to existing literature have been mentioned 
within the section.  There has been no attempt to separate the literature based on the 
country of researcher or subjects.  This was not attempted, as governance literature from 
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one country is commonly used to support research outcomes based in another country 
(Terjesen et al., 2009; Singh, 2008; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).  Additionally, the survey 
research was performed on FTSE 350 directors49.  These directors manage firms which 
are often multinational in nature as to customers, employees, and shareholders.  
Because of this international focus of these firms, it would seem appropriate to compare 
results to literature from countries other than the UK.  More research is necessary to 
determine whether governance literature can be used successfully to support research 
across multiple countries. 
6.1. Demographic Results – Survey Section 1: “About Me”  
6.1.1 Gender Diversity of Directors and Survey Respondents 
Results of the survey analysis indicated that the gender of the respondents is similar to 
the gender composition of the UK board directors in total.  The percentage of women 
directors who completed the survey was 11.11% of the total.  As of 2008 the percentage 
of women directors in the UK was 11.8% (Sealy, Vinnicombe & Singh, 2008).  In 
comparison, as discussed above in the analysis of all FTSE 350 firms, women made up a 
total 8.2%.  The table below presents the number of women respondents completing the 
survey. 
Table 6.2: Gender of Survey Respondents 
Number Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
Male 64 88.9 88.9 
Female 8 11.1 100.0 
Total 72 100.0  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 FTSE 350 directors were sent surveys and interviewed.  The Fortune 500 US directors were only 
interviewed. 
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By performing an analysis of the boards that the responding directors sit on, it was 
determined that the diversity of those boards was very similar to the diversity of the 
boards in the full dataset of firms.  Of those directors responding to the survey, 30 
directors or 41.7% of the boards represented had no female directors.  In comparison, in 
the group of FTSE 350 firms, 44.6% of firms had no women directors.  
Table 6.3: Firms by Percentage of Female Directors 
Firm percentage Number of firms Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
= .00 30 41.7 41.7% 
0< % ≤ 10 13 18.1 59.7% 
10< % ≤ 20 26 36.1 95.8% 
20< % ≤30% 3 4.2 100.0% 
Total 72 100.0  
 
6.1.2. Age of Directors 
The majority of respondents, or 80% were between the ages of 46 and 65.  Seven 
directors (10%) were between the ages of 36-45, and seven directors (10%) were over 65 
years old.  Generally the age range of the directors seems consistent with the age range 
expected for professionals who have worked long enough to attain the position of director 
at a FTSE 350 company.  A 2009 joint survey conducted by RTF Navigator50 indicated 
that the average age for FTSE 350 directors was 58.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 RTF Navigator conducted an analysis of corporate pay for the Daily Telegraph, The Sunday Telegraph, 
and telegraph.co.uk which included information on director age. 
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Table 6.4: Respondent Age by Gender 
 Gender Total Percentage 
Male Female 
 
36-45 5 2 7 10.0% 
46-55 19 4 23 33.0% 
56-65 32 1 33 47.0% 
65+ 7 0 7 10.0% 
Total 63 7 70 100.0% 
 
Similar to what was found in the analysis of the full data set, women directors are 
younger than their male counterparts.  This age difference between women and male 
directors is statistically significant at the two-tailed 0.05 level.  Women directors tend to 
be statistically significantly younger than their male peers, with an average age of 53.8, 
compared to 56.2 for male directors.  This supports findings by Catalyst that female 
directors tend to be younger than male directors (Catalyst, 2006 p 14).  Arguments have 
been made that the lack of boardroom diversity can be attributed to the lack of women “in 
the management pipeline”, and that over time this would diminish.  This finding supports 
this assumption, as it shows women directors are younger, thereby having less time in 
the management pipeline than their male counterparts.  Figure 6.1 below presents the 
age distribution of the 70 respondents who provided their age. 
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Table 6.5: Director Age and Director Gender 
 Gender Age 
Gender 
 1 -.296* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .013 
N 72 70 
Age 
 -.296* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .013  
N 70 70 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
6.1.3. Nationality Diversity 
Diversity in nationality was not analyzed in the full dataset, as this was not collected in the 
Manifest database.  However, these data were collected from the survey respondents.  
The vast majority (88.57%) of survey respondents listed British as their nationality.  Of 
those not listing British as their nationality were two South Africans, and one each of the 
following nationalities: Austrian, Belgian, English (director did not select a nationality of 
British, but instead wrote in ‘English’ in the open comments), New Zealand, Spanish, and 
Swedish.  As discussed previously in the study, the lack of diversity in the respondents 
results in findings that are primarily the opinion and perceptions of British directors.  All 
responding women directors were British.  Table 6.6 details director nationality by gender. 
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6.1.4. Racial Ethnic Group of Directors 
As was the case with nationality, the race of the directors in the full database of 3066 
directors was not available; however, race was asked in the survey.  The racial 
homogenity of the respondents mirrored the lack of diversity in UK boards, as 91.4 
percent of respondents identified themselves as White British.   All women survey 
respondents listed White British as their racial ethnic group.  Table 6.7 below details the 
racial profile of the respondents. 
Table 6.6 Director Nationality by Gender 
 Nationality Male Female Total Directors responding 
 British 56 8 64 
 Austrian 1 0 1 
 Belgian 1 0 1 
 New Zealand 1 0 1 
 South African 2 0 2 
 Spanish 1 0 1 
 Swedish 1 0 1 
Total  63 8 71 
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Table 6.7 Diversity By Racial Ethnic Group and Gender  Total 
Male Female 
Racial Ethnic Group 
White British 57 7 64 
White Irish 1 0 1 
White and Black African* 2 0 2 
White Asian** 1 0 1 
Other 2 0 2 
Total 63 7 70 
*Mixed Race of White and Black African  ** Mixed Race of White and Asian 
6.1.5. Director Level of Education 
Almost all respondents had at least a Bachelors Degree, while almost half had a Masters 
Degree or higher.  Singh et al. (2008) study multiple human capital dimensions of new 
directors of FTSE 100 firms in the UK, and find that women are more likely to have MBA 
degrees.  This was not the case for this respondents of this survey.  Table 6.8 details the 
education of the directors. 
 Table 6.8 Highest Level of Education by Gender  Total 
Male % Female % 
 
A levels 4 6% 0 0 4 
Bachelors 28 45% 4 57% 32 
Masters 26 42% 3 43% 29 
Doctorate 4 6% 0 0 4 
Total 62  7  69 
 
6.1.6 Director Years of Professional Work Experience 
The respondents were highly experienced with over 95% of the males having over 20+ 
years of professional work experience, and all directors having over fifteen years of 
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professional work experience.  Women in the survey had slightly less work experience 
than men with 85% having 20+ years of professional work experience.  However, women 
respondents were significantly younger than men therefore this accounts for their less 
years of experience.  To determine whether women’s younger age accounted for their 
less years of experience, the analysis was completed after standardizing the experience 
by the age.  This analysis confirmed that there was no statistically significant difference in 
experience once standardized per unit of age.  There was no statistically significant 
correlation between gender and years of work experience at the.05 significance level. 
6.1.7. Director Years of Professional Board Experience 
There were a variety of experience levels related to board experience, with over 50% of 
all respondents indicating over fifteen years of board experience.  Respondents’ 
experience levels were fairly equally distributed, indicating their wide range of experience.  
The respondents were asked “How long have you served as a board member of ANY 
company (total years of board experience).  This length of time was used as a proxy for 
years of board experience.  There was no statistically significant difference in board 
experience between men and women at the .05 significance level. 
Table 6.9: Gender and Experience 
 Gender Years of Board Experience 
Gender 
 1 -.227 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .058 
N 71 70 
Total years of Board 
Experience. 
 -.227 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .058  
N 70 70 
 
!
6.2!Key!Issue!1:!!Director!Perceptions!of!Diversity!in!the!Selection!Process:!How!and!
Why!are!Board!Members!Selected?!E!Survey!Section!2:!“Selection!Considerations”!
 
Questions were asked to reveal the perspectives and opinions of directors towards 
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diversity and their selection for the board.  Questions were asked to determine whether 
directors felt that there was any demographic characteristic that made an impact on their 
appointment to the board.  The demographic characteristics that the directors were asked 
about were gender, race, nationality, and age.  Literature (Portes, 1998) suggests that 
when a board selects a woman or minority director, it may be expecting to derive new 
types of social capital and experience increased board benefits.  Overall, most directors 
did not believe that their selection to the board was impacted by demographic 
characteristics.  Of all demographic characteristics, only age and having a nationality 
other than British were perceived by some directors to have hindered their board 
selection.  Additionally, younger directors were more likely to believe that their age was 
an attribute to selection, one of women felt that her gender was an attribute to their 
selection, and 25% of British directors felt that their nationality was an attribute. 
6.2.1.1 Key Issue 1:  Director Perceptions of Gender in the Selection Process 
One of the demographic characteristics studied was gender.  Overall, directors did not 
believe that gender contributed in any way to their board selection.  When asked whether 
gender was an asset, hindrance, or not relevant; the majority of directors responded that 
their gender was not relevant in their selection to the board.  Males did not believe that 
gender was relevant to their board selection.  Ninety percent of male respondents 
believed that gender was not relevant to their board selection.  No female directors 
believed that their gender was a hindrance, and specifically 1 of the 6 female directors 
who responded to this question perceived that her gender was an asset to being 
appointed to the board. 
6.2.1.2 Key Issue 1:  Director Perceptions of Race in the Selection Process 
Another of the demographic characteristics studied was race.  Overall, directors did not 
believe that race contributed in any way to their board selection.  When asked whether 
race was an asset, hindrance, or not relevant; almost all directors responded that their 
race was not relevant in their selection to the board.  For those directors who identified 
themselves as racially diverse, none of those directors responded that race was relevant 
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as an asset or hindrance in their selection to the board.   
Ninety-five percent of male respondents believed that race was not relevant to their board 
selection.  None of the women respondents believed that race was relevant to her board 
selection.  A small percentage (4.8%) of white males responded that race was an 
attribute to their board selection, and 95% perceived that race was not relevant.  None of 
the non-white directors perceived that race was relevant in their board selection. 
6.2.1.3 Key Issue 1:  Director Perceptions of Nationality in the Selection Process 
The third demographic characteristic studied was nationality.  Overall, directors did not 
believe that nationality contributed to their board selection.  When asked whether their 
nationality was an asset, hindrance, or not relevant; the majority of directors responded 
that their nationality was not relevant in their selection to the board.  However some 
directors did perceive differences due to nationality. 
Results indicated that 76.7% of British directors perceived that nationality was not 
relevant to their selection; however, 23.3% of British directors believed that their 
nationality was an asset to their board selection.  Moreover, results indicated that 75% of 
those directors who identified themselves as having a nationality other than British 
perceived that nationality was not relevant in their selection to the board; while 25% of the 
Non-British directors perceived that nationality was a hindrance to being selected for the 
board.  
These perceptions provide some indication that while most directors do not perceive that 
demographic characteristics are an asset or hindrance, there is some suggestion from 
the results that nationality is one of two areas (age was the second) where there may be 
perceived differences due to demographic characteristics.  These results suggest that 
British directors perceive nationality as either not relevant or an asset.  In contrast, non-
British directors perceived nationality as either not relevant or a hindrance.  However, it 
was not statistically significant difference at the .05 two-tailed t-test level. 
 
 
 
214 
Table 6.10: Relevancy of Nationality to Selection 
 Nationality Relevant to 
selection 
(Nationality) 
Nationality 
 1 .086 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .485 
N 70 68 
Relevant to selection 
 .086 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .485  
N 68 68 
 
 
6.2.1.4 Key Issue 1:  Director Perceptions of Age in the Selection Process 
When asked whether their age was an asset, hindrance, or not relevant to their selection 
to the board; more directors believed that age mattered than they believed that race, 
gender, or nationality mattered in their selection to the board.  Approximately 67% of both 
men and women of all ages felt that age did not matter in their selection to the board; 
however, approximately 30% of both men and women directors of all ages felt that age 
was an asset to being selected.  
Younger directors were more likely to believe that age was an asset, as 42% of directors 
between the ages 36-55 felt that their age was an asset, though 57% felt age was not 
relevant.  Of those over 56 years old, over 70% felt age was not relevant.  Some directors 
over 66 years old felt that age was a hindrance.  In this age group, 14% of directors 
answered that they believed their age was a hindrance to their being selected for the 
board.  These results suggest that younger directors believe that age is a demographic 
characteristic that directors consider in selecting members.  The difference in answers 
between different age groups was not statistically significant at the .05 level. 
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Table 6.11: Correlations Age Relevancy to Selection 
 Age Relevant to 
selection (Age) 
Age 
 1 .194 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .112 
N 70 68 
Relevant to 
Selection (Age) 
 .194 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .112  
N 68 68 
 
 
 
6.2.2.1 Key Issue 1:  Director Perceptions of Group Affiliations in the Selection Process 
In addition to whether a particular demographic characteristic was relevant to their board 
appointment, directors were asked about whether their group affiliations may have been 
relevant to their selection.  This research sought to determine whether directors 
perceived that their group affiliation and influence, particularly those that were made up of 
those with similar demographic characteristics, was important to board selection thereby 
indicating a potential social capital impact to board appointments.  As shown in the tables 
below, directors did not generally perceive that their group affiliations impacted their 
selection to the board.  These results suggest that directors may not believe that their 
social capital based on demographic groups or affiliations was important.  There are 
several reasons why this may be the case.  First, social capital literature (Coleman, 1988) 
suggests that social capital may be the least tangible type of capital (the most tangible 
being financial capital and human capital).  Therefore, directors may not be aware of their 
own capital and how capital based on demographic groups may have been important to 
their board selection.  Second, Portes argues that social capital depends on the ability of 
actors to secure benefits by virture of membership in social networks or other social 
structures (Portes, 1998).  These directors may not believe that there are benefits to the 
firm because of these memberships. 
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Table 6.12: Director and Influence in the Section Process 
 Influence that I have in organizations comprised 
mostly of those of my race was very important in 
my being appointed for this board. 
Total 
Sdisagree 2 Neutral 4 Sagree 
Gender 
Male 47 2 7 3 1 60 
Female 4 1 1 0 0 6 
Total 51 3 8 3 1 66 
       
 Influence that I have in organizations comprised 
mostly of those of my race was very important in 
my being appointed for this board. 
Total 
Sdisagree 2 neutral 4 Sagree 
Race 
White British 46 3 8 3 1 61 
White Irish 1 0 0 0 0 1 
White and 
Black African 
1 0 0 0 0 1 
White Asian 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Other 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 51 3 8 3 1 66 
 Influence that I have in organizations comprised 
mostly of those of my gender was very important 
in my being appointed for this board. 
Total 
Sdisagree 2 neutral 4 Sagree 
Gender 
Male 46 4 7 2 1 60 
Female 5 1 0 0 0 6 
Total 51 5 7 2 1 66 
 
 
6.2.2.2 Key Issue 1:  Director Perceptions of Personal Connections in the Selection 
Process 
Directors were asked questions to determine whether their personal connections with 
other board members or the CEO were important in their being appointed to the board.  
These questions were asked to attempt to determine whether these types of personal 
connections and friendships are important to directors being appointed to boards.  A 
majority of directors did not perceive that connection to board members or the CEO were 
important to their being appointed to the board.!
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Table 6.13 Personal Connections and Appointment 
 Personal connections with other board members 
were important in my being appointed to this board. 
Total 
Sdisagree 2 neutral 4 Sagree 
 
Male 
 35 5 12 6 3 61 
 94.6% 71.4% 92.3% 85.7% 100.0% 91.0
% 
Female 
 2 2 1 1 0 6 
 5.4% 28.6% 7.7% 14.3% 0.0% 9.0% 
Total 
 37 7 13 7 3 67 
 
100.0% 100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0
% 
100.0% 100.0
% 
 
6.2.3 Key Issue 1:  Director Perceptions of Director Connections in the Selection Process 
Directors were asked a series of questions regarding the nature of their connections with 
other board members prior to their selection.  This researcher sought to determine if 
directors sat on other boards with the existing directors of the board prior to their 
appointment, and if so what types of board connections were most prevalent.  The most 
prevalent category across all categories of connections was “None, followed by “one” 
indicating that generally, most directors did not sit with other members of the board on 
other boards prior to their appointment.  These results indicate that these directors were 
not selected due to their personal connections with other board members.  This suggests 
that the directors were chosen from different social groups.  Choosing directors from 
different social groups can be an advantage for firms, as individuals with similar social 
networks often have similar information and therefore provide redundant information 
benefits (Burt, 2001), resulting in a minimal change in the firm’s social capital.  For these 
surveyed firms, the lack of personal connections between directors can be beneficial. 
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Table 6.14: Director Board Connections 
 Men Women 
Director sat with no other 
board member on a PLC 
board prior to their 
appointment. 
86% 67% 
Director sat with no other 
member on a Non-Profit or 
Charity board prior to their 
appointment. 
82% 80% 
Director sat with no other 
member on a Cultural or 
Civic board prior to their 
appointment. 
90% 100% 
Director sat with no other 
member on a Political or 
Charity board prior to their 
appointment. 
98% 80% 
Director sat with no other 
member on any other type 
of board (not mentioned 
above) prior to their 
appointment. 
91% 100% 
! !
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Table 6.15: Director Board Connections – By Board Type 
 
 Prior to your appointment to this 
company's board, how many other PLC 
boards did you sit on with an existing 
director of this company?  
Total 
0 1 2 
 
Male 
 53 6 2 61 
 86.9% 9.8% 3.3% 100.0% 
Female 
 4 2 0 6 
 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 
Total 
 57 8 2 67 
 85.1% 11.9% 3.0% 100.0% 
 Prior to your appointment to this 
company's board, how many other non-
profit or charity  boards did you sit on with 
an existing director of this company? 
Total 
0 1 2 3 
 
Male 
 50 5 5 1 61 
 82.0% 8.2% 8.2% 1.6% 100.0% 
Female 
 4 0 0 1 5 
 80.0% 0.0% 0.0% 20.0% 100.0% 
Total 
 54 5 5 2 66 
 81.8% 7.6% 7.6% 3.0% 100.0% 
 
6.2.2.3 Key Issue 1:  Director Perceptions of Outside Consulting Firms in the Selection 
Process 
Most directors did perceive that consulting firms were important to their appointment.  
When asked if an outside consulting firm or search firm was important to their being 
appointed to the board, 52% of the males perceived that an outside consulting firm or 
search firm was important to their being appointed to the board.  Approximately 33% of 
males strongly disagreed that a consulting firm or search firm was important to their being 
appointed to the board. 
When asked if an outside consulting firm or search firm was important to their being 
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appointed to the board, the majority of females perceived that an outside consulting firm 
or search firm was important to their being appointed to the board.  This result is 
consistent with Burt (1992) who argues the importance of these firms due to their ability 
to bridge structural holes.  This result supports that recruitment firms enjoy significant 
power to shape placement decisions.  Findlay and Cloverdill (1998) refer to this power as 
the ‘visible hand. 
The results support that outside consulting firms and recruitment firms play a very 
important part in board appointments in the UK, and thus in the level of firm diversity. 
Table 6.16 Consulting Firm Influence on Selection 
 An outside consulting or search firm was important in my 
being appointed to this board. 
Total 
Sdisagree 2 Neutral 4 Sagree 
 
Male 
20 3 6 10 22 61 
90.9% 100.0% 100.0% 90.9% 88.0% 91.0% 
Female 
2 0 0 1 3 6 
9.1% 0.0% 0.0% 9.1% 12.0% 9.0% 
22 3 6 11 25 67 
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
6.3!Key!Issue!2:!!Director!Perception!of!Benefits!of!Diversity!to!Firm!Governance!–!
Survey!Section!3:!“Diversity”!
!
A group of questions were asked to determine the level of comfort directors feel with 
other directors.  Additionally, questions were asked to determine whether directors 
engage in debate when discussing firm issues.  Both types of questions were analyzed 
by gender to determine if gender diversity might result in directors who were more likely 
to offer disagreement and debate on the board.  Additionally, while a high degree of 
comfort with the CEO or other directors does not necessarily mean that a director is 
unwilling to provide dissent, research presented in Chapter 3 (Ramirez, 2003) does 
indicate that these characteristics may result in group-think or a general lack of 
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governance.  Additionally, agency theory suggests that the primary duty of the board is to 
monitor management.  Consequently, according to agency theory, a board which is 
overly comfortable with the CEO may be at risk of not meeting their management 
oversight duties. 
6.3.1 Key Issue 2:  Director Perception of CEO Relationship – Survey Section 3: 
“Diversity” 
Results indicated that 83% of male board members perceived themselves as having a 
very good or good relationship with their CEO.  In contrast only 42% of female board 
directors perceived themselves as having a very good or good relationship with their 
CEO.  These results may indicate that female directors do not form strong relationships 
with the company CEO to the extent that male directors form them.  Agency theory 
emphasizes control of managerial “opportunism” by having board members who are 
thoroughly independent Donaldson and Davis (1991) and do not beholden to 
management.51  Taking an agency theory viewpoint; if women do not form strong 
relationships with the company CEO, this may strengthen governance of the firm.  
Additionally, no male directors, and only one female director categorized their relationship 
with the CEO as uncomfortable.    
As to their relationship with other directors, all males perceived that their relationship with 
the majority of other directors was one with a high degree of comfort or an acceptable 
level of comfort.  All female directors perceived that their relationship the majority of other 
directors was one with a high degree of comfort or an acceptable level of comfort. 
 
6.3.2 Key Issue 2:  Director Perception of their willingness to express disagreement with 
other Directors – Survey Section 3: “Diversity” 
The majority of the male directors  (78%) indicated that they agree without much debate 
on important company issues.  All female directors indicated that they agree without 
much debate on important company issues.  This result provides support for Rose, 2007, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 A full discussion of agency theory is provided in chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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and   2010, who argue that because of issues such as similar socialization of directors 
and self-censorship of their opinions, that women directors do not provide any additional 
governance through debating or voicing dissention.  Additionally, it provides support for 
Fairfax, (2005) who argues against the position that women will provide the role of 
“super-outsider” on the board.  This result does not provide support for an often given 
rationale for board governance, which Is that diversity would lead to more debate on the 
board, and will result in a board that is less likely to engage in group-think (Ramirez, 
2003).   
6.4!Key!Issue!3:!!Director!Perception!of!Social!Capital!E!!–!Continued!Survey!Section!3:!
“Diversity”!
One aspect of this thesis was to determine if the social capital of the firm was improved 
by the presence of diverse directors.  To determine if this might be true, directors were 
asked about new links or “bridges” that the company experienced because of their 
appointment.  Both the men and women directors were split on this question.  
Only 12% of the male directors agreed that their appointment to the board provided new 
linkages between the company and new demographic groups.  Women directors were 
split in the middle with their answers.  While 56% of the women disagreed or strongly 
disagreed that their appointment to the board provided linkages between the company 
and new demographic groups, there were 42% who agreed with this statement.  As only 
12% of male directors agreed that their appointment to the board provided new linkages 
between the company and new demographic groups, versus 42% of women who agreed, 
these results do provide some support for the resource dependence view argued in 
previous literature (Fondas, 2000; Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000) that women directors 
build the board’s links to its environment, bringing strategic input (and social capital) to 
the boards on which they serve.  Additionally, the results suggest support that diversity 
assists the board in increasing the diversity of social linkages and connections given their 
unique and different network ties (Hagan 1988, Campbell 1988, Ibarra 1992). 
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6.4.2 Key Issue 3:  Director Relationships -  – Continued Survey Section 3: “Diversity” 
One aspect of this dissertation study was to determine if the social capital of the firm was 
improved by the existing relationships of directors, and if there were differences by 
gender.  Questions were asked to determine if social capital of the firm was improved by 
the relationships of directors with stakeholders such as suppliers and important 
customers.  To determine if this might be true, directors were asked about their 
relationships with important company suppliers, customers, and bankers.  Kim and 
Cannelle (2008) argue that external social capital can be assessed determining the 
relationship between individuals and important company stakeholders (customers, 
bankers, suppliers).  The majority of directors did not believe that these relationships 
were particularly strong, indicating a lack of social capital between these directors and 
these types of stakeholders. 
 
6.4.3 Key Issue 3:  Director Opinions -  – Continued Survey Section 3: “Diversity” 
One potential benefit to the board diversity is the possibility of having a diverse set of 
opinions.  Improved corporate governance is possible through directors having and 
sharing a broader and different range of opinions (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000).  While 
the survey did not determine whether these diverse directors gave opinions influenced by 
their diverse characteristics; the survey did ask directors if their opinions were sought out 
due to their demographic differences.  For example, according to the Marketing Rationale 
(Fairfax 2005) it would not be usual if when discussing an issue related to women, that a 
woman director may be asked “as a woman, what do you think about the marketing of 
this product to our women customers”.  Or, similarly, according to the Employee 
Relations Rationale (Fairfax 2005) it is plausible that minority directors would be 
specifically asked for their opinion on an employment issue that concerned minorities.  
When asked how often their opinion is sought because of their race, gender, age, or 
nationality; the majority of men and women directors indicated that this seldom if ever 
occurs.  Consequently, director answers to these questions did not provide support for 
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the Employee Relations or Marketing Rationale for board diversity. 
 
6.4.3.1. Key Issue 3:  Director Opinions based on Gender  – Continued Survey Section 3: 
“Diversity”: 
Results indicated that 97% of males and 86% of females were never asked for their 
opinion based on their gender. 
6.4.3.2.1 Key Issue 3:  Director Opinions based on Race  – Continued Survey Section 3: 
“Diversity”: 
Results indicated that 98% of white Directors were never asked for their opinion based on 
their race, and none of the non-white directors are asked their opinion based on their 
race. 
6.4.3.2.2 Key Issue 3:  Director Opinions based on Nationality  – Continued Survey 
Section 3: “Diversity”: 
Results indicated that 91% of British Directors were never asked for their opinion based 
on their nationality.  In contrast 57% of the non-British directors were never asked their 
opinion based on their nationality, 29% indicated that they are seldom asked their opinion 
based on nationality, and 14% are often asked their opinion based on their nationality.  
This result suggests that nationality is an area where boards seek a diverse point of view.  
It may also suggest that issues of nationality is an area where UK boards seek a diverse 
viewpoint.  However, due to the small number of non-British directors, this perception is 
one that is for future research. 
 
6.4.3.2.3 Key Issue 3:  Director Opinions based on Age-  – Continued Survey Section 3: 
“Diversity”: 
Results indicated that 95% of Directors between 46-55 were never asked for their opinion 
based on their age, and 71% of those between 35-45 indicated that they are never asked 
for their opinion based on their age.  Additionally, 28% of these directors between 35-45 
indicated that they are seldom asked for their opinion based on their age. 
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Results indicated that 71% of the Directors aged over 55 were never asked their opinion 
based on their age,  However, 14% of those over 65 indicated that they are often asked 
their opinion based on age, and 20% between 56 and 65 are seldom asked their opinion 
based on age.  These results suggest that age is not an area where directors seek a 
diverse point of view when making decisions. 
6.4.4 Key Issue 3:  Director Perceptions on Board Signals  – Continued Survey Section 3: 
“Diversity” 
 
Broom and Krawiec (2008) argue that one of the reasons boards diversify, is to signal to 
the marketplace that the firm is providing equal opportunity, considering the needs of 
certain demographic groups, and to signal that the firm is forward-looking or socially 
responsible.  This survey asked directors questions that provided insight into potential 
board signaling behavior.  These questions were designed to determine if diversity 
influenced the perspectives of the directors regarding the importance of these board 
signals.  While results indicated that there were differences between female and male 
directors, the results in this area were not statistically significant at the 5% level. 
6.4.4.1 Key Issue 3:  Director Perceptions on Board Signals to Special Interest Groups-  – 
Continued Survey Section 3: “Diversity” 
One such group that the board could potentially signal regarding diversity on the board is 
special interest groups who are interested in the diversity of the firm.  If these types of 
groups are perceived by the directors as important and vocal, and the firm feels as 
though their board diversity is monitored by these firms; it could potentially suggest a 
need to signal to these firms that the board is diverse, providing equal opportunity, and 
values diversity.  However when reviewing director opinions, surveyed directors did not 
perceive that these type of groups monitor company diversity.   
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Results indicated that only 27% of the male directors and 14% of female directors who 
perceive that there are special interest groups that monitor the diversity of their boards.  
6.4.4.2 Key Issue 3:  Director Perceptions on Board Signals on Social Responsibility– 
Continued Survey Section 3: “Diversity” 
When asked whether the board diversity was essential to send a message that the board 
was socially responsible, the director’s answers reflected broad opinions across all 
answers.  However, more women directors either agreed or strongly agreed with this 
statement than men. 
Results indicated that only 21% of male directors believe that it is absolutely essential to 
have a diverse board if the company wants to send a message that it is socially 
responsible.  Thirty-five percent were neutral, and 42% disagreed. 
In contrast 43% of female directors believed that it is absolutely essential to have a 
diverse board if the company wants to send a message that it is socially responsible.  
Approximately 30% disagreed with this statement, and the remaining females directors 
were neutral.  There are differences in the numbers represented by genders, however 
there were no statistically significant differences. 
6.4.4.3 Key Issue 3:  Director Perceptions on Board Signals on Equal Opportunity– 
Continued Survey Section 3: “Diversity” 
A slight majority of female directors agreed or strongly agreed that the diversity of the 
board was essential in sending a message that the board was providing equal 
opportunity.  Male directors did not agree that this was essential. 
Results indicated that only 21% of male directors believed that it is absolutely essential to 
have a diverse board if the company wants to send a message that it is socially 
responsible.  Thirty-two percent of the male directors disagreed or strongly disagreed with 
this statement. 
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Fifty-seven percent of female directors agreed that it is absolutely essential to have a 
diverse board if the company wants to send a message that it is providing equal 
opportunity.  Female directors who did not indicate agreement were neutral (42%), and 
no female directors disagreed. 
6.4.4.5 Key Issue 3:  Director Perceptions on Board Signals on Progressiveness 
Continued Survey Section 3: “Diversity” 
Results indicated that 34% of male directors believed that it is absolutely essential to 
have a diverse board if the company wants to send a message that it is progressive.  
Thirty-six percent of the male directors disagreed or strongly disagreed with this 
statement. 
Results indicated that 42% of female directors agreed that it is absolutely essential to 
have a diverse board if the company wants to send a message that it is progressive. 
Female directors who did not indicate agreement were neutral (57%), and no female 
directors disagreed. 
6.4.4.6 Key Issue 3:  Director Perceptions on Board Signals on Demographic Group 
Concerns Continued Survey Section 3: “Diversity”!
When asked whether the board diversity was essential to send a message that the board 
was concerned about the product needs of certain demographic groups, the director’s 
answers reflected broad opinions across all answers.   
Results indicated that 21% of male directors agreed that is essential to have a diverse 
board if the company wants to send a message that it is concerned about the needs of 
certain demographic groups.  Forty-four percent of males disagreed with this statement 
and 34% were neutral. 
Forty-three percent of female directors agreed that is essential to have a diverse board if 
the company wants to send a message that it is concerned about the needs of certain 
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demographic groups.  Twenty-nine percent of females disagreed with this statement and 
28% were neutral. 
6.5!Key!Issues!and!Themes!of!Director!Perception!of!Diversity!and!Employee!Relations!
–!Survey!Section!4:!“Board!Diversity!and!Employee!Relations”!
 
The Employee Relations Rationale and Litigation Rationale for board diversity argue that 
a diverse board of directors will assist the firm in signaling to the marketplace and to its 
own employees that the company is fair in its employment practices.  Directors were 
asked if the composition of the board sent a message to employees about the firm’s 
values.  When asked whether the composition of the board sends a message to 
employees regarding equal opportunity, director’s answers reflect divided viewpoints.  
While 42% of women were of the opinion that the composition of the board did send a 
message to employees regarding equal opportunity, 28% were neutral.  Similarly 38% of 
the male directors either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, but 42% of the 
male directors were neutral.  These results suggest that director’s perceptions lend 
support to the Employee Relations Rationale for board diversity.   
Additionally, directors were asked if they felt it was important to senior female 
management that there was diversity on the board.  The majority, or 57%, of female 
directors and nearly half of the males (48%) either agreed or strongly agreed that 
diversity of the board was important to senior female managers.  These results suggest 
that director’s perceptions lend support to the Employee Relations Rationale for board 
diversity.   
Similarly, directors were asked if they felt it was important to senior racial or ethnic 
minority managers that there was diversity on the board.  Only White British Directors 
disagreed that this this was important.  The 50% or greater of the other racial minorities 
responding agreed or strongly agreed that diversity on the board was important to senior 
racial or ethnic minority managers. 
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Consistent with the Employee Relations Rationale for board diversity, these results 
indicate that directors perceive that board diversity is important to employees.  They 
indicated that this is especially important for female employees and senior managers that 
were either racially or ethnically diverse.  Additionally they also believe that the diversity 
of the board sends a message to employees about equal opportunity. However, results 
were contradictory when asked about their own presence on the board, 71% female 
directors were neutral as to whether their presence on the board was important to 
employee morale.  Only 14% of women agreed that their presence on the board was 
important to employee morale, while 47% of men agreed that their presence on the board 
was important to employee morale.  Of those who indicated their nationality as something 
other than British, 72% believed that their presence on the board was important to 
employee morale.  However, although some directors agreed that their presence on the 
board was beneficial to employee moral; their agreement to this question does not 
necessarily indicate that the director believed that their presence was important due to 
their race, gender, or nationality. 
Not only do directors generally perceive that board diversity is important in helping to 
communicate company values such as equal opportunity (Litigation Rationale), but 
directors agreed that the board takes steps to make sure that the board and its 
composition are visible to employees.  The majority of directors, 86% of males and 71% 
of females, indicate that their board pursues activities that make them visible to 
employees. 
Another way that boards communicate with their stakeholders is through their mission 
statement.  Directors were asked if their mission statements mention diversity or equal 
opportunity.  Almost 86% of male directors indicated that no such mentions are made in 
the mission statement, versus 58% of female directors.  However 41% of the female 
directors indicated that the company mission statement did mention diversity or equality 
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in its mission statement.  When analyzing the level of diversity of the board and whether 
the company mentions diversity or equality in its mission statement, generally speaking 
the larger the percentage of women directors on the board, the more likely that the 
company included such statements in its mission statement.  Sixty-six percent of the 
firms with 30% or more female directors include statements of equality or diversity in their 
mission statement.  Forty percent of firms with between 10-20% female directors include 
such statements in their mission statement, 33% of firms with between 0-10% female 
directors included this in their mission statement, and 34% of firms with no female 
directors included statements of equality or diversity in their mission statement.  These 
results suggest that having more women directors on the board improves the likelihood 
that a firm would have statements of equality or diversity in their mission statement.  
However, it cannot be determined whether those companies with such values were more 
likely to appoint women directors, or boards with a greater percentage of women directors 
were encouraged by their women directors to include these statements in the mission 
statement. 
Amongst the variety of reasons for diversifying the board is the possibility that the board 
had some type of discrimination lawsuit in the years prior to the appointment of a woman 
or ethnic minority to the board (Litigation Rationale).  Eighty-five percent of male directors 
indicated that there was no such lawsuit, or that they were not aware of any such lawsuit 
(8.3%).  However almost one third of the women directors indicated that they were aware 
of discrimination lawsuits in the three years prior to the appointment of a women or ethnic 
minority to the board, and 42.8% of the women directors answered that there had been 
no discrimination lawsuits prior to the appointment of a female or minority to the board. 
Professional Reputation 
The directors were asked questions to assess the degree to which they perceived the 
directorship as presenting a perceived risk to their reputation.  Directors were asked 
whether they believed that their performance on the board would impact their reputation.  
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When asked how important their performance on the source board was to their 
professional reputation in other business settings or boards, most directors felt their 
performance was very important.  Seventy-one percent of women directors and 
approximately 85% of male directors rate the importance of their performance as either 
high or very high importance to their professional reputation.  None of the directors rated 
their performance as unimportant to their reputation and other boards.  Fama and Jensen 
(1988) suggest that the need of directors to establish reputations as expert directors 
would help in encouraging directors to perform excellent in their governance function. 
Open Comments 
In addition to the survey questions using the likert scale method, respondents were given 
the option of giving open-ended answers at several points in the survey.  Most comments 
on these questions were administrative or repetitive in nature, as they provide information 
already given in the survey itself.  These open-ended questions are presented in the 
appendix. 
6.6!Conclusion!and!Detailed!Discussion!of!Survey!Findings!
!
When analyzing the demographic characteristics of the surveyed directors, the male and 
female directors were similar in their experience and educational attainment.  However, 
female directors were younger than their male counterparts.  This result supports 
previous literature (Catalyst, 2006; Ferreira, 2010; Sealy, 2007) and may support the 
argument that as time passes, the number of women in UK pipeline will increase and 
board diversity will increase.  Additionally, it shows that women directors are younger, 
thereby having less time in the management pipeline than their male counterparts. 
The racial homogenity of the respondents mirrored the lack of diversity in UK boards, as 
91.4 percent of respondents identified themselves as White British.    Existing literature 
reflects this dynamic, only 27 out of FTSE100 companies had ethnic minority directors as 
of 2007 (Singh, 2007) and there is little ethnic diversity in UK corporations in general 
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(Brammer, Milllington & Pavelin, 2007). Sealy, Vinnicombe and Singh (2008) found only 
4.7% ethnic minority directors on the boards of FTSE100 companies.   
Most respondents believed that gender was not relevant to their board selection.  No 
female directors believed that their gender was a hindrance, and in fact one of the female 
directors responded that her gender was an asset to being appointed to the board.  In 
contrast only 4.8% of male directors believed their gender to be an asset.  While literature 
supports that some high-profile women have many board appointments available to 
them52 (Farrell and Hersch, 2005; Sealy et al., 2007), literature does not implicitly support 
that women have a preference in board appointments, but instead discusses barriers to 
their appointments (Terjesen, 2009, Catalyst and Opportunity Now, 2000).  However, in 
an analysis of director interviews performed by Broome and Krawiec (2008), many of the 
women directors interviewed indicated that their boards were actively seeking a woman 
at the time of their appointment, providing support that those women who are already on 
boards may not have experienced a barrier to their appointment. 
Most directors did not perceive that their connections with the CEO or other board 
members were important to their appointment to the board.  Only 10% of the male 
directors agreed or strongly agreed with this statement, while no women directors were of 
the opinion that these types of connections were important to their selection.  This finding 
provides some support that recommendation by The Higgs Report (2003) are being 
followed by boards, and directors are not being selected from the personal contacts of 
existing directors.  Additionally this finding suggest that directors are not chosen from 
similar social networks thereby increasing the opportunity for their boards to increase 
social links to new networks (Burt, 2001). 
Seventy-five percent of non-British directors responded that nationality was not relevant 
in their selection to the board.  However there were 25% of the non-British directors that 
responded that nationality was a hindrance to being selected for the board.  Similarly, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Women hold significantly more multiple directorships; 5% of women, but <1% of men have two or more 
seats Sealy et al, 2008. 
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amongst British directors, 23% believed that their British nationality was an asset to their 
board selection.  Of all of the demographic traits, being British was a characteristic that 
majority directors considered an asset for the British and hindrance to selection for non-
British.  While neither percentage was a majority opinion, it is an interesting result.  There 
are a number of possible reasons for this perception including former British Colonization, 
nationality bias in other areas of the culture, and a long history of turmoil amongst British 
countries.  This result presents a very interesting area for further study.  While literature 
discusses such things such as minorities preferring to be called English or British (Condor 
et al., 2006), and citizenship and national identity (Abell et al., 2006) in the UK, this 
researcher did not find literature discussing relevancy of British versus non-British board 
members or other management related literature.  This is an area for future research. 
The results support that outside consulting firms and recruitment firms play a very 
important part in board appointments, and thus in the level of firm diversity.  Directors did 
perceive that outside consulting firms were very important.  This importance supports 
arguments by Findlay and Cloverdill (1998) who refer this important role as the ‘visible 
hand’.  Since the consulting firms are first hired by the firm, and candidates are first 
selected by the consulting firm, the consulting firm has enormous control and acts as a 
visible hand in the selection process.   
Results indicated that generally directors did not sit on boards with other directors of the 
firm prior to their appointment.  These results may indicate the lack of connections that 
the directors shared with board members prior to their appointments.  The lack of 
directors who sat on boards with other directors may be a particular disadvantage for 
women and minority directors.  Westphal (2000) found that minority directors are more 
influential on the board if they have direct or indirect social network ties to majority 
directors through common memberships on other boards. Westphal found that 
demographic minorities can avoid out-group biases that minimize their influence on the 
board if they have prior experience on other boards with other directors.  The lack of 
these connections for survey respondents indicate that diverse directors in the study may 
 
 
234 
not have these leveraged opportunities to maximize their influence on boards by forming 
direct and indirect social networks with white male directors.  However, consistent with 
resource dependency theory; the lack of connections suggest that with these 
appointments, the boards may have acquired new information or contacts to assist them 
in strategic management of the firms. 
When asked about the number of other boards that the directors sat on with existing 
members of the board prior to their appointment, the number was none, or low.  The 
majority of directors responding indicated that they did not sit on boards with directors on 
other PLC boards, non-profit boards, civic or cultural boards, or political or governmental 
boards.    
However, a closer inspection of these results reveals that two of the women did sit on one 
other board with a member of a PLC board prior to appointment and one of women sat on 
three or more non-profit or charity boards with existing directors.  This may suggest that 
firstly, one successful route to corporate directorship for women is to first seek 
appointment on non-profit or charity boards, and second, knowing at least one other 
member of a PLC member is helpful for women to gain board appointments. 
This result may support literature by Hillman (2002), who reported that diverse candidates 
may often come from non-business backgrounds such as governmental and university 
posts and thus enjoy stronger connections in other types of institutions such as non-
profits and possibly their boards. 
Results did not support that directors perceive group memberships provided them social 
capital that was important to their being selected for the board.  The combined results 
from these questions indicate that directors did not perceive that social capital gained 
from influence in groups comprised of members of their same gender, nationality, or race 
influenced their board appointment.  In addition, Directors did not believe that personal 
connections, group memberships, or social connections provided any new links to the 
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board.  There was no statistically significant difference between gender and whether the 
director perceived that their appointment provided new links. 
Over 82% of the females either disagreed or strongly disagreed that personal 
connections that they had with the CEO were important to their being appointed to the 
board.  Additionally, when comparing the perceived strength of a board member 
relationship to his or her CEO, 42% of female board directors compared to 83% of male 
board members perceived themselves as having a very good or good relationship with 
their CEO.  No male directors categorized their relationship with the CEO as 
uncomfortable, but one of the women described her relationship with the CEO as 
somewhat uncomfortable.  The differences between genders was not statistically 
significant, however, these results may suggest that male directors perceive their 
relationships with the CEO slightly better than female directors.  Westphal and Sterns 
(2006) argue that managers who display ingratiatory behaviour toward their CEO are 
more likely to be appointed to boards of other firms where their CEO is a director or is 
indirectly connected through a board interlock network.  The survey results may suggest 
that women directors may not display these behaviors thereby reducing their 
opportunities for other boards by virtue of CEO connections. 
As to their relationship with other directors, all directors perceived that their relationship 
the majority of other directors was one with a high degree of comfort or an acceptable 
level of comfort. 
Agency theory focuses on board oversight of management, and thorough deliberation of 
management decisions.  Prior research suggests that female directors will provide more 
deliberation and debate on the board than male directors (Ramirez, 2003).  The results of 
the survey did not provide support for this argument.  All female directors, and most male 
directors indicated that they agree without much debate on important company issues.  
However, this result supports arguments by Fanto that directors are appointed and join 
boards where they have similar opinions.  Fanto et al. (2011) argue that candidates with 
 
 
236 
significantly different opinions to the existing board members will in fact avoid board 
memberships with these firms.  The answers that the directors gave regarding their 
agreement without much debate may lend support to Fanto et al.  However, this lack of 
debate may signal that boards are not leveraging diversity to its full extent.  Debate in top 
management groups has been shown to improve decision-making.  According to 
Simmons (1999), debate may increase the opportunity for diversity to enhance decision 
comprehensiveness by drawing on diversity.  They argue that debate forces members to 
rethink their points of view and consider other factors.  Without debate on important 
company issues, the diversity of these boards could be an untapped resource to improve 
firm decision-making and governance. 
Director opinions 
One potential benefit to the board diversity is the possibility of having a diverse set of 
opinions.  Improved corporate governance is possible through directors having and 
sharing a broader and different range of opinions (Fondas and Sassalos, 2000,; 
Maznevski, 1994).  Previous research has found that homogenous boards do not notice 
how similar opinions are of directors because the values are the norm for them.  
Additionally, women have different workplace experience, as well as different experience 
in their communities, services, and the marketplace, and therefore women directors 
“bring a different voice to debates and decision-making.” (Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 
2004) 
While the survey did not determine whether these diverse directors gave opinions 
influenced by their diverse characteristics; the survey did ask directors if their opinions 
were sought out due to their demographic differences.  When asked how often their 
opinion is sought because of their race, gender, age, or nationality; the majority of 
directors indicated that this seldom if ever occurs.  However, 29% of non-British directors 
indicated that they are seldom asked their opinion based on nationality, and 14% are 
often asked their opinion based on nationality. 
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Special Interest Groups, and other benchmarking bodies may serve as monitors of 
diversity.  However, only one of the female directors perceived that special interest 
groups monitor board diversity.  Twenty-five percent of the male directors perceive that 
these types of groups monitor the diversity of their boards.  Broome et al. assert that 
perceptions of interest groups have the power to influence corporate performance 
(Broome, 2008 p 17).  Klarsfeld (2012) argue that industry standards, benchmarking 
exercises and best practice guidelines by these types of groups are examples of 
autonomous rules that gain a quasi-regulatory character.  Therefore, it is possible that 
directors would consider these factors when they make board decisions on director 
appointments.  Without the belief that these types of stakeholder groups monitor diversity, 
the directors may perceive there to be one less reason to diversify boards. 
When asked whether board diversity was essential to send a message that the board 
was progressive, the male director’s answers reflected broad opinions across all 
answers.  However, proportionately more women directors either agreed or strongly 
agreed with this statement than men.  Additionally, no women disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with this statement compared to 37% of men who either disagreed or strongly 
disagreed that board diversity was essential to send a message that the board was 
progressive. 
Broome et al. (2008) argue that, although their actions may be inconsistent, boards 
sometimes seek to communicate firm values such as equality, progressiveness, and 
equal opportunity by signaling with board of director diversity.  They argue that firms may 
attempt to employ board diversity as a signal that the firm is forward-looking or socially 
responsible in some way, a signal most often relevant to regulators, the public, or other 
interest groups (p. 24).  Similar to Broome et al., agreement with the signaling benefits of 
diversity was inconsistent with the surveyed directors.  More female directors believed 
that the composition of the board sends a signal of the board’s values.  Female directors 
were more likely than male directors to agree that board diversity was essential to send a 
message that the board was providing equal opportunity, that it was socially responsible, 
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progressive.  These results suggest that gender may influence the perspectives of the 
directors regarding the importance of these board signals.  However, while results 
indicated that there were differences between female and male directors, the results were 
not statistically significant at the 5% level.  There are several reasons given in the 
literature that may explain why most surveyed directors may not feel the need to signal 
board diversity.  For example, Fairfax (2005) questions the extent to which relevant 
corporate constituencies are aware of board composition.  These survey results indicate 
that this may be a plausible explanation for these directors, as only 14% of female 
directors, and 25% of male directors perceive that special interest groups monitor board 
diversity.  
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Chapter 7 – Interview Results 
7.0!Introduction!
Chapter 7 contains the results of the interviews with the twenty directors in the UK and 
US—ten in each country.  After this introduction, the first section of this chapter provides 
the demographic characteristics of the UK and US Directors that were interviewed.  The 
next sections provide the results of the interviews, which are presented as four issues: 
Key Issue 1:  Director Perceptions of Diversity in the Selection Process: How and Why 
are Board Members Selected?  Key Issue 2:  Director Perception of Benefits of Diversity 
to Firm Governance, Key Issue 3:  Director Perception of Social Capital, and 4: Director 
Perceptions Gained from Director Open-Ended Dialogue.  This introduction provides a 
summary of the results that are explained further in the sections of this chapter that 
follow.  It is noted here that the findings serve as tentative insights into some of the issues 
influencing racial and gender diversity on board governance as perceived by corporate 
board members in the UK and US. 
First, the results indicate that in general white male directors across countries did not 
believe that race or gender was a consideration in their own appointment to the board.  
Females and blacks; however, were more likely to perceive race or gender as having 
influenced their appointment.  Moreover, female and black directors believed that their 
race and gender had a positive influence on their appointment.  Second, directors of all 
race and genders did believe that their boards considered race and gender as an 
attribute to select other diverse directors.  Their answers also reflect that boards use 
various types of diversity, including race, gender, work experience, and political ties as 
part of the criterion for board selection. 
Results of the interviews indicated that recruitment firms played a much larger part in the 
appointment of the UK directors than the US directors.  Recruitment firms were involved 
in the placement of seven of the ten UK directors interviewed for this study, while only 
three of the ten US directors were selected with the assistance of a recruitment firm.  
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Results also indicated that three of the five black US directors were selected with the help 
of a recruitment firm versus none of the white US directors. 
Results of the interviews indicate that directors are split on whether race and gender 
diversity contributed positively to board governance and decision-making.  In general, UK 
male directors were more likely to believe that race and gender per se made either no 
contribution to the board effectiveness or only a very modest one.  US directors were, 
however, almost unanimous in their belief that there were positive tangible benefits to 
diversity with respect to board governance.  It should be noted that when directors 
support board diversity, they uniformly support race and gender diversity from a business 
rationale rather than from an ethical or moral perspective.  Benefits of diversity mentioned 
by the interviewed directors were an increase in boardroom debate thereby improving the 
quality of decisions, drawing from a larger talent pool, a focus on employee issues, a 
focus on needs of diverse customer groups, and assisting the board to reach consensus. 
With respect to diversity, most UK directors professed that they did not believe that social 
capital was a consideration in their own appointment to the board.  US directors were 
more likely than their British counterparts to report that social capital or network ties were 
helpful for their board appointment.  Whereas UK directors emphasized having directors 
with different network ties on the board (some having financial ties, while others having 
political ties, etc.), the US directors reported being assisted by each having similar 
networks.  UK female directors appear to provide new connections between different 
demographic groups and their boards; thereby increasing board social capital. 
Interviewees raised a wide range of other observations during their interviews, among 
those that stood out as recurring themes, or as remarkably insightful, or as passionately 
held were the following: most directors have formal governance training; the need for 
directors to form consensus on board decisions rather than providing extensive debate; 
and the need for boards to have skill or functional diversity in their appointments.   
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7.1!Demographic!Data!for!Interviewees!
The demographic characteristics of the interviewed directors reveal that all directors were 
middle-aged and highly experienced.  The US group was older than the UK group, and 
had a longer tenure on their board.  Additionally, the US group of directors was 
significantly more diverse than the UK group.  The largest racial demographic in the UK 
were white males (8/10), while the largest demographic in the US were black males 
(4/10).  The smallest demographic was the one black female.  The number of blacks is 
not representative of boards in the US53; however, given the lack of minority board 
members in the UK group, the number of blacks was important for providing a racial 
minority perspective in the study. 
7.1.1 Age 
Of the ten UK directors who were interviewed, six were between 46-55 years old, one 
was between 36-45 years old, two were between the ages of 56-65 years old, and one 
director was over 65 years old.  The average age was 55 amongst the UK directors.  
Of the ten US directors who were interviewed, all but one was 60 years old or older.  The 
average age was 65 amongst the US directors, versus 55 for the UK directors.  
7.1.2 Nationality  
Nine of the ten UK directors interviewed identified themselves as British, and one was US 
American.  All ten of the US directors were US American.   
7.1.3 Racial Ethnic Group 
There was no racial diversity amount the UK group as 100% of directors interviewed 
identified themselves as white.   
The racial diversity of the US Directors interviewed was much less homogeneous than 
the UK group.  The group of directors interviewed included four black males, two white 
males, three white females and one black woman.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53!In the Fortune 500 companies, ethnic minorities held about 7% of board seats (Minority Business 
Roundtable, 2009) and ethnic minority women held 3.2% of board seats (Catalyst, 2008). 
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7.1.4 Gender 
The gender diversity of the UK directors included two women and eight men interviewed.  
The US directors included four women and six men. 
7.1.5 Years of Professional Work Experience 
The UK directors interviewed were highly experienced.  All ten of these directors had over 
twenty years of professional work experience.  
The US directors interviewed were also highly experienced.  As with the UK director 
group, all of the directors had over twenty years of professional work experience.  
7.1.6 Years on the board 
Like the survey participants, directors were very experienced, but the UK directors tended 
towards the lower number of years of experience on the company board of the survey.  
Over 44% of the UK directors had been at the company being surveyed for less than 3 
years.  
Like the UK interview participants, US directors were very experienced.  However, 
contrasting the UK directors, the average length of time on their board was over 10 years, 
compared to the UK interviewed directors where over 44% of the directors had been at 
the company being surveyed for less than 3 years. 
 
7.2!Interview!Results!
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Table 7.1 Interview Results 
Section Finding Additional Comments 
7.2 White males did not believe that their race or gender were attributes to being 
selected for the board. 
6/8 UK white males did not believe that race or gender 
impacted their board appointment. 
2/8 UK white males perceived their gender to be a 
hindrance for board appointment 
2/2 US white males perceived that their gender and 
race had no impact. 
7.2 Directors did believe that race and gender are considered in the appointment of 
diverse directors. 
7/8 white UK males, and both UK women believed 
that race or gender is a consideration for diverse 
directors. 
9/10 US Directors believed that race and gender are 
considered in the appointment of diverse directors. 
 
7.3 Recruitment firms play a much larger part in the recruitment of directors in the 
UK than in the US; however, results suggest that they may be more important in 
the recruitment of diverse directors. 
7/10 UK Directors were selected with the assistance 
of a recruitment firm.  
3/10 US Directors were selected with the assistance 
of a recruitment firm.  All three of these directors were 
black. 
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7.4 Generally, UK white male directors did not believe that there were tangible 
benefits of diversity to firm governance. 
3/8 white male UK directors believed that there were 
tangible benefits to diversity to firm governance.  All 
white females, US white males, and black males 
believed there were tangible benefits to diversity. 
7.5 UK directors were less likely than US directors to believe that social capital was 
a consideration in their own appointment to the board. 
Only 2/10 UK directors believed that social capital was 
a consideration in their own appointments, while 9/10 
US directors believed social capital was a 
consideration in their own appointment. 
7.6 UK white female perceived their appointment provided new social capital to the 
firm, white males and most black directors did not perceive new social capital 
due to their appointment. 
2/2 white females perceived they provided new social 
capital versus no white males, 1/4 black males, and 
0/1 black females. 
7.7 Most directors described having attended some type of informal or formal 
training in governance 
The majority of directors in both countries had 
attended some type of governance training. 
7.7 White male directors reported that they were less likely to engage in board 
debate than diverse directors.  Overall, men seemed to say they are more likely 
to seek consensus than to engage in boardroom debate. 
4/10 white males indicated they engage in boardroom 
debate versus 4/5 white women, 2/4 black males, and 
the one black female. 
7.7 Most boards appear to make board appointments that increase the functional 
diversity on their boards.   
9/10 white males, 4/5 white women, 3/4 black males, 
and one black female reported functional diversity is 
sought with board appointments. 
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7.2.1%Key%Issue%1:  Director Perceptions of Diversity in the Selection Process: How and 
Why are Board Members Selected? 
This researcher was interested in whether the directors would perceive that race or 
gender was a consideration in their own selection to the board, and if their companies 
seek race or gender diversity as one of the selection criteria for board members in 
general.  Section 1, questions 2-5 of the Interview Guide* sought to find out the director’s 
perceptions of this issue, and together provide a key theme of these results.  Results 
indicated that in general white male directors did not perceive that race or gender was a 
criterion for their own selection; however, they said that race or gender had been a factor 
of consideration in the appointment of other female or minority members of the board.  
One of the two UK white females, and all three of US white females perceived that 
gender was a factor in their being appointed to the board.  All of the black males believed 
race was a consideration in their own appointment, but the black female did not believe 
race or gender was a factor in her own appointment. 
 
*Interview Guide Section I. 
2. Do you feel that race or gender was a factor in your being appointed to 
the board? 
3. Was the company specifically looking for a minority or woman director 
at the time of your selection? 
4. Was your race or gender an added advantage to your being selected? 
5. Has race or gender been a factor of consideration in the appointment of 
other female or minority members of the board? 
7.2.1.1 Director Perception of Selection Process UK:  
Race and Gender Diversity as a UK Criterion for Own Board Appointment 
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In general, white males in the UK did not believe that their race or gender was a 
consideration in their selection for their board.  Specifically six out of eight white males in 
UK believed that their board did not consider race or gender diversity a criterion in their 
own selection to the board.  The two white male UK directors who believed that their race 
or gender was considered by their board did not view their race and gender as positive 
attributes.  In both cases, the directors believed that being a white male was a 
disadvantage to their selection.  One of these two directors said,  
Gender was probably a bit of a hindrance.  One of the other candidates was a 
female.  Right now there is a drive for diversity, so being a white male probably 
made me less desirable. 
The other white male who believed that his race or gender was considered, believed that 
his board would have preferred to appoint a woman.  These two statements are 
interesting in that although white males make up the substantial majority of directors on 
UK boards, these two directors felt that as males they were disadvantaged by their 
gender.  The results may indicate that UK white male directors would be unwilling to 
pursue steps to increase diversity on the board such as quotas, or targeted recruiting, if 
they already perceive that they have no advantage in the selection process or perceive 
themselves disadvantaged. 
White women directors were split on whether they thought gender was a consideration in 
their own board appointment.  Additionally, some directors seemed to express conflicting 
opinions on whether gender was an asset or a hindrance.  For example, a woman 
director (#12018) who expressly claimed that her gender was considered to be an asset 
by the board went on to say,  
My gender was an attribute; however, that was not why I was chosen.  My gender 
was an additional asset but I also had to be better than the males.   
It is possible to derive from, “I had to be better than the males,” that the director is 
actually stating that she not only had to be as good as her male peers, but that the cost or 
penalty of being a female was that she had to be better than her male counterparts.  A 
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similar conflicting opinion was also repeated by one of the male directors (#12806) who 
stated that  
diversity is considered in board appointments, but skill is always the first criteria,  
then he went on to say  
unlike male directors, the women appointees always seem to need to have a clear 
skill. 
  
So while the director admitted that gender is a consideration, thereby suggesting it was 
an attribute, he also mentioned the need of women directors to have a clear skill. 
7.2.2.2 Director Perception of Selection Process US: 
Race and Gender Diversity as a Criterion for Own Board Appointment 
Both white males in US believed that their board did not consider race or gender as a 
criterion in their own selection to the board.  While all three white females in US believed 
that their boards did consider race/gender diversity as a criterion in their own selection to 
the board, they did not believe that it was the primary selection factor.  The women 
interviewed mentioned very specific technical skills that they had which assisted them in 
being selected for the board.  One female director (#23690) mentioned that she had a 
very distinct specialty skill that improved her likelihood of selection.   
They needed specific skills with the Asian government officials.  I had experience 
doing US China trade agreements and knew the players in that market.  
Another female director (#28772) explained that having a technical skill as the primary 
reason for her board appointment;  
I did a presentation on stock selling where the Chairman of “X” company was in 
the audience and saw my work.  When they had an opening on the board he 
remembered me and called.  
Additionally, this director explained her extensive skills also included managing retail 
operations.  She felt that these experiences made her a valuable member of the board of 
another retail company.  The third US white woman (#24161) felt that her appointment 
 
 
248 
was made due to her gender, and her visibility in the media.  In answering the questions 
she said,  
Yes very much.  There was media attention on diversifying boards and I was a 
visible woman with the experience and education. It was serendipity.  I was at the 
right place at the right time.  I had the qualifications, but also I had been in the media 
with several articles at that time.  I had been in an important government post, had 
industry experience, and was an academic.  This experience and visibility, along with 
there being an emphasis on appointing women to boards was instrumental to my 
being selected. 
The answers given by the US women support the statement of UK Directors (#12018) 
and (#12806), that women must have a clear skill and be better than the male directors.  
While their boards may have been searching for a diverse appointment, the results may 
suggest that the board was unwilling to make the appointment without the diverse director 
meeting extremely narrow and high criteria. 
Only one of the four black males in the US believed that their board did not consider race 
or gender as a criterion in his own selection.  He stated that race and gender were not a 
factor.  Director (#25151) mentioned that while the company was not specifically seeking 
to diversify its board, they felt that his appointment would be good for public relations.   
They were not looking for an African American, but the company realized that my 
appointment would be very helpful for public relations.   
The other three black males did believe that their race/gender was a factor in their own 
selection.  One black male director (#29602) believed that race, as a secondary 
consideration, was an attribute for his selection.  He explained,  
The “X” company was looking for both marketing and big company experience 
with diversity as a second criteria.  So while I wasn’t chosen for my race, it 
certainly helped me and did not harm my chances to be appointed.  They believed 
that I would bring a fresh perspective.   
Another black male director (#26082)) had similar comments.  He felt that his race was 
an attribute, but that there were many other positive attributes that made him qualified for 
the board.   
Yes my race was a positive factor in my being selected for the board, but it is not 
the only factor. With my selection, and that of other diverse members of the board 
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diversity has been expressed in multiple areas other than race.  For example, I 
also can give the board the local government perspective, and insights to local 
and state politics.   
The African American woman (#29290) interviewed believed that her board did not 
consider gender or race as a criterion for her selection.  This director believed that her 
appointment was only due to her past experience.  She responded,  
Neither race or gender played a part in my selection for the board, the board 
wanted someone with regulatory experience, and I was well respected in the 
industry for my regulatory expertise.  
Although the director did not believe that gender or race was a consideration for her 
appointment, results from other interviews indicate that both race and gender are 
considered to some degree in board appointments.  It is unlikely that characteristics such 
as race or gender would not be noticed and thereby considered in her appointment.  
However, this director’s comment does support the comments made by other directors 
regarding a clear skill.  She was very clear that she was chosen for specifically for her 
regulatory experience. 
In summary, White males did not believe their gender or race was an attribute to their 
selection.  Eight of the white males believed that neither race nor gender impacted their 
selection.  There were two white males (both UK) who believed their gender had an 
impact, but both perceived the impact to be a disadvantage.  While UK directorships held 
by women stands at relatively low 11.8% of all directors (Sealy, Vinnicombe and Singh, 
2008) and the results of this thesis indicates that 44.5% of UK directors served on boards 
where there were no women, there was still a concern on the part of these white male 
directors that diversity may come at a cost to them.  These males felt that they were at 
risk to be disadvantages for board appointment due to a preference of boards for women 
candidates.  Kahan et al. (2007) describe this as the “white male effect”; a pattern 
showing that certain white men fear various risks less than or more than women and 
minorities.  For example, their research on risk perception demonstrated that a group of 
affluent, highly educated white males, who also tend to hold very hierarchical and 
individualistic norms, tend to misperceive (more so than white females and minorities) the 
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risks of certain activities in a manner that is consistent with their worldviews.  Their 
research indicates that the risk perceptions of these males tends to be highly skewed in 
favor of activities that may be seen as advancing their status in society, and highly 
skewed against activities that tend to threaten their social status.  Women or minorities on 
boards may be the type of activity that threatens the social status.  Therefore, while these 
white males may have felt at risk for lack of board opportunities, based on the level of 
board diversity, it may be that these were misperceptions. 
These thesis findings, support the research of Kahan et al., as they suggest that white 
males do not believe that they enjoy any white male privilege based on their gender or 
race, and instead may believe that they are at a disadvantage.  These results are also 
consistent with the findings of this thesis’s UK survey54.  As was discussed in Chapter 6 
previously, most directors did not find gender or race as important to their selection to the 
board.  Specifically, 90% of UK white males surveyed did not believe that gender was 
relevant to their selections to the board and 95% of these males did not believe race was 
relevant in their selection to the board. 
In contrast, although female and minority board participation remains low, both white 
female directors in the UK and US, and black male directors in the US believed their 
gender was an asset to their board selection.  These results provide an interesting 
observation about directors where the majority group does not perceive their potential 
advantage, and the minority group does not perceive their potential disadvantage.  As 
previously discussed in Chapter 6, the results of the UK survey were slightly different, as 
only one of the six females who answered the questions believed gender to be an asset.  
The other female respondents did not perceive that their gender was relevant to their 
board selection.  However, consistent with the interviews, no female directors perceived 
their gender as having been a hindrance to their board selection. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Chapter 6, page 201 contains the results of this researchers UK survey. 
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7.2.2.3. Race and Gender Diversity as a Criterion for Other Women or Minority UK Board 
Appointments 
Seven out of eight white males believed that race or gender has been a factor of 
consideration in the appointment of a woman or minority as a criterion for board selection.  
White males in the UK did perceive that race or gender has been a factor of consideration 
in the appointment of a female or minority.  After speaking to the directors, it was 
important to note that while their boards had used race or gender as a factor of 
consideration, in their statements it was apparent that these characteristics were not the 
primary criterion considered in appointments.  One white male UK director (#12427) who 
mentioned that his board considered diversity in their appointments indicated that his goal 
is to have both the most qualified person, and a female candidate.  In his interview he 
stated,  
The first goal was to make sure we chose the most qualified individual, a 
secondary consideration of the board was a preference for a female candidate.  In 
that particular instance, the female candidate was by far the best qualified and 
was appointed.   
A similar comment was made by another white male UK director (#10929),  
We are aware of the need for diversity, but it is not a driver.  Any candidate we 
consider must have executive level experience and it (selection) is based on 
whoever is the best candidate.  
Another UK director (#11583) mentioned that they also look at diversity as a positive 
attribute in their selections,  
We specifically look at gender diversity with every appointment, but we do not 
have minority diversity.  We have not had many minority candidates.  Well, we 
once had a minority candidate for an executive position that I fought for, but for a 
variety of reasons the board did not agree.  I should have pushed the issue 
harder.   
The director did not want to elaborate on the issues, but clearly thought that the minority 
candidate may have been a good board candidate.  Although this director specifically 
mentioned his board’s willingness to strive for diversity in its selections, he was unwilling 
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to attach any particular traits to women directors.  When asked if he had seen any 
positive benefits to women being on the board, he said,  
In my case yes, but specifically because of the specific woman.  The person is 
excellent and just happens to be a woman.  Her positive traits are not because 
she is a woman. 
As discussed previously, there was one male director who communicated a belief that 
female candidates may have to rise to a different standard to be considered for board 
appointments.  One UK female director (#12069) expressed,  
The Chairman and CEO of my company have been seeking another woman to 
join the board.  While diversity is one of your positive qualities, it is not in the 
company’s actual selection criteria.   
She also expressed her opinion on the lack of diversity on UK boards as it relates to the 
number of women with the expertise to sit on boards,  
The emphasis on diversity on boards has increased.  There is an incorrect 
perception that there are not enough qualified women for boards, but given the 
latest banking crisis there is a perception that the qualified men in control made a 
mess.   
During the conversation, the director explained that although it is was conventional 
wisdom that there were not qualified women for directorships, she felt that obviously the 
men in charge were not qualified enough either.  Had they been qualified enough, the 
country would not have been facing the banking crisis occurring at the time.  In essence, 
the level of expertise and experience that women were being held to was clearly not 
being met by the men on boards at the time. 
The other white women director (#12018) added that positive discrimination, or even 
quotas could be a good thing.  During her interview she stated  
It is a tragedy that British firms are not more diverse.  Boards should be balanced 
and have more breadth and depth.  The only way to accomplish this may be 
quotas.  I know this is highly unpopular, but I know of no other way that diversity 
can be achieved.  You have to have a broad range of skills and viewpoints and 
diversity helps to accomplish that. 
According to this UK female director, there may even be a need to introduce quotas into 
the UK.  However, these types of measures are not popular in the US or the UK.  There 
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have been recent actions in European Countries that have instituted quotas for women 
directors.  The Norway requirement of 40% women directors is discussed in the Literature 
Review of this thesis.  Additionally, more recently, the European Union Commission 
proposed a European Union law which aims to attain a 40% objective of women in non-
executive board member positions in large publicly listed companies by 2020.  Norway, 
Spain and France, have introduced mandatory quotas (Credit Suisse, 2012 p 25) for 
women directors in addition to the European Commission’s proposal for a 40% objective.  
The low numbers of UK women directors, especially the lack of boards with women 
making up over 40% of the board is of concern given the direction of the rest of the 
European Union; however, UK MP’s overall are not supportive of the quotas 55.  The 
other female director (#12069) did not perceive that quotas were needed.  Instead she 
agreed that diversity was one of your positive qualities, but also mentioned in the 
conversation that when they are seeking new director candidates, they do not alert their 
consulting firms that diversity is one of their selection criteria.  Without deliberate 
measures, it is unclear how the director may have thought more diversity could be 
accomplished. 
7.2.2.4. Director Perceptions of Selection Process US: Race and Gender Diversity as a 
Criterion for Other Women or Minority US Board Appointments 
Both of the white males interviewed in the US believed that race or gender has been a 
factor of consideration in the appointment of a woman or minority to the board.  One 
(#22152) simply stated, that yes it had been considered.  The other white male director 
(#23851) also believed that race and gender were considered in the appointment of 
female or minority members.  When he was asked about the appointment of diverse 
candidates, he mentioned,  
Yes.  The skills must be present, but diversity is something we are aware of and is 
one of the consideration factors. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Reported by the BBC on 12 March 2013 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21755429 
 
 
254 
All three of the white female directors interviewed in the US believed that race or gender 
has been a factor of consideration in the appointment of a woman or minority to the 
board.  One of these females (#23690) explained how the board works with recruitment 
firms to assist with this effort  
Our governance committee has a view which is extremely beneficial to diversity.  
As a board we decide what skill sets we need on the board.  Then we ask a 
recruiter to give us an equal number of male and female candidates with those 
skill sets.  We also ask them to bring us diverse candidates.  Then we decide on 
who is the best fit.   
Another women director (#28772) offered that she has been asked for help to recruit 
women.  When asked if diversity is considered in board appointments she said 
 I have specifically been asked by the board to recommend women of color.  
Additionally, I have consistently brought the names of other women to the board 
of directors for potential board members.  
These comments support alternatives suggested by Krawiec et al. (2013), as they detail 
methods that board directors gave to increase board diversity.  These suggestions 
included limiting some searches to women or minority candidates, and identifying the skill 
sets needed for new board members and then look specifically for women or minorities 
who have that skill set, rather using diversity as a “plus” factor. 
All four Black Males felt that race or gender had been used as a criterion for other women 
or minority US board appointments.  The comments of these four directors indicate that 
their boards are very diverse, each having more than three diverse members.  Their 
boards also actively include diversity as a board selection criterion.  One of these 
directors (#26082) explained that his company has a commitment to diversity.  He 
offered,  
Yes, the CEO was very committed to diversity.  Senior management is committed 
to diversity.  The new CEO brought in an African American and a female board 
member.  Now the board is very diverse and includes three African Americans 
and two women.  
Another of these black males (#29602) said,  
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Generally speaking the board is always trying to ensure they are diverse.  I have 
served as chair of the governance committee, and we selected a female at a time 
when gender was being considered.   
One of these black male directors (#27242) added that the board is diverse and offered 
why they use diversity as a selection criterion,  
Yes, our company operates in major metropolitan areas with significant minority 
populations.  We operate from Western PA to Detroit and all major metropolitan 
areas.  Having a diverse point of view is helpful from a business point of view.  It 
adds a certain richness to the discussion and vibrancy. 
The black female director did not believe that race or gender had been a factor of 
consideration in the appointment of women or minorities.  However, she voiced that she 
was new to the board and perhaps it had not happened during her tenure. 
7.3.%%Director%Recruitment%Methods:%How%were%you%recruited?%
Recruitment firms played a much larger part in the appointment of the UK directors than 
in the US.  This involvement by the recruitment firms ranged from simply performing due 
diligence on candidates who had been identified by the board in advance, placing 
advertising for the company in the search for a new director, to replacing an entire board.  
Recruitment firms were involved in the placement of seven of the ten UK directors 
interviewed for this study.  Only three of the ten US directors were selected with the help 
of a recruitment firm.  Results also indicated that three of the five black US directors were 
selected with the help of a recruitment firm versus none of the white US directors.  One 
possible reason may be found in the process explained by Director (#23690), who 
explained that when they are looking for diverse directors they turn to recruitment firms 
and ask for equal numbers of male and female candidates as well as minority candidates.  
This may suggest why black directors appear to be selected more with the help of 
recruitment firms.  It may also suggest that diverse directors lack the correct social and 
professional networks to become known to boards without the help of recruitment firms.  
7.3.1 Director Recruitment Methods: How were you recruited: UK? 
Six of the eight white male directors mentioned being recruited to the board by a 
recruitment firm.  One white male director, (#10929) indicated that his entire board had 
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been selected and replaced by a recruitment firm. This indicates the significant power 
that recruitment firms play in the placement of UK directors.  One of the UK directors 
(#10963) suggested that the lack of diversity on UK boards might be partly the fault of the 
recruitment firms.  He said that recruitment firms generally showed “insufficient 
imagination in where they find these candidates.”  This director also said he would like to 
see qualified candidates being drawn from a “wider pool.”   
One of the two white female directors (#12018) was selected with the assistance of a 
recruitment firm.  She indicated,   
It was an advertised position.  I was vetted and went through a professional 
process with the recruitment firm.  Advertising of board positions makes this 
process less "Old Boy" than it used to be. 
As discussed in Chapter 6 previously, the UK Survey results provide some support for the 
interview results on the importance that recruitment firms play in the appointment of UK 
directors.  Most UK Directors did perceive that consulting firms were important to their 
appointment.  When asked if an outside consulting firm or search firm was important to 
their being appointed to the board, 67% of the women and 52% of the men perceived that 
an outside consulting firm or search firm was important to their being appointed to the 
board. 
7.3.2. Director Recruitment Methods: How were you recruited: US?  
Neither of the white males was appointed to their boards with the assistance of a 
recruitment firm, and none of the white female directors were appointed to their boards 
with the assistance of a recruitment firm. 
In contrast, two of the four black male directors were appointed to their board with the 
assistance of a recruitment firm, and the black female director was appointed with the 
help of a recruitment firm.  However, she indicated that she had already been selected by 
the board, and the recruitment firm was hired to simply perform the background due 
diligence. 
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In summary, seven of the ten UK directors were appointed with help of a recruitment firm.  
The reliance on recruitment firms was also observed in the UK survey.  In the survey, 
52% of UK males and 67% of UK females perceived that an outside consulting firm was 
important to their being appointed to the board.  In contrast, only three of the ten US 
directors were selected with the assistance of a recruitment firm.  All three of these US 
directors were black.  Considering that recruitment firms were involved in the appointment 
of three of these four black directors, may suggest that the social capital of black 
professionals may not be as strong as white professionals and therefore they are unable 
to secure the necessary contacts to secure board appointments without this intermediary.  
These results may indicate support for findings by Hillman et al. (2002) who argue that 
white males who serve on boards and the women and minorities who serve on boards 
tend to be different.  Additionally, Hillman et al. (2002) determined that female and black 
directors are more likely to come from non-business backgrounds, which may contribute 
to their different contacts.  Two of the four black directors did not have corporate 
backgrounds at the time of their appointments.  Burt (1992) indicates that recruitment 
firms can also be considered a way to bridge the structural holes that exist between firms 
and director candidates.  These results suggest that structural holes may be broader 
between diverse candidates in the US, than they are for majority directors.  One possible 
reason for this difference may be the high levels of segregation amongst black in the US 
(Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010). 
 Lastly, results indicate that recruitment firms enjoy significant influence in the 
appointment of UK directors.  Consistent with Findlay and Cloverdill (1998), candidates 
are first selected by the headhunter, and the headhunter enjoys enormous control and 
acts as a visible hand in the selection process.   
7.4%Key%Issue%2:%%Director%Perception%of%Tangible%Benefits%of%Diversity%to%Firm%
Governance%
7.4.1!Introduction!
This researcher was interested in whether the directors would perceive that there were 
tangible benefits to race or gender diversity on firm governance.  Section 3, question 1 of 
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the Interview Guide asked, Have you seen tangible benefits to diversity on the board?  
Following are the results of the directors’ perceptions of the benefits of race or gender 
diversity, and provide a key theme.  UK directors were less likely than were US directors 
to believe that there were tangible benefits of diversity to firm governance. 
7.4.1.2 Director Perceptions of Whether There Are Tangible Benefits of Diversity: UK 
Only three out of eight white male directors interviewed in UK perceived that there were 
tangible benefits to diversity on firm governance.  While white male directors were willing 
to discuss the beneficial aspects of specific individuals, they were not willing to discuss it 
in the context of race or gender diversity, preferring instead to only think of differences in 
the context of individual personality traits.  The resolution of this contradiction perhaps 
lies in understanding that viewing people through the filter of gender or race can be 
socially unacceptable in the UK, and is seen by many as stereotyping.  Directors 
explained the impact of diversity on the board; however, several of the directors were 
careful to classify these differences as, “It is not because she is a woman, it is because 
she is so smart.”  One of the white male directors (#10929) who answered yes was asked 
about these benefits to the board.  He said, 
 Personnel issues are something women are more concerned about.  In fact, the 
woman director suggested flexible work schedules.”  
The other two other white male directors explained that the positive impacts were due to 
the individual.  One (#12427) said,  
The board has not changed in my opinion by the woman director.  The woman 
member on the board is about the same as the others on the board, but because 
she is so smart, she is more likely to challenge other directors.  
 This male director went further to add,  
When the board has brought on their first woman director.  There were no specific 
benefits of diversity; the woman on the board is just a first class director.   
Another said, (#11583) It has more to do with people and them as individuals. 
White males who thought there were benefits to race or gender diversity offered some of 
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the following comments,  
I feel more comfortable when women are present.  They don’t show off as much.   
(#10963)  He also said, 
all the women were highly qualified and slightly more imaginative than male 
directors.  
 Another UK director (#12806), he said,  
Females lead the discussion in a ‘female’ tactful way.  They produce a more open 
environment than male directors.   
This was a mutual perception of another male director (#11583) who explained,  
Women are more likely than male directors to say “I don’t understand?”  Men will 
often wait until after the meeting to admit that they did not understand and seek 
greater clarification.  Additionally, women seem to be better at asking questions in 
a way that is tactful and doesn’t agitate the other directors. 
The benefits ascribed to women by these directors supports literature on gender 
differences in leadership roles.  For example, females are thought to exhibit more 
communal leadership characteristics than males.  These communal behaviors include 
speaking tentatively, not drawing attention to oneself, accepting others’ positions, 
supporting and soothing others, and contributing to the solution of relational and 
interpersonal problems (Eagly and Johannesen-Schmidt, 2001).  Additionally, Eagly and 
Johnson (1990) found that females tend to be more democratic and participative and less 
autocratic and directive as compared to male leaders.  
Both of the white female directors in the UK believed that there were tangible benefits to 
diversity on the board.  One of the women directors (#12069) explained a communal 
behavior when discussing that she had a reputation for being sympathetic to staff.  She 
said that the staff, and therefore the board, seek her opinion often on softer staff issues.  
This director indicated that her presence on the board made the board more focused and 
serious, as she keeps them on track.  Lastly, she felt that they respected her asking 
penetrating questions.  However, similar to the white male UK directors, she was 
unwilling to classify any of these behaviors as being because she is a woman, or that it is 
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something that women often do.  Instead she preferred to speak in the context of how her 
personal attributes made a difference on the board.  One of the UK woman directors 
(#12018) expressed am opinion about how she has benefited the board,  
I will often question and I am not as eager to follow.  
7.4.2.3 Director Perception of Whether There Are Tangible Benefits of Diversity US 
Both white male US directors perceived that there were tangible benefits to diversity.  
One of the white male US directors (#23851) interviewed provided comments that 
highlight how diversity can benefit the board,  
I have also seen value on the board specifically because of their diverse 
attributes.  This includes diversity of race and nationality 
 (he mentioned a director who had been a politician in an impoverished Latin 
American country)  
which gave us additional insight into the consumer needs of the poor, and how the 
company could market and serve impoverished people better.  Additionally, I have 
seen value contributed by a female board member who was also a mother who 
brought a female consumer focus to the board that otherwise we would not have 
had  
(she was a wife and a mother who used the company products). 
With his statement, the white male director was able to describe the impact of several 
types of diversity including race, gender, and nationality.  In each case, he was also able 
to make a connection to a business decision that was improved because of this diversity.  
The other white male director (#22152) said,  
It is subjective; but yes.  You can’t measure it, but diversity in general is a positive 
factor. 
All three of the white female US Directors indicated they have seen tangible benefits to 
diversity.  For example, one US white female director (#24161) said  
As a woman, I was able to provide relevant input regarding how women were 
being presented in the firm’s advertising (many years ago).  I let them know that 
as their products were being marketed to women, it was important that they 
realize how sexist the advertising was.   
She also added that there was not always a view on the board that the minority market 
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was an important market (years ago), she helped to convince the board that these other 
groups should be marketed to.  Her selection sent a strong message to other women at 
the company that it provided equal opportunities for women there.  The women in the 
company were impressed with her, and impressed with her willingness to take the time to 
meet with women in the company.  Another US white female director (#28772) mentioned 
how important a diverse perspective has been valued by her boards,  
Yes, where the business is female orientated, I certainly feel that my gender 
diversity is very important.  Consumer products have been a key place.  However, 
on my other non-consumer products board I bring value.  I seem to have a focus 
on human resources where the men did not.   
The perspective of this director supports the Marketing Rationale for board diversity sited 
in literature.  (Dallas 2002, Catalyst 2004 p 3).  The rationale purports that companies 
that employ a diverse group of people will successfully reach a broad range of customers 
and clients thereby increasing their profitability.  Additionally, board of director best 
practices suggests that a substantial number of directors, consider it important to have 
minority representation on the board.  The reason is “to better reflect the changing 
marketplace and the growth in minority market segments.”56 
All four of the black male Directors perceived that there were tangible benefits of diversity 
on the board.  One black male US director (#26082) provided a perspective on how 
diversity can benefit the board.   
There is added perspective which makes for a richer perspective and contribution.  
It is more holistic.  Without that diversity, it is not the same.  The CEO or chair 
may ask you occasionally to give your personal insight into an area directly 
affecting minorities.  Without this perspective the board discussion would be less 
thorough.   
A similar perspective is offered by another African-American male (#27242),  
Having a diverse point of view is helpful from the business point of view.  It adds a 
certain richness and vibrancy to the discussion.   
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56! Korn Ferry,26th Annual Board of Directors Study (1999) Service industries such as motels, restaurants, telephone, 
and airlines that have substantial minority employees are found to have more minority representation on boards, 
indicating a labor stakeholder orientation. Also in Fryxell G & Lerner L (1989). 
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Both of these directors had either experience or directorships in the Banking sector which 
is a service related industry.  In industries which are consumer service related, literature 
supports the importance of diversity on the board (Korn Ferry, 1999). 
The black female director in the US did not agree that she had seen tangible benefits of 
diversity.  She added that she was new to the board and therefore had no opportunity 
observe such benefits. 
In summary, both US white male directors, all white female directors, and all black male 
directors reported having seen tangible benefits to diversity on firm governance.  Only 
three out of eight UK white male directors perceived that there were tangible benefits to 
diversity on firm governance.  Of the three directors reporting benefits, it is interesting to 
note that one was an American in a UK firm, and that the other has worked extensively in 
the US in various executive positives.  It is possible that perhaps those two directors had 
developed a more Americanized viewpoint of diversity and its benefits.  There are several 
possible reasons why the other UK white male directors did not perceive tangible benefits 
of diversity.  First, is the possibility that there was no actual change to the board.   
Second, it is the case that most of these directors were not willing to attribute any such 
benefits to diversity.  Third, the extent of the impact of diversity may depend on the 
board’s needs.  Richard, et al, (2007) and Pitcher and Smith (2001) suggest that diversity 
has a positive impact on the firm in situations where creativity, proactivity and innovation 
is needed.  Richard et al. (2007) suggests that diversity and performance may not have a 
simple relationship and instead are impacted by the firm’s environment.  It is plausible, 
that the boards that these directors served on did not have an environment that benefitted 
from diversity.  
For those directors who perceived tangible benefits to diversity, all perceived those 
benefits to be economic benefits to the board.  None mentioned the normative view 
argument that a diverse board should be sought because of ethical reasons, thereby in 
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direct conflict with arguments by Fairfax (2003) and Wheeler (2009) that board diversity 
should be based on reasons of fairness or equity rather than economic.  
 
7.5%Key%Issue%3:%%Director%Perception%of%Social%Capital%%
7.5.1 Introduction 
This researcher was interested in whether the directors would perceive that social capital 
was a criterion in their own selection to the board, or if their companies seek new social 
capital when appointing new board members.  Section 1, questions 2-5 of the Interview 
Guide* sought to find out the director’s perceptions of this issue, and together provide a 
key theme of these results. 
Results of the interviews indicated that most UK directors do not believe that social 
capital was a consideration in their own appointment to the board.  However, their 
answers also reflect that boards seek various types of social capital and network ties 
including political connections, financial market contacts, work experience, and political 
ties as part of the criterion for board selection.  
US directors were more likely than their British counterparts to report that social capital or 
network ties were helpful for their board appointment.  Whereas the UK directors 
emphasized having different network ties on the board, the US directors reported being 
assisted by having similar networks and not new social networks.  This was represented 
by either knowing someone with ties to the board, having similar interest or similar 
industry activities.  This result is consistent with Krawiec (2013) who while interviewing 
US board members found that board placement in the United States still largely functions 
through personal and professional connections that they refer to as the “who you know” 
phenomenon. 
Amongst UK directors, both female directors perceived that their board membership 
provided new links to different demographic groups.  UK male directors did not report 
these new links. 
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Section 1 Questions number one, seven, eight, nine, and ten of Section I had the 
potential of revealing directors perceptions whether social capital their own or others’ 
board appointment.  The questions used in the interviews were discussed to either 
directly or indirectly provide an opportunity for the directors to give their perceptions of 
social capital and selection: 
Section I 
Question One: How were you selected to be a board director?  What was the 
course of events? 
Question Seven Did you have connections through your primary current or past 
employer that were helpful you in being selected for the board?  How 
important were they? 
Question Eight: Was there a perception that your influence on clubs and civic 
activities would be important to the board? 
Question Nine: Did you have connections with board members that were helpful in 
being selected for the board?  How important were they? 
Question Ten Did you have connections with the CEO that were helpful in being 
selected for the board?  How important were they? 
 
7.5.2 Director Perceptions of Social Capital UK: as a Criterion for Board Appointment 
Only two of the eight white males in UK perceived that social capital assisted in their 
being appointed to the board.  One of these Directors who indicated that social capital 
assisted in his being appointed mentioned political ties.  He felt that his political 
connections made him a more valuable selection.  He also indicated that he had 
connections in “The City” which is important for a chairman in enabling the firm to access 
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capital.  This director also highlighted his board’s preference for social capital in 
appointments saying,  
“One of the woman on the board has political connections.  The other woman has 
‘City’ connections.  It is important that the directors do not have the same social 
networks.” 
A similar result is found in the answers of the UK female directors, neither of the two 
white females perceived that social capital or network ties assisted in their being 
appointed to the board.  
These interview findings are also supported by the results of the UK survey.  The survey 
results did not support that Directors perceive group memberships provided them social 
capital that was important to their being selected for the board.  The combined results 
from these questions indicate that directors did not perceive that social capital gained 
from influence in groups of the same gender, nationality, or race influence their board 
appointment.   
 
7.5.3 Director Perception of Social Capital US: as a Criterion for Board Appointment 
Both of the white male US directors perceived that social capital or network ties were 
helpful in their appointment to the board.  One white male US Director (#23851) stated,  
I got a call from an old friend.  The friend was not a board member, but was a 
friend of the CEO of a company looking for another director.  At the time, I was 
looking to get off of the boards I was serving on, but decided to meet with the 
CEO at the request of my friend. 
Another white male US Director (#22152)) said,  
I have been on many boards over the years, and there is no one way of being 
selected that stands out.  On a few boards I was recruited by a head hunter but 
for several others I have been asked to serve by someone that I know.  
Director (#23851) thought that his connections with his two primary employers played a 
huge role.   
There were other things that made a difference, but work connections were the 
most significant to being asked to join the board.   
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Director (#22152) thought this his employment connections were most important to being 
selected for the board.  His background included significant leadership positions in the 
financial services industry.  He felt like this financial services experience is very good for 
companies to have on their boards. 
All three of the white female US Directors perceived that similar social capital or network 
ties were helpful in their appointment to the board.  One white woman director (#28772) 
explained her selection as,  
I was CEO/President of a smaller firm.  At a conference I gave a presentation to a 
group of industry professionals.  In the audience was the Chairman of the board I 
currently sit on.  He was impressed by my work that when they had a board 
opening he contacted me.  
A similar experience is reflected in another woman’s interview (#23690),  
I had many years of experience and had been a CEO/President of a small firm, I 
was giving a presentation at an industry event about a technical implementation 
that I had had led at another company.  In the audience was the Chairman of my 
current board.  He invited me to be on the board because the implementation I 
spoke about was related to an issue that his company was facing. 
Three out of the four black male US directors perceived that similar social capital or 
network ties were helpful in their appointment to the board.  One (#25151) US black male 
Director explained his appointment,  
I was in the right place at the right time.  I had served on a board of a university 
and that board position gave me exposure to corporate partners.  These 
interactions allowed these corporate individuals to become acquainted with my 
expertise.  These corporate partners were also people that I ran into at city 
symphony performances. 
The director was convinced that his familiarity with directors in professional and social 
settings was important to being selected.  He emphasized that his casual interactions at 
cultural performances was probably a strong deciding factor in allowing other directors to 
see him less of an outsider and “someone who could fit in.” 
Another example of the social capital criterion for selection is revealed in the answer 
given by another black male US Director.  In the interview with Director (#26082) he 
communicated that he was selected for the board based on the diversity of his 
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experience, influence he held in the local government, and contacts with state politicians.  
His contacts were different from the remaining board members.   
Because of my role at “X” company, I became very knowledgeable about state 
politics.  I also became friends with a number of state politicians.  These are very 
important contacts to the “X” industry.  When I was appointed to the board, there 
was an expectation that I could help the company understand the politics of state 
government.  
 Additionally this director said,  
Almost everyone on the board is from outside the state.  It was my social contacts 
to the state political leaders which was missing on the existing board.  
His political affiliations and political skill were instrumental in his being appointed.  A 
closer look at these two director interviews reveals two distinctly different approaches to 
their appointment to a company board.  In the first instance Director (#25151) was 
chosen based on his similar social capital, or his social palatability “sameness” and ability 
to fit in with the other board members (same industry, same cultural interest).  However, 
in the second example Director (#26082), was chosen because of his unique social 
network.  In this instance the board was deliberate in its attempt to appoint a director who 
could provide a bridge to a different network thereby increasing its ability to access new 
networks.  One possible explanation for this difference is that the first board could have 
been happy with their existing board composition and networks, and thus was searching 
for a board member who would be most like them.  However, the actions of the second 
group supports literature that suggests that a diverse group of board members may 
increase the diversity of social connections on the board given their unique and different 
network ties (Hagan 1988, Campbell 1988, Ibarra 1992).  The second board may have 
been actively seeking change or seeking access into other network groups, and therefore 
was seeking a board member who could provide links to these new networks.   
The black female director perceived that social capital or network ties were helpful in her 
appointment to the board.  Similar to the US white women, her social ties were based 
upon industry groups.  The black woman director (29290) mentioned a similar experience 
as the white women above  
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I have been very active in industry professional organizations.  I have made 
myself very visible in these circles and gave training courses to professionals in 
the industry.  I have established myself as an expert in this industry.  However, it 
is not only important to be at the meetings to establish myself as an expert, it is 
key to be in the same “circles” where these individuals are.  This assisted in my 
being asked to sit on a board. 
 
7.6%Key%Issue%4:%%Director%Perception%of%Social%Capital%in%Appointment:  
Has your being appointment to the board provided a link from the board to any new and 
different demographic groups? 
7.6.1 Director Perception of Social Capital in Appointment UK: Has your being 
appointment to the board provided a link from the board to any new and different 
demographic groups?  
None of the UK male directors thought that their appointment provided any new links to 
different demographic groups.  However, both female directors, agreed that their 
appointment to the board provided a link from the board to new and different 
demographic groups.  In each case, these directors answered that they were not selected 
for their ability to provide links to new or different groups; however, both believed that 
they provided these linkages once on the board.  
The first white female director (#12018) felt that her networks were very different and 
therefore this was an asset she brought to the board.  One example was an introduction 
to the women of the company to new networking groups that she was familiar with.  This 
included activities sponsored by Cranfield University, who she stated had a number of 
research initiatives in board diversity.  She felt that these networking opportunities were 
very helpful in encouraging women to network more.  The other female director (#12069) 
also felt as though her presence on the board resulted in new networks.  She is on 
boards of different cultural organizations, university women’s studies programs, as well 
as boards in other countries.  These are all new networks for the board and a source of 
information that enhances her technical expertise. 
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While none of the UK males perceived that they had provided new demographic links to 
the board, both UK females perceived their appointment had provided such links.  These 
differences between the UK male and female directors were also observed in the UK 
survey data discussed previously.  In the survey only 12% of male directors agreed that 
their appointment provided linkages between the company and new demographic groups, 
while 42% of females agreed that their appointment provided linkages.  These results 
suggest that, consistent with Burt (2001), diverse individuals may provide new social 
capital by virtue of their different demographic links.  Burt argues that individuals 
spanning two groups often improve the social capital of both groups.  Holes in the social 
structure “structural holes” create a competitive advantage for those individuals whose 
relationships span those holes.  Results of this thesis’s interviews and surveys indicate 
that female directors in the UK may create a competitive advantage for their boards due 
to this social spanning. 
7.6.2 Director Perception of Social Capital in Appointment US:  
Has your being appointment to the board provided a link from the board to any new and 
different demographic groups?  
Neither of the US white males perceived that their appointment provided any new links 
from the board to any new or different demographic groups, and none of the white female 
US directors perceived that their appointment to the board provided a link to any new or 
different demographic groups. 
Three of the four black male directors did not perceive that their appointment had 
provided new links between the board and any new and different demographic groups.  
The black male who believed that he provided new links was a director who was very 
prominent in the minority community.  His board, and therefore his company, has been 
able to reap the benefits of his ties to major community groups.  Much of the business of 
the company is consumer related, and his ties have allowed the company to secure 
several new exclusive distribution agreements with these large community groups. 
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The black female director did not perceive that her appointment had provided a link from 
the board to any new or different demographic groups. 
In summary, US directors were more likely than UK directors to perceive that their social 
contacts and network ties were important to their being appointed to the board.  
Consistent with their answers about whether race or gender was a consideration their 
appointment, UK directors were more likely to attribute their appointment solely to 
functional diversity (skills, experience, expertise).   
Both UK white women directors believed that their appointment brought new social 
capital or different network ties to new or different demographic groups.  However, only 
one white woman (UK), and one black male (US) felt their social capital was important to 
enhancing board capital.  These mixed findings provide inconclusive results.  The UK 
female results support arguments by Loury (1977) and by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) 
who argue that one of the indirect effects of diversity is the opportunity for the firm to 
access the diverse groups of contacts, relationships, and social ties that diverse directors 
may bring.  Additionally, they support arguments by Burt (2001) that diverse directors will 
allow the firm to bridge structural holds between the firm and its environment.   
In addition, US director answers indicate that directors were more likely to be chosen to 
increase homogeneity of social groups rather than diversity.  This may account for the 
lack of perceived new social connections among these directors and their boards.  
Additionally, this lends support to Rose (2007), who argues that because diverse 
directors are chosen from closely connected groups, any ability to bridge the firm to 
different groups or information is lost or significantly attenuated. 
Directors indicated that when they were chosen to diversify the board, diversity was 
primarily functional diversity such as experience and skills.  The directors’ answers 
revealed that boards prefer to have a variety of competencies from a variety of functional 
backgrounds on the board.  Functional diversity has been shown to improve decision 
making for boards.  Simmons, Pelled, and Smith (1999) argue that diversity is beneficial 
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for corporate decision-making, but only when the diversity is task related and used to 
increase debate.  They also argue that when members debate they are likely to draw on 
their diversity and on their divergent knowledge sets-to bolster their arguments.  As 
members are confronted with new information from diverse sources, they are often forced 
to rethink their points of view and consider factors not previously considered.  The 
directors in this thesis research indicated that functional diversity is sought by boards; 
however, the extent of its advantage may be modest as indicated by the number of 
directors that said that they do not often or intensely engage in board deliberations, but 
instead follow a path to quick consensus. 
 
7.7%Director%Perceptions%Gained%From%Director%OpenPEnded%Dialogue%
7.7.1.  Director Governance Training 
Most directors described having attended some type of informal or formal training in 
governance.  Six of the ten UK directors, and seven of the ten US directors had attended 
formal director governance training57.  One of the UK directors spoke about his extensive 
training in governance, but he was the exception in the group.  Others mentioned 
attending some seminars annually on governance or director performance issues.  When 
asked specifically about whether they had any governance training, other directors 
indicated that they focused on being the best at their particular vocation. Singh and 
Vinnicombe (2004) found that FTSE 100 firms with women directors adopted and 
reported the new governance practices recommended by the Higgs Review earlier than 
firms with all male boards.  One of the differences they found for these firms included 
having director induction and training, a regular review of board performance and the 
balance of board skills, knowledge and experience, and director succession planning 
structures, including approval for the use of external search consultants (Singh and 
Vinnicombe, 2004).  Supporting governance training literature, the two UK women 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 When soliciting interviews for the US study, the NACD meetings were one of the places that this researcher used to 
meet directors.  This perhaps biases the US group of directors since these directors were met in a board governance 
educational setting.   
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directors, both indicated that they had received governance training.  Additionally, all of 
the US women directors indicated having attended governance training. 
Six of the ten UK directors indicated having had formal governance training.  One of 
these directors (#10963) described extensive training, “ 
I have done quite a few of those courses.  Prior to appointment I volunteered to 
take a chartered director course.  It is a long course and is run by the Institute of 
Directors (18 months).  I have also taken director training offered internally by the 
company.”   
When asked about governance training, one of the white male directors explained that he 
preferred to focus on technical training, “I have joined a variety of professional accounting 
bodies and feel that this is very important to being able to stay current on financial 
issues.” 
In the US, one of the two white males had governance training.  He had not taken board 
classes, but had read board materials and articles as well as other informal reading on 
boards.  He had also spent time reading about board case history, and observing board 
leaders and other board members who had been successful.  One of the three US White 
Female directors had formal board training.  In addition she discussed that because she 
was President and CEO (#23690) she was qualified to be on the board, but that she 
continues to go to board education classes. 
All four Black Male directors had pursued formal board governance training.  One of the 
black male directors (#27242) mentioned that he is a member of the NACD and was in 
the first class awarded the certificate of professionalism.  He also completes 30 hours of 
director education classes per year.  Another of the black male directors (#25151) 
mentioned that at the time he was appointed to the board, there were not formal Directors 
Education classes, but now that they exist he has taken advantage of them.  He 
mentioned that at the beginning of his tenure as a board member he had to come up to 
speed with some business terminology due to his non-business background.  Director 
(#29602) spoke of ongoing governance training.  This included board training once each 
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year for 5 hours per year, reading board publications and magazines, subscriptions, 
business case studies, best practices, and governance information.  He also said that he 
tried to learn from talking to other board members.  The last of the black male directors 
(#26082) also had governance training.  In addition to informal board education, he has 
had board training and certification from NACD.  He also mentioned that he had served 
on 12 or 13 other boards previously so that gave him additional experience.   
The black female director had attended governance training.  She had also taught a two-
day Bank Directors course, and she has attended bank Director’s College by the State 
Bankers College.  The director mentioned that her involvement in this training was 
important to her becoming well known and respected in the industry.  Her comment was, 
It is about who knows your skills, and who can validate your skills. 
 
7.7.2.  Director Debate: Quick Agreement or a Tendency to Debate 
Section III, questions 3-4* from the Interview Guide allowed the directors to discuss 
whether they normally engage in debate or find immediate agreement on board issues.  
Results indicated that directors across countries, gender, and race were very much 
committed to reaching consensus.  The answers do not clearly reveal whether this drive 
to reach consensus supersedes director’s willingness to participate in dialogue that would 
enhance the board's strategic decisions.  Additionally, the interviews suggest that board 
members employ a variety of methods to reach consensus such as pre-meetings.  Lastly, 
there were some directors, both male and female who felt that the women on their board 
challenged board members more than other directors and asked a great number of 
questions. 
*Section III 
3. What is your assessment of your relationship with other directors? 
4. How agreeable are you with other board members?  Do you normally find much 
debate with other directors, or normally agree right away? 
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7.7.2.1 Director Debate UK: Agreement Right Away or a Tendency to Debate 
Four of the eight white male directors indicated that they do not engage in debate and 
instead come to quick agreement on most issues.  One UK director (#11583) said,  
We are not very likely to challenge others on the board.  Perhaps we could 
challenge a bit more than we currently do.  We generally very quickly come to a 
consensus.  We don’t often have votes.  In three years there has only been a vote 
two or three times.  Normally a consensus is reached.   
Another UK white male director (#12778) also explained the importance of reaching 
consensus,  
We all are aware that we all must reach a consensus. We all challenge each other 
equally.  
However, later in the conversation the director gave a slightly different perspective when 
he offered   
We do not challenge others much and agree often to the decision.  
 
UK Director (#10929) described his personal style as follows, 
 All of the individuals must work to reach a consensus.  We all tend to challenge 
each other equally.   
However, later in the discussion the director indicated,  
I do not challenge much of what is suggested at board meetings and I agree often 
with the other directors.   
One of the UK chairmen (#11583) in the study described his role of leadership as 
consensus building.  In his interview he stated,  
As a chairman, you have to be able to lead to consensus.   
 
This statement was very revealing to this researcher, as he did not state that his job was 
to necessarily lead to the best decision, but only to lead to consensus.  However, his 
importance placed on consensus could have been because of the question topic of 
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consensus, and the subject on the top of this mind.  However, the statements on 
consensus highlight the importance that consensus building was given with the directors 
interviewed in the UK.  Another white male chairman (#12982) qualified his statement to 
include which items were more likely to be debated.  He indicated that debate was more 
likely on big issues,  
We are more likely to have extensive debate on significant items such as five-year 
plans.  These types of issues call for more discussion and debate and lead to 
better decisions. 
Two of the UK white male directors gave specific details regarding the methods used to 
reach consensus on the board.  These discussions are examples that consensus is 
sometimes reached after debate.  One of the UK Chairman (#11583) interviewed 
explained his process as the following:  
I have smaller informal meetings with directors prior to the board meeting.  This is 
where the discussion really takes place.  Since as the chairman I am a non-
executive, these ‘telephone’ meetings are even more important and often serve as 
pre-meetings.  
Another example of how consensus is reached came from UK director (#12778)) who 
said,  
There is normally much debate around key issues, finding alignment once a 
debate is in process can sometimes be hard. If there is not a possibility of 
alignment we take the issue away and are asked to do additional research and 
present again at a later date. 
Both of the white women UK directors said that they did not agree right away, and 
debated issues on the board.  One of the women directors (#12069) reported that 
everyone on her board debated a lot.  Additionally, this director indicated that her 
executive team gains consensus prior to the board meeting.  
Prior to the meeting we get together as a team and agree on our position.  When 
we go into a board meeting, we want to be a united front as executive staff.   
The other woman (#12018) reported that she engaged in debate on her board; and that 
she believed women debated more than the male directors.  She described it in this way,  
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Women seem to be less eager to just follow.  They are more likely to ask "Why" or 
Please Explain.  
The opinion of this director was supported by a UK male director (#11583) who said,  
Women are more likely to say I don’t understand than most men directors.  Men 
will often wait until after the meeting to admit that they did not understand and 
seek greater clarification.  Additionally, women seem to be better at asking 
questions in a way that is tactful and doesn’t agitate the other directors.   
7.7.2.2 Director Debate US: Agreement Right Away or a Tendency to Debate 
Neither of the white male directors indicated that they engaged in much debate with their 
boards and instead emphasized the need to reach consensus.  One of these directors 
reported that they do not agree right away, but also focuses more in the discussion on the 
need to reach a consensus.  This director (#23851) acknowledge that while they may not 
reach a quick agreement, they are very aware of the need to respect others opinions and 
reach a consensus,   
You must always be conscious of the relationship.  The most important element in 
the relationships on the board is mutual respect.  The current board is a very 
cohesive team.  There is not necessarily a quick agreement, but there is always 
an emphasis on relationship and consensus.   
Two of the three of the white female directors indicated that they engage in much debate 
with their boards, but also emphasized that they are focused on reaching consensus   
One US women director (#28772) cautioned about how much it may be appropriate to 
debate, and said,   
It just depends on whether it is worth fighting for.  I pick my battles.  Some women 
are not listened to because they take insignificant things and pick a battle over every 
one of them.  Consequently they are then not listened to.  
Another US woman director (#23690) believed that women are well suited to help being 
the board to consensus.  She said,  
I have noticed that women tend to be consensus builders.  Women will often drive 
decisions to a consensus. 
Two of the four black male directors agreed that they engaged in debate and did not 
normally reach immediate agreement.  One black male US director (#25151) said,  
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Although I often do not immediately agree with everything, it is important to realize 
that consensus is very important.  I debate a lot at board meetings, but I always 
come to the consensus.   
Another US black male (#26082) expressed a similar perspective,  
I challenge management but am not disruptive.  You have to actually bring value 
to the board.  I give a different perspective.  I do not agree right away, but I don’t 
debate.   
The black female (#29290) did not agree that she normally agreed right away.  She 
explained,  
I evaluate based on my own independent analysis and the specific issues.  There 
is discussion among all directors.  I operate independently. 
Women in both countries were more likely than men to say that they challenge the 
prevailing opinion of the board.  This behavior is consistent with good governance 
according to Higgs (2003, p. 27) that says, non-executive directors should constructively 
challenge and contribute to the development of strategy58.  Additionally, this result 
supports Ramirez’s (2003) argument (p 859) that benefits to diversity include a reduction 
in groupthink, increased decision-making quality, and helps to avoid mindless adherence 
to group norms, and a failure of group members to challenge implicit or explicit 
assumptions.  It also supports Elstad and Ladegard (2010) who argue that women 
directors do not reduce their visibility by censoring their opinions.  In contrast, these 
results do not support arguments by Fairfax that diverse directors lacking of a critical 
mass of diversity on the board would not feel confident enough to voice dissenting 
opinions.  The results of this thesis research are also mixed.  While the interview results 
indicate that diverse directors were more likely to engage in debate and board discussion, 
the survey results did not corroborate these findings.  The UK survey results found 
fundamentally conflicting outcomes.  The women who completed the survey did not share 
this opinion of themselves.  Of the seven women who chose to answer the question, all 
indicated that they agreed with most decisions without much debate either always or 
almost always.  One can conclude from this analysis that either 1.) The women did 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 Five of the six women directors interviewed act as Non-executive directors on their boards.   
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debate more than other members of the board, but failed to recognize this trait in 
themselves, or 2.)The women did not debate very often.  Results from the UK survey 
indicated that no group indicated that they were likely to debate an issue prior to 
agreeing.  This was determined by testing the director answers for all groups on the 
question “Normally, how often do you agree (without much debate) with most board 
members on important company issues.  The majority of directors (76.8%) indicated that 
most of the time they agree without much debate.  19.6% of the directors indicated they 
agree about half the time without much debate, and 3.6% said not that often.  No director 
of any demographic felt as though they debate often prior to agreement on important 
company issues.  This may raise warning signs that directors may be relinquishing some 
of their responsibilities of due diligence in favor of reaching consensus, possibly seeking 
social palatability (Rose 2007).  Alternatively, it may signal that the informal channels of 
communication; often outside and prior to board meetings, is where many of the debates 
are held.   
 
 
7.7.3.  Director Functional Diversity: Experience and Expertise 
Functional diversity was mentioned often by UK and US directors, in the context of 
making sure that the board had a diverse set of experiences (previous experience as a 
CEO, CPA, etc.).  Director answers also indicate that boards acknowledge a need to 
have a variety of expertise on their boards, (law, accounting, marketing, etc.) and 
therefore seek to find diversity in the technical expertise of their boards.  Results indicate 
that directors believed that expertise and experience should be the primary reason to 
select a director.  Directors agree that their own appointments were primarily based upon 
their experience and technical expertise.  Additionally, based on their answers describing 
why they were appointed, is a tendency to accept functional diversity as a positive for the 
board.  Directors indicated that when they were chosen to diversify the board, that 
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diversity was primarily functional diversity.  The directors’ answers revealed that boards 
prefer to have a variety of competencies from a variety of backgrounds on the board.   
This emphasis on expertise and experience was consistent with both the UK and US 
directors.  However, when the US Directors were asked the same questions, they were 
more likely to include other factors in their selection besides expertise and experience.  
The US directors were also keen to explain the particular competency or skill they were 
chosen for with their appointment, and in three cases (#25151, #23851, #22152) 
mentioned individual connections that were helpful in their gaining board positions.  Like 
those in the UK, US directors also communicated that they were selected first for their 
expertise.  However, eight of the ten US director’s answers indicated that other factors 
were important.  Unlike the UK directors who were hesitant to discuss any reasons other 
than skill as a basis for their appointment, the US directors often added more dimensions 
to their appointment criteria.  Eight of the ten directors included information on either 
individuals that they knew through social connections to the board, organizations that 
they were a part of, or access to networks important to the board.  Therefore, the US 
directors appeared to acknowledge that there were other elements that influenced their 
appointment to the board.  So while the US directors answers were consistent with 
expertise being the primary selection criteria, eight of the ten offered other factors that 
may have influenced the selection. 
7.7.3.1 Director Functional Diversity UK: Experience and Expertise 
Seven of the eight UK male directors perceived that their boards sought to provide 
functional diversity with their appointments, while one of the two white female UK 
directors perceived that their boards sought to provide functional diversity to the board 
with their appointments. 
7.7.3.2 Director Functional Diversity US: Experience and Expertise 
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Both of the US white male directors perceived that their boards were seeking functional 
diversity with their appointments.  One of these directors provided financial expertise for 
his board, and the other director mentioned that his board was seeking someone with 
former CEO experience. 
Two of the three white women perceived that their boards were seeking functional 
diversity with their appointments.  These two women mentioned giving industry 
presentations that were key to their appointments, in both cases their general 
participation in industry events and speaking engagements led to there being known as 
an expert within the field that their boards sought to provide functional diversity to the 
board.   
Three of the four black male US directors perceived that their boards were seeking 
functional diversity with their appointments.  For example, one of the directors mentioned 
his financial competency and auditing background, and another mentioned his 
background as a marketing specialist.  Another director, (#29602)African-American male, 
mentioned that several of the boards he was on had been looking to diversify, but also 
indicated that his functional skill set in marketing and large company experience was 
primary.   
“In the case of “X” company and “Y” company they were looking to add more 
diversity to the board.  “X” company had one African-American female and wanted 
an African American male.  Hoever,“Y” Company was looking for both marketing 
and big company experience with diversity as a second criteria.”   
Whether specific expertise in an area, or experience, most directors discussed being 
selected for the board on the basis of their having these traits. 
The black female director perceived that her board was seeking functional diversity with 
her appointment.  She mentioned that her board was seeking to add a board member 
who could provide regulatory expertise. 
These results support findings by Krawiec et al. (2013) who found during interviews that 
directors were able to give numerous concrete examples of the benefits of functional 
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diversity on their boards, but had difficulty defining specific examples of the benefits of 
demographic diversity. 
7.8%Closing%Summary%
The perspectives of the US and UK Directors were somewhat different across many 
interview questions.  The Directors differed in the way their were recruited, their 
perception of whether there are tangible benefits to diversity on the board, the length of 
time the board spends in deliberation versus reaching consensus, and whether race or 
gender diversity was a selection factor when being appointed.  There are a number of 
factors that could have contributed to this development.  Firstly, the directors in the US 
group were extremely diverse.  The US group comprised 4 black males, 1 black female, 3 
white females, and 2 white males.  In contrast the UK group comprised 8 white males and 
2 white females.  So while the UK answers are provided mostly by white males; the 
answers from the US directors are provided mostly from diverse individuals.  Second, 
since the US directors interviewed were in large part diverse, the boards they sit on were 
diverse.  Sitting on a corporate board that is diverse may give a director a different 
perspective, than sitting on one that is not.  Thirdly, in the US and the UK there may be 
country specific expectations for diversity on the board.  For example, when the UK 
boards were asked if there were pressures from special interest groups that might affect 
their board’s diversity, they said no.  However, for several of the US board members, they 
mentioned that board diversity is sometimes good for public relations indicating there may 
be public pressure for board diversity in the US that impacts US boards. 
It appears that when boards are diverse, they are deliberately diverse.  There are several 
perceptions that indicate this may be the case.  First, when asked if race or gender was 
considered in the appointment of a woman or minority director, almost all directors 
indicated that it was a consideration.  This result suggests that when boards consider 
diverse directors, that diversity is an element of the selection process.  Second, a majority 
of black directors in the US were chosen with the help of a recruitment firm; suggesting a 
deliberate search for diversity.  This result is supported by one of the US white female 
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directors who explained that her board asks the recruitment firm to present a slate of 
equal numbers of male and female candidates.  The black male directors in the US also 
explained a selection process that included intentional seeking diverse candidates.  
Board diversity does not seem to just happen without board members who are committed 
to diversity, and boards will only intentionally seek diversity if they feel diversity has 
tangible benefits.   
While women, black males, and US white males perceived there to be tangible benefits to 
diversity, most UK white male directors did not see tangible benefits to diversity, and 
some felt that board diversity was at a cost to them.  This may partly explain why 40% of 
UK boards had no gender diversity.  Additionally, this perception does not suggest than 
an increase in UK board diversity is imminent without a change in perceptions, as those 
white male directors in the UK may not intentionally seek diversity in their boards.   
Similarly, results in the US suggest that board appointments continue to be influenced by 
sharing similar social networks.  This may impair the board’s ability to benefit from 
diverse forms of social capital that diverse directors could have brought, limit the board’s 
exposure to potential board members who do not share the same social networks, as well 
as partly explain the small number of minorities on boards, and suggests the increasing 
board diversity is only possible when specific actions to increase diversity are taken. 
As compared to the results of the survey, the demographics of the interviewees are 
consistent with those of the survey respondents with respect to age, years of experience, 
and board tenure.  Three key interview issues and findings serve to support the results of 
this thesis’s UK survey59, but one area provides conflicting results.  First, findings within 
Key Issue 1 suggest that white males do not believe their race or gender is an advantage 
in the board selection process.  These results are also consistent with the findings of this 
thesis’s UK survey.  Second, both the interviews and surveys reflect that UK directors 
believe recruitment firms are important players in the board appointment process (Key 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
59 Chapter 6, page 201 contains the results of this researchers UK survey. 
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Issue 4).  Third, results of both the interviews and the UK survey indicate that women 
directors may provide new and different types of social capital and networks to the board, 
consistent with literature on diversity and structural holes (Key Issue 3).  However, 
regarding Key Issue 2, while interview answers by women directors, consistent with prior 
literature, indicate that women tend to question and seek debate more than male 
directors, which may improve the board decision-making process, and provide tangible 
benefits to diversity, this result was not supported in the UK survey data.  
The inconsistencies between the UK Interviews and UK Surveys are probably the result 
of strong cultural norms or expectations.  For example, it may be culturally inappropriate 
for UK directors to attribute leadership differences or benefits to gender.  Contrary 
findings may be due to small sampling problems, as there were only 8 women in the 
survey and 6 in the interviews.  These women may not have been representative on Key 
Issues.  Lastly, the ideas may not have been strongly held by interviewees and possibly 
varied from one time period to the next. 
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Chapter 8 Director Perceptions of Social Capital as a Rationale for Board 
Diversity 
8.1%Introduction%
This chapter is intended to provide reflections and analysis of the thesis data from a 
social capital perspective.  The goal of the chapter is to provide a theoretical contribution 
to existing social capital literature (Kim and Cannella, 2008; Westphal and Stern, 2006; 
Burt, 2001; Peng, 2004) and provide a discussion about how directors perceive board 
social capital and diversity.  The chapter includes a discussion of how social capital 
impacts the board, and whether it provides a rationale for board diversity.  Additionally, it 
will present an analysis of the survey questions and interview questions from the 
viewpoint of social capital. 
8.2%Social%Capital’s%ability%to%enhance%Board%Governance%%
Five economic rationales commonly given to support board diversity are 1) attracting 
diverse customers (marketing rationale); 2) developing policies that provide equal 
opportunity and fairness for employees and signal to the market that the company 
operates fairly (legal rationale); 3) providing an example to employees and outsiders 
about company values (employee relations); 4) ensuring that new and different 
professionals are on the board (talent rationale) thereby providing a diverse viewpoint for 
the board; and 5) preventing board group-think (super-outsider or governance rationale) 
(Fairfax 2005, Dallas 2002, Catalyst 2004). The goal of this chapter is to explore 
theoretically whether director social capital enhances any of these five rationales, or 
whether social capital can be considered as a plausible sixth rationale. 
 Board directors can directly or indirectly increase overall shareholder or stakeholder 
value.  The five rationales of board diversity are primarily thought to directly increase firm 
economic value.  However, the social capital provided to the board by virtue of the 
directors provides another potential rationale for board diversity.  This can include 
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providing additional resources such as legitimacy, advice and counsel, and links to other 
organizations (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003), or other attributes associated with social 
capital that the director may bring to the firm due to his or her selection to the board.  This 
social capital may also serve as a resource to span or bridge structural holes or 
weaknesses.  Burt (2001) suggests that demographically diverse directors may have 
unique social ties they can use to assist in spanning structural holes between the firm and 
potential new markets, or supplies thus providing a potential competitive advantage.  This 
potential social capital benefit has not yet been discussed within the existing five 
rationales, and presents an argument for a potential sixth rationale. 
To determine if directors perceive that board appointments were made with the 
expectation that directors would bring an increase in firm social capital, directors were 
asked questions via surveys and interviews which would help to determine if they 
perceived that this was the case.  
Figure 8.1: Board Expectations when Selecting Directors 
 
 
In developing Figure 8.1, this researcher considered the following relationship between 
social capital and board selection: board members, all other things equal, can either be 
selected because their social network is similar to other board members (“Like Directors”) 
Demographically!Similar!
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Expectation!of!Similar!
Social!Capital?!
Result!–!Minimal!Change!
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in which case their social network serves a reinforcing function to board capital.  This 
should result in minimal change in firm social networks.  Or, board members can be 
selected because their social network is different than other board members 
(“Demographically Diverse Directors”).  The selection of a Like Director is likely to arise 
when the firm has established a productive business niche and is interested in 
intensifying the links between the firm and existing social network (Kim and Cannella, 
2008).  Furthermore, in addition to actively searching for like directors because of their 
similar demographic characteristics, the firm’s business niche also intensifies the 
attractiveness of like directors.  This effect is distinct from any natural tendency to select 
new members that the current directors are already closely connected to (Westphal and 
Stern, 2006).  Selecting an additional board member whose social network is similar with 
that of existing board members can signal to the firm’s client that the firm is investing in 
its existing social relationships, and seeking to strengthen its existing partnerships rather 
than exploring new relationships.  However, individuals with similar social networks often 
have similar information and therefore provide redundant information benefits (Burt, 
2001), resulting in a minimal change in the firm’s social networks (Figure 8.1 top box on 
right hand side).  So while the incumbent directors may desire to select candidates who 
are closely linked to them, firm strategic direction may lead them to select those who are 
best suited to the particular strategy in which the firm is pursuing (Kim and Cannella, 
2008). The danger is that in reinforcing existing social links and networks, the firm may be 
reducing the total amount of information available to the board for decision-making. 
Consequently, if the firm chooses a board member whose social network is dissimilar to 
that of the existing board members (“Demographically Diverse Director” box on lower 
left), then the firm is exhibiting a desire to bridge to new clients or simply attempting to 
avoid further investment in homogeneous social capital.  Thus, the selection of different 
social capital may suggest 1) a strategic change in direction, 2) simply a desire to search 
for additional clients or opportunities, or 3) an effort to avoid board inflexibility due to a 
narrow range of social capital.  Additionally, firms who need to increase their legitimacy, 
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such as young firms, may have a greater need for social networks outside their existing 
network (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Kim and Cannella, 2008).  The option to explore a 
more heterogeneous mix of social networks via the directors; puts the firm in a position to 
bridge to new social networks and increase firm sales and profits (Burt, 2001).  As 
discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, Burt (2001) argues that individuals who belong to 
different types of groups may provide a bridge between those groups.  His theory 
describes social capital functioning as a broker in a given network of relationships 
between people or groups otherwise disconnected in social structure. 
Demographically diverse directors can potentially span to new social networks as they 
may provide linkages or bridges to different types of groups (Portes, 1998).  Hillman 
(2002) found that female and racial minority directors bring more resources than the 
additional perspectives provided by their gender and/or race.  They also accelerated ties 
to other organizations.  These accelerated ties are a source of social capital.  Moreover, 
consistent with resource dependency theory, Provan (1980) finds that firms who are able 
to attract andentice powerful members of the community onto their boards are able to 
acquire critical resources from the environment.  Women directors have been shown to 
have greater community influence, and also have statistically significant differences in 
their backgrounds as compared to male directors (Singh, et al. 2008).  
If a change in type of social capital is effective, then the firm experiences an increase in 
its value, which is depicted by the lower right hand box in Figure 8.1 labeled “Increase in 
Social Capital”.  Alternatively, if the investment in a different or unique social network 
decreases firm value (Woolcock, 1998), it translates into a negative return on its 
investment in the new and dissimilar social network, which is depicted by the lower right 
hand box in Figure 8.1 as a decrease in social capital.  This decrease can be caused by 
potential negative consequences of social capital such as excess claims on group 
members (Portes, 1998).  Moreover, Peng (2004) finds that while resource-rich directors 
have a positive influence on firm performance, resource-poor outside directors do not.  
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This is reflected in Figure 8.1 in the bottom right box as bridge or spanning to new social 
capital which decreases capital. 
If Figure 8.1 holds true, and diverse directors bridge to different connections thereby 
spanning new and diverse structural gaps; then one of the indirect effects of diversity, 
and thus a potential sixth rationale, is the opportunity for the firm to access the diverse 
groups of contacts, relationships, and social ties that diverse directors may bring.  Social 
ties with key external constituencies may result in strategic ties that the firm can leverage 
for resources (Pfeffer and Salanik, 1978).   
In order to determine whether social capital could really be considered a sixth potential 
rationale for board diversity, it is helpful to determine if theoretically social capital not only 
is beneficial to the board and consequently the firm, but more importantly how it is 
beneficial to governance.  Figure 8.2 is provided as a way to display how social capital 
may improve governance.   
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Figure 8.2 How Social Capital May Improve Governance  
Per Resource Dependency Functions (adapted 1. to 4.  From Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
 
Resource Dependency Theory argues that the role of board members include providing 
the firm with certain resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Figure 8.2 shows how social 
capital can contribute to the board’s four main governance roles: Quadrant (1) advice and 
counsel, Quadrant (2) legitimacy, Quadrant (3) channels for communicating information 
between external organizations and the firm, and Quadrant (4) preferential access to 
commitments or support from important elements outside the firm.  Each of these 
resource areas can be aided by social capital. 
The director’s role of advice and counsel, Quadrant 1, shows how these governance 
roles can be positively impacted by social capital.  Diverse social capital can provide 
access, via its bridging function, to a diverse group of individuals thereby diversifying and 
enhancing the potential advise and counsel available to the firm.  These new social 
networks may contribute new sources of unique, or "non-redundant" relationships (Burt 
1992) that bring new information and advice.  Quadrant (2) shows how the legitimizing 
role of directors can be positively impacted by social capital.  Prestigious or legitimate 
• A#diverse#group#of#board#members#may#increase#the#diversity#of#social#linkages#and#connections#to#the#board#given#their#unique#and#different#networks.#
• Social#Capital#of#directors#can#assist#the#>irm#in#communicating#useful#information#to#the#>irm's#external#environment.#
• Social#Capital#of#directors#can#provide#access#and#potential#alignment#between#the#>irm#and#powerful#members#of#the#community.#
• Diverse#Social#Capital#can#provide#access#to#a#diverse#group#of#individuals#thereby#diversifying#and#enhancing#the#potential#knowledge#base#the#>irm#has#access#to.# 1.)#Advise#and#Counsel# 2.)#Legitimacy#
4.)#Access#to#important#external#elements#3.)#Channels#for#communication#
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persons or organizations represented on the board provide confirmation to stakeholders 
and customers of the value and worth of the organization (Pfeffer and Salancik,1978).  
The social capital of directors can provide access and potential alignment between the 
firm and powerful members of the community (Provan, 1980).  This is shown to be 
particularly true for firms who need to increase their legitimacy and may have a greater 
need for social networks outside their existing network (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Kim 
and Cannella, 2008).  Quadrant (3) shows how social capital can improve the 
communication role of directions.  Social Capital of directors can assist the firm in 
communicating useful information to the firm's external environment by increasing 
information channels via the diverse social connections of directors.  Social networks 
expand both the epistemic environment (what is known) and the rate at which that 
environment is accessed (how rapidly).  Information can be expected to spread across 
actors in the same market, but it will circulate within networks before it circulates between 
networks (Burt 1992).  A diversity of board social networks can assist the board in 
spreading information within networks of diverse groups, thereby helping to spread the 
firms information in a faster more efficient manner.  Quadrant (4) shows how social 
capital provides the firm with improved access to commitments or support from important 
elements outside the firm.  A diverse group of board members may increase the diversity 
of social linkages and connections to the board given their unique and different networks.  
It is not unusual for people within the same social networks to seek commitments or 
support from those within that social network.  Choosing diverse directors can assist in 
broadening the number of potential contacts that are able to provide commitment or 
support to firm objectives. 
These benefits of diverse social capital make it a plausible contender for inclusion as a 
sixth rationale for board diversity (see Figure 8.3).  However, to further investigate 
whether social capital should be considered an additional rationale; this researcher 
sought to determine whether there was a common denominator that social capital shred 
with the five rationales for board diversity.  Firstly, each of the board diversity rationales 
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assumes that race or gender benefits the board in some specific way.  The rationale 
describes how it is beneficial, or more specifically what function it serves in improving 
governance.  Looking specifically at functionality, this researcher determined that each of 
the rationales performs an important function of bridging a specific gap to necessary firm 
resources.  Figure 8.3 serves to show how each rationale helps to acquire needed 
resources. 
Figure 8.3 Rationales for Board Diversity (Fairfax, 2005) including proposed new Social 
Capital Rationale 
 
Each of the board diversity rationales acts as a potential bridge to fill gaps in the 
resources needed by the corporation for the most effective governance.  For example, 
the talent rationale (first box in Figure 8.3, counting clockwise from lower left) argues that 
given the diversity of the labor market, firms cannot ignore portions of the labor pool when 
accessing talent.  Corporations that ignore portions of the labor pool may miss out on the 
Improved#Governance#Talent#Rationale#Board#should#represent#talent#from#diverse#population#segments#
Preventing#GroupNThink#Rationale.##Diversity#of#opinion#and#thought#because#of#demographic#differences#
Market#Rationale.#Greater#ability#to#market#to#all#segments#of#a#diverse#population#
Employee#Relations#Rationale.##Employees#are#more#con>ident#in#>irm#policies/#fairness#when#the#board#is#diverse.# Litigation#Rationale.#Discrimination#lawsuits#are#less#likely#because#diversity#signals#fairness#and#diverse#input#to#policy.#
Social#Capital#Rationale.#Firm#can#link#to#diverse#social#groups#creating#more#social#capital#and#its#bene>its.#
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talented individuals in that ignored labor segment.  The firms that ignore segments of the 
labor pool, will not have the most talented group of directors.  Board diversity; by insuring 
that the board is accessing all segments of the labor pool for board positions, functions as 
a bridge to better talent who would otherwise be under-utilized. 
The second box in Figure 8.3, is the rationale that board diversity aids in helping the 
board to make better quality decisions.  This argument assumes that heterogeneous 
groups make better quality decisions (Carter et al.), and therefore a board that is not 
diverse will not be at their optimal decision making capabilities.  This rationale argues that 
the function of board diversity is to bridge the board to a diverse set of directors, which is 
necessary for optimal decision-making. 
The third box in Figure 8.3 is the marketing rationale.  This rationale argues that firms 
with diverse directors will be better at marketing to diverse populations, as well as 
developing products which will appeal to those populations.  Board diversity functions as 
a method for insuring that the firm creates the best marketing strategies.  Without diverse 
board members, the firm will not have this necessary resource. 
The fourth rationale is presented in fourth box of Figure 8.3.  This rationale is referred to 
as the employee relations rationale, and argues that a diverse board will facilitate 
company policies which reflect the concerns of all employees, and diverse board 
members will act as a signal that the firm is operating fairly.  These fair policies will assist 
in maintaining a satisfied workforce that believes the firm to be fair, and therefore will 
produce higher productivity.  The function of this rationale for board diversity is to bridge 
this gap to diverse perspectives to the board when policies are written.  Without these 
diverse board members, the board will not have access to these diverse perspectives.  
The fifth rationale is the litigation rationale.  Related to the employee relations rationale, 
this rationale assumes that there is a gap in the directors knowing what types of policies 
the firm should pass.  The assumption is that diverse directors have a perspective, and 
sensitivity to issues of discrimination that can get the board sued.  Therefore, these 
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diverse directors can anticipate the problems and appropriately suggest actions which will 
help the firm to avoid discrimination litigation. Therefore the function of this rationale is to 
provide the board with a bridge to these diverse perspectives.  Without these diverse 
members of the board, the board would not have these members to perform this 
important function. 
The final box, representing the new sixth rationale, is social capital.  Like the other six 
rationales, the rationale assumes that race or gender benefits the board in a specific way.  
Like the other rationales, the rationale describes how it is beneficial, and what function it 
serves in improving governance.  Looking specifically at functionality, this researcher 
determined that, like the other five rationales, diverse social capital performs the 
important function of bridging a specific gap to necessary firm resources.    
As shown in Figure 8.1, the primary role of diverse social capital is to bridge the firm to 
diverse networks and social ties.  These could be in the form of personal relationships of 
the directors, diverse clubs or other social activities, or other non-employment based 
contacts.  These diverse social contacts present an opportunity for the board to access 
the benefits accrued to them by virtue of these unique groups. 
Consistent with the other five rationales that function as a bridge to new social capital, 
this analysis suggests that social capital should be considered as a sixth rationale for 
board diversity.  Social Capital serves a role in governance (figure 8.2), and rises to the 
standard of other rationales for board diversity.  
Researchers have noted the difficulty in isolating social capital from human capital 
(Coleman, 1988 and Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998), and have determined that the two are 
conceptually and empirically difficult to define and disentangle.  However, in order to 
narrow the range of social capital variables, this researcher restricted the definition of 
social capital in this study to connections by virtue of personal relationships, club 
memberships, and other non-employment based contacts.  Previous research has looked 
at how a variety of human and social capital attributes (education level, expertise, etc.) 
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differ for board candidates (Lester et al., 2008).  This researcher chose to determine if the 
specific social capital attributes identified above differ for diverse candidates, and whether 
these attributes make a difference in how they contribute to their boards.  These 
questions are used to determine if the social capital of demographically diverse directors 
differs from that of like directors.  This thesis was not designed to attempt to directly 
measure social capital; therefore those questions, both in the survey and the interview 
guide,  that may give some insight into board member’s perceptions of social capital do 
so indirectly.  Results of my research indicate that most UK directors do not believe that 
social capital was a consideration in their own appointment to the board.  However, their 
answers also reflect that boards do seek various types of work experience and human 
capital.  For example, consistent with Lester et al. (2008), director answers reveal that 
various resources are sought from directorial appointments including political 
connections, financial market contacts, and work experience, as part of the criterion for 
board selection. 
In closing this section, however, it also seems that social capital, like race and gender, is 
an attribute of a board director.  As a consequence, although social capital can have an 
impact on board governance along with the five board diversity rationales, what should 
also be apparent is that social capital, also like race and gender, is an element of 
diversity unto itself. 
8.3%UK%Survey%Results%–%Social%Capital%Questions%
!
The UK Survey of FTSE 350 directors included a several questions designed to indirectly 
gain the perceptions of directors regarding the importance of social capital in their 
selection and their board governance, as well as determine whether social capital is 
another board diversity rationale.   
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Table 8.1: Social Capital Related Survey Questions 
Question Topic Question Characteristic Literature 
Selection Process Influence that I have in organizations comprised 
mostly of those of my “varying characteristic” was 
very important in my being appointed for this board. 
Race 
Gender 
 
Sheridan, 2001.Women who successfully obtain board 
positions have long- standing, close relationships with other 
female directors. 
Catalyst, 1995. Women directors are good at networking 
with other women. 
Singh et al., 2006.  Women often act as speakers at 
networking events, which women find very inspiring, and an 
opportunity to gain encouragement. 
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Selection Process Personal connections with the CEO were important to 
my being appointed to this board. 
What is your assessment of your relationship with the 
CEO of this company? 
 Kim and Cannelle, 2008.  Question suggested by Kim and 
Cannelle to determine level of internal social capital.  Internal 
social capital influences director selection because 
incumbents will naturally favor and trust others like 
themselves and others to whom they have close 
interpersonal relationships. 
Diversity The types and nature of community group 
memberships I hold seem very different as compared 
to others on the board. 
 Harper, 2002. Dimension of social networks may be 
understood by evaluating the number of cultural, leisure, 
social groups belonged to.   
Diversity My appointment to the board provided linkages 
between the company and new demographic groups. 
 Hillman et al., 2002 examine how firms seek to increase their 
resources and survival by becoming more central in 
networks and linkages to other firms. 
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Diversity I have strong relationships with important company 
stakeholders (customers, bankers, special interest 
groups 
 Bilimoria, 2000.  Important US groups, such as union 
pension funds with many female members, voice concerns 
about the lack of diverse boards. This would increases 
pressure on Chairs and CEOs to appoint female directors. 
Brammer et al. 2007.  Close proximity to consumers plays a 
more significant role in affecting board diversity than does 
industry workforce, reflecting the influence of a firm’s 
external business environment. 
Kim and Cannelle, 2008, external social capital can be 
assessed by asking questions about important company 
stakeholders (customers, bankers, suppliers) 
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Information on which type of board social capital the firms were seeking was investigated 
in this thesis using Likert questions as suggested by other researchers (Kim and 
Cannella, 2008).  Kim and Cannella suggest the following questions as a measure of 
board social capital: 
1.) Do outside directors have good relationships with the CEO?  Thesis survey question 
#11-5, #16. 
Survey answers indicated that 83% of male board members perceived themselves as 
having a good or very good relationship with their CEO.  In contrast only 42% of female 
board directors perceived themselves as having a very good or good relations with their 
CEO.  These results may indicate that male directors have stronger social capital with 
those internal to the board such as the CEO, whereas female board members may be 
more distant to the CEO and perhaps have higher external social capital60.  Research 
indicates that individuals with high external social capital will be distant from other 
dominant coalition members (Kim and Cannella, 2008).  
2.) Does the board have members who know important suppliers of the company? Thesis 
survey question #19-3. 
Survey answers indicated that 27% of the male directors agreed or strongly agreed that 
their relationship with important company suppliers was strong.  Additionally, only 14% of 
female directors agreed or strongly agreed that their relationship with important company 
suppliers was strong.  These results suggest that social capital connections to company 
suppliers is not sought amongst boards, and directors generally do not believe that they 
have these connections. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Kim and Cannella label the ties to those inside the organization as internal social capital, and the ties to 
those outside the organization as external social capital (p. 284). 
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3.) Does the board have members who know important customers of the company? 
Thesis survey question #19-4. 
When asked about company customers, over 50% of the male directors indicated that 
they did not have strong relationships with important company customers; however 
approximately 30% of males either agreed or strongly agreed that they did have strong 
relationships with important company customers. 
Similar to males, approximately 42% of the female directors indicated that they did not 
have strong relationships with important company customers; also similar to males, 
approximately 30% of female directors either agreed or strongly agreed that they did 
have strong relationships with important company customers. 
These results do not suggest a difference in social capital with customers between males 
and females. 
4.) Does the board have members who know important bank officials in the company's 
local business community?  Thesis survey question #19-5. 
When asked whether they had strong relationships with important banking and finance 
groups, the males’s answers were broadly spread across all categories.  Approximately 
57% of males had strong opinions (either strongly disagreed or strongly agreed). 
When asked whether they had strong relationships with important banking and finance 
groups, the female answers were broadly spread across all categories.  Approximately 
41% of females had strong opinions (either strongly disagreed or strongly agreed). 
In addition to these questions and answers above, director survey answers did not 
support that they perceive that group memberships provided them social capital that was 
important to their being selected for the board.  Figure 8.1 is not supported from the 
survey answers, as the combined results from these questions indicate that directors did 
not perceive that social capital gained from influence in groups comprised of members of 
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their same gender, nationality, or race influenced their board appointment61.  In addition, 
Directors did not believe that personal connections, group memberships, or social 
connections provided any new links to the board.  There was no statistically significant 
difference between gender of director and whether the director perceived that her or his 
appointment provided new social capital links. 
 
8.4$UK$and$US$Interview$Results$–$Social$Capital$Questions$
With respect to race and gender diversity, when asked questions designed to determine 
information about social capital, most UK directors professed that they did not believe 
that social capital was a consideration in their own appointment to the board.  US 
directors were more likely than their British counterparts to report that social capital or 
social ties were helpful for their board appointment.  Whereas UK directors emphasized 
having directors with different networks on the board (some having financial ties, while 
others having political ties, etc.), the US directors reported being assisted by each having 
similar networks.  This was represented by either knowing someone with ties to the 
board, having similar cultural interests, or similar industry activities.   
No question, except possibly Interview Guide question number eight asks the respondent 
to directly take an explicit aspect of social capital into consideration.  The first section of 
the Interview Guide questions number one, seven, eight, nine, and ten had the potential 
of revealing director’s perceptions whether social capital influenced their own or others’ 
board appointment: 
Section I 
Question One: How were you selected to be a board director? What was the course of 
events? 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 See section 6.2 for a full discussion of director’s perceptions about whether demographic characteristics 
were important to their board appointment. 
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Question Seven: Did you have connections through your primary current or past 
employer that were helpful to you in being selected for the board?  How important were 
they? 
Question Eight: Was there a perception that your influence on clubs and civic activities 
would be important to the board? 
Question Nine: Did you have connections with board members that were helpful in being 
selected for the board?  How important were they? 
Question Ten Did you have connections with the CEO that were helpful in being selected 
for the board?  How important were they? 
 
Director Perceptions of Social Capital as a Criterion for Board Appointment 
Only two of the eight white males in UK perceived that social capital or social ties 
assisted in their being appointed to the board, and neither of the two white females 
perceived that social capital or social ties assisted in their being appointed to the board.  
One of the two white male directors who indicated that social ties assisted in his being 
appointed mentioned political ties.  He felt that his political connections made him a more 
valuable selection.  Consistent with resource dependency theory, he also indicated that 
he had connections in “The City” which is important for a chairman in enabling the firm to 
access capital.  This director also highlighted his board’s preference for political and 
employment based social capital in appointments saying, “One of the woman on the 
board has political connections.  The other woman has ‘City’ connections.  It is important 
that the directors do not have the same social networks.”  This director’s answer suggest 
that social contacts may be important, but more importantly it seems to support a 
resource dependency theory view, as his answers reflect a focus on connections which 
link to other organizations rather than other people.  His explanation for the connections 
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in “The City,” suggest that the board was seeking the “links to other organizations,” such 
as those discussed by Hillman and Dalziel (2003, p. 383).  While he did not specifically 
discuss why his political connections were important to the board, it is plausible to infer 
that his political connections are often important for resource dependency benefits 
discussed by Lester et al. 2008, and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) including the following: 
(1) advice and counsel, (2) legitimacy (3) channels for communicating information 
between external organizations and the firm, and (4) preferential access to commitments 
or support from important elements outside the firm. 
As only two of ten UK directors believed social capital expectations were relevant in their 
selection, it does not appear that Figure 8.1, describing how directors chose “like” or 
“demographically diverse directors” is supported by the survey results for UK director 
selection. 
Both of the white male US directors perceived that social capital was helpful in their 
appointment to the board.  One white male US Director (#23851) stated,  
I got a call from an old friend.  The friend was not a board member, but was a 
friend of the CEO of a company looking for another director.  At the time, I was 
looking to get off of the boards I was serving on, but decided to meet with the 
CEO at the request of my friend.   
Another white male US Director (#22152) said,  
I have been on many boards over the years, and there is no one way of being 
selected that stands out.  On a few boards I was recruited by a head hunter but 
for several others I have been asked to serve by someone that I know. 
Director (#23851) thought that his connections with his two primary employers played a 
significant role.   
There were other things that made a difference, but work connections were the 
most significant to being asked to join the board. 
Director (#22152) thought that his employment connections were most important to his 
being selected for the board.  His background included significant leadership positions in 
the financial services industry.  He felt that financial services experience was very good 
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for companies to have on their boards.  This director’s perception provides support for 
(Lester et al., 2008), who argue that directors from backgrounds such as banking and 
finance bring important social capital to boards, and thus are sought after by firms 
(p.1010).  Providing support for figure 8.2, the second director’s answer suggests that 
directors perceive certain types of social capital, such that accumulated in a banking 
career as important for board social capital.  This director’s answer provides support that 
boards may seek new or different types of social capital with their appointments for 
purposes such as accessing important external groups or channels for communication 
(Pfeffer and Salancik).  However, this director, a black male, did not provide support with 
his answer that his social capital due to his diversity was sought with his appointment.  
His answer does not provide support for Figure 8.1 Demographically Diverse Director 
scenario. 
Consistent with Figure 8.2, all three of the white female US Directors indicated that social 
ties were helpful in their appointment to the board; however, in these cases the emphasis 
was on providing new technical knowledge or human capital rather than social capital.  
One white woman director (#28772) explained her selection as,  
I was CEO/President of a smaller firm.  At a conference I gave a presentation to a 
group of industry professionals.  In the audience was the Chairman of the board I 
currently sit on.  He was impressed by my work that when they had a board 
opening he contacted me. 
A similar experience is reflected in another woman’s interview (#23690),  
I had many years of experience and had been a CEO/President of a small firm, I 
was giving a presentation at an industry event about a technical implementation 
that I had had led at another company.  In the audience was the Chairman of my 
current board.  He invited me to be on the board because the implementation I 
spoke about was related to an issue that his company was facing. 
Three out of the four black male US directors perceived that social capital or network ties 
were helpful in their appointment to the board.  One (#25151) black male US Director 
explained his appointment,  
I was in the right place at the right time.  I had served on a board of a university 
and that board position gave me exposure to corporate partners.  These 
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interactions allowed these corporate individuals to become acquainted with my 
expertise.  These corporate partners were also people that I ran into at city 
symphony performances. 
The director was convinced that his familiarity with them in professional and social 
settings was important to being selected.  He emphasized that his casual interactions at 
cultural performances was probably a strong deciding factor in allowing other directors to 
see him less of an outsider and “someone who could fit in.”  This director provided one of 
the direct indications that his social ties were more important than those gained through 
other ties such as employment.  His answer also reveals that his similarity was being 
sought rather than his uniqueness. 
Another example of the social capital criterion for selection is revealed in the answer 
given by another black male US Director.  In the interview with Director (#10614) he 
communicated that he was selected for the board based on the diversity of his 
experience, influence he held in the local government, and contacts with state politicians.  
His contacts were different from the remaining board members.   
Because of my role at my company, I became very knowledgeable about state 
politics.  I also became friends with a number of state politicians.  These are very 
important contacts to the (removed) industry.  When I was appointed to the board, 
there was an expectation that I could help the company understand the politics of 
state government. 
 Additionally this director said,  
Almost everyone on the board is from another state.  It was my social contacts to 
the state political leaders which was missing on the existing board. 
Consistent with Figure 8.2, suggesting that boards seek social capital of directors to 
provide access to powerful members of the community, as well as channels of 
communication; his political affiliations and political skill were instrumental in his being 
appointed.  His answers provide support for Lester et al. (2008), who argue that political 
social capital is valuable to firms. 
A closer look at these two director interviews reveals two distinctly different approaches 
to their appointment to a company board.  In the first instance Director (#25151) was 
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chosen based on his similar social capital, or his social palatability “sameness” and ability 
to fit in with the other board members (same industry, same cultural interest).  However, 
in the second example, consistent with Figure 8.3, Director (#10614), was chosen 
because of his unique social network.  In this second instance the board was deliberate in 
its attempt to appoint a director who could provide a bridge, or ‘spanning’ to a different 
network thereby increasing its ability to access new networks.  One possible explanation 
for this difference is that the first board could have been happy with their existing board 
composition and networks, and thus was searching for a board member who would be 
most like them.  This would be a “LIKE director” with no marginal increase in social 
capital.  However, the second board may have been actively seeking change or seeking 
access into other network groups, and therefore was seeking a board member who could 
provide links to these new networks.  This would be a “demographically diverse director” 
with an expectation of an increase in social capital.  While social capital appears to have 
influenced the selection process; Director (#25151) is a “Like Director” (see Figure 8.1); 
while Director (#10614) appears to fit the “demographically diverse director” in the above 
exhibit.  In both cases the possible element of diversity was not their race, but instead 
their diversity of social networks, thus not supporting diverse social capital as an 
additional rationale for board diversity (Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.3). 
The black female director perceived that social capital or network ties were helpful in her 
appointment to the board.  Similar to the US white women, her social ties were based 
upon industry groups.  The black woman director mentioned a similar experience as the 
white women above,  
I have been very active in industry professional organizations.  I have made 
myself very visible in these circles and gave training courses to professionals in 
the industry.  I have established myself as an expert in this industry.  However, it 
is not only important to be at the meetings to establish myself as an expert, it is 
key to be in the same “circles” where these individuals are.  This assisted in my 
being asked to sit on a board. 
The emphasis that this director places on being in the same circles as other directors 
does not provide support that her board was looking for different social capital. 
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Director Perception of Social Capital: Has your being appointment to the board provided 
a link from the board to any new and different demographic groups? 
None of the UK male directors thought that their appointment provided any new links to 
different demographic groups.  However, both UK female directors, one executive one 
non-executive, agreed that their appointment to the board provided a link from the board 
to new and different demographic groups.  In each case, these directors answered that 
they were not selected for their ability to provide links to new or different groups; 
however, both believed that they provided these linkages once on the board.  
The first white female director (#12018) felt that her networks were very different and 
therefore this was an asset she brought to the board.  One example was an introduction 
to the women of the company to new networking groups that she was familiar with.  This 
included activities sponsored by Cranfield University, who she stated had a number of 
research initiatives in board diversity.  She felt that these networking opportunities were 
very helpful in encouraging women to network more.  The other female director (#10614) 
also felt as though her presence on the board resulted in new networks.  She is on 
boards of different cultural organizations, university women’s studies programs, as well 
as boards in other countries.  These are all new networks for the board and a source of 
information that enhances her technical expertise.  The answers of both women provide 
support that consistent with the resource dependency view and Figure 8.1 and 8.3, 
women’s presence on boards serves the organisation’s interest to build links to its 
environment, bringing strategic input (and social capital) to the boards on which they 
serve (Fondas, 2000; Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2000). 
Gender diversity may provide new and different social capital to the firm, and therefore 
provide support for the “demographically diverse director” in Figure 8.1 above, and 
suggest that consistent with Figure 8.3, increased social capital may provide a rationale 
for gender diversity. 
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Neither of the US white males perceived that their appointment provided any new links 
from the board to any new or different demographic groups, and none of the white female 
US directors perceived that their appointment to the board provided a link to any new or 
different demographic groups. 
Three of the four black male directors did not perceive that their appointment had 
provided new links between the board and any new and different demographic groups.  
The black male (#25151) who believed that he provided new links was a director who 
was very prominent in the minority community.  His board, and therefore his company, 
has been able to reap the benefits of his ties to major community groups.  Much of the 
business of the company is consumer related, and his ties have allowed the company to 
secure several new exclusive distribution agreements with these large community 
groups.  This black male director (#25151), answered that he was not chosen for his 
different social capital (see answer above); however, consistent with literature (Van Der 
Walt and Ingley 2003), as well as Figure 8.1 above, as it appears that the outcome was 
new social capital and new resources available to his firm.  This outcome suggests 
additional social capital as a rationale for board diversity. 
The black female director did not perceive that her appointment had provided a link from 
the board to any new or different demographic groups. 
US directors were more likely than UK directors to perceive that their social contacts and 
network ties were important to their being appointed to the board.  Consistent with their 
answers about whether race or gender was a consideration in their appointment, UK 
directors were more likely to attribute their appointment solely to human capital (skills, 
experience, expertise), rather than to contacts or networks. 
Both UK women believed that their companies gained ties to different social groups via 
their presence on the board, but none of the UK male directors believed that their 
appointment brought new social capital or different network ties to new or different 
demographic groups.  One black male (US) felt his social capital enhanced board capital; 
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however, the other seven other diverse individuals did not share these views.  These 
results do not provide strong support to the argument that one of the indirect effects of 
diversity is the opportunity for the firm to access the diverse groups of contacts, 
relationships, and social ties that diverse directors may bring.  Thus whether or not 
enhanced social capital is a rationale of board diversity is also inconclusive.  Additionally, 
they do not support arguments by Burt (2001) that diverse directors will allow the firm to 
bridge structural holds between the firm and its environment.   
In addition, US director answers indicate that directors were more likely to be chosen to 
increase homogeneity of social groups rather than to increase their diversity.  This may 
account for the lack of perceived new social connections among these directors and their 
boards.  Additionally, this lends support to Rose (2007), who argues that because diverse 
directors are chosen from closely connected groups, any ability to bridge the firm to 
different groups or information is lost or significantly attenuated.  If this is the case, 
diverse directors who may provide a bridge to different groups and enhanced social 
capital to the firm are not the types of directors being asked to join boards.  Therefore, 
opportunities for social capital to be a viable rationale for board diversity are somewhat 
diminished. 
Directors indicated that when they were chosen to diversify the board, diversity was 
primarily functional diversity such as experience and skills.  The directors’ answers 
revealed that, consistent with resource dependency theory, boards prefer to have a 
variety of competencies from a variety of functional backgrounds on the board.  However, 
answers were not consistent with Van der Walt and Ingley (2003), and did not provide 
support that firms create demographically diverse boards in order to establish and 
maintain linkages to other businesses, government and social organisations  (Van der 
Walt and Ingley 2003, pp. 229).  
UK directors were not selected for the types of social capital studied in this thesis 
(personal relationships, club memberships, and other non-employment based social 
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contacts).  Although the sample size is too small to support any strong conclusions, given 
that both of the UK women indicated that they were able to provide new social networks 
to the board, it may be the case that women belong to or are more active in more 
organizations, both professional and social, than their male counterparts; and therefore 
women are more likely to be more valuable to board for their social capital than men.  
8.5$Closing$Summary$–$Social$Capital$Questions$
!
In theory, increased social capital as manifested in intensifying or extending social 
networks would seem to be a decision that firms may need to give more explicit attention 
to.  In particular, if firms select “Like Directors” who offer essentially identical external 
social capital to incumbent directors, they are likely to enhance the firm by strengthening 
existing social networks   The firm, however, must be careful that strengthening of 
existing relationships does not become a source of redundant information (Burt 2001).  
For a given configuration of board social capital will not yield identical effects on firm 
performance in all environmental conditions (Kim and Cannella, 2008).  Instead, a firm 
will determine its social capital needs based on the firm’s strategic plan, which includes 
its need to bridge to new groups, or lack thereof. 
Boards may not be aware of the advantages that diverse social capital may have for the 
board, or they may not believe contacts outside of their established social network to be 
valuable for the board.  Boards do not appear to recognize that social capital is a 
strategic resource and sufficiently diverse groups such as women, may be more likely to 
contribute non-overlapping social capital networks, which may translate into greater 
external influence and thus additional resources for the firm.  When and if boards adopt 
this view, it may be possible that social capital becomes a legitimate sixth rationale for 
board diversity. 
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CHAPTER 9 - CONCLUSION 
9.1 Introduction 
Boards of Directors play an important part in company oversight and strategic 
management.  Boards are  a key mechanism in the shaping of firm governance.  
Because of the critical role of boards, directors are often blamed for firm problems and 
credited with the power to improve corporate governance (Aguilera, 2005 p. S39).  Board 
diversity can be an important element of whether the board can operate effectively.  The 
Higgs Review explicitly discourages homogeneous boards, and suggests that diverse 
boards may improve governance.  It states, “the current population of non-executive 
directors is narrowly drawn” (Higgs, 2003, p. 13), and they are mostly “white males 
nearing retirement age with previous PLC director experience” (Higgs, 2003, p. 42).  
Higgs also argues that “a commitment to equal opportunities which can be of motivational 
as well as reputational importance is inevitably undermined if the board itself does not 
follow the same guiding principles” (Higgs, 2003, p. 42). 
This thesis has sought to provide an understanding of how directors in the UK and US 
perceive board diversity may improve firm governance.  Specifically it contributes to what 
we know about the roles and importance of race and gender in board 
governance.  Based upon the survey and interview samples of UK directors and the 
interview sample of US directors, it was found that although the perceptions of individual 
directors often vary considerable by demographic characteristics and geographical 
location, white male directors, whether UK or US, are more likely than other directors to 
view gender and race as inconsequential in board governance.  It should be noted, 
however, that the similarities of responses among white males on both sides of the 
Atlantic have different causes:  For example, minorities occupy a more prominent place in 
the US (30 percent of the population) than they occupy in the UK (9 percent) (Goodhart, 
2004).  Additionally, UK culture seems to generally support an attitude of being 
both colorblind and genderblind in the workplace and elsewhere in society; whereas US 
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culture has a history of recognizing and justifying the existence of racial and gender 
differences (May 1999).  This recognition in the country may be due to the long turbulent 
history of racial turmoil in the US (Peterson et al., 2007).  For example, due to the history 
of slavery, along with the ‘Jim Crow’62 apartheid laws in the 1950’s and 1960’s; US 
culture is accustomed to acknowledging inequalities, even if still at times rather 
grudgingly.  Thus in the US, unlike the UK, efforts to adopt a colorblind perspective in 
the workplace are often viewed askance by vocal and visible political and religious groups 
long-committed to investigating and uprooting racial and gender bias. In the United 
States, dozens of advocacy groups are dedicated to promoting board diversity, by 
measuring it, studying it, or providing training or mentoring to potential female or minority 
board members (Conley 2009). 
This chapter contains reflections and concluding thoughts of the research I undertook to 
investigate board diversity and governance.  The goal of the research was to provide an 
academic contribution to existing literature (Fairfax, 2005; Ramirez, 2003; Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; and Roberts et al., 2005) of director 
perspectives about diversity and how it may impact firm governance.  This thesis, in 
particular, sought to contribute to what we know about director’s opinions on whether or 
not diversity matters (Field and Keys 2003, Burke 2000, Fondas 2000), and if it does, why 
and in what ways?  The evidence from the empirical findings of my research has been 
revealing in the complexity of attitudes on board diversity. The evidence suggests that 
this complexity occurs due to perception differences by virtue of one’s race, gender, and 
cultural norms of one’s country.  In addition, this thesis research provides results from the 
UK and US, which allows for the comparison and contrasting of board governance and 
diversity attitudes across the two countries.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Jim Crow laws in the US were a system of laws intended to completely racially segregate public, and 
private services and facilities during 1950 and 1960’s.  These laws resulted in “Whites Only” signs across 
most the Southeastern US for public services such as toilets, water-fountains, restaurants, hotels, and leisure 
events. 
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The US corporate governance system has more in common with the UK than it does with 
other major industrial nations (Cheffins, 2001).  Comparison literature between UK and 
US governance are not as commonplace as single country analyses or comparisons 
between the Anglo-American systems such as the US and UK and Continental systems.  
Aguilera et al. (2006) states, “Scholars of corporate governance understand the world to 
be divided into two systems, the Anglo-American shareholder system and the Continental 
European/Japanese stakeholder system. “……“Less attention has been paid to 
differences in corporate governance within the “Anglo-American” system” (Arguilera et al., 
2006, p. 147).  Performing a search on the Social Science Research Network using the 
words “United States, United Kingdom, and Governance” only resulted in 23 papers.  
These papers include those that discuss the direct difference between UK and US 
governance, and those that compare the governance systems of other countries or areas 
against the UK and US (shareholder orientated model) type systems.  For example, 
Cheffins and Thomas (2001), compare the shareholder rights and executive pay 
differences between the UK and US and Aguilera et al. (2006) compare the major 
provisions of the UK and US governance systems included CSR differences.  Cheffins 
(2001) compares the UK and US governance systems to continental Europe.  Armour et 
al. compare UK and US corporate director litigation (2009), and Aguilera (2005) 
compares the UK and US type systems to continental Europe and Asia (stakeholder 
oriented model) in a discussion of institutional governance (Augilera, 2005, p. S41).  
Buchanan (2012) compares UK and US shareholder proposal rules and relate the 
differences in rules to differences in proposing activities.  However, within this search, this 
researcher could find no evidence of a similar contribution such as hers, which is a direct 
comparison and analysis of UK and US director perceptions on board diversity. 
This thesis also takes a critical look at the issue of social capital, and whether firms 
consider the social capital of directors in their appointment decisions.  It examines 
whether firms are the beneficiaries of new and different capital by virtue of diverse 
director appointments (Van der Walt et al., 2002; Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003; Scott, 
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1991, López-Fernández and Sánchez-Gardey, 2010, Loury, 1987), and if these observed 
benefits differ between the UK and US, or male and female.  Based on the findings, 
boards may not thoroughly consider the diversity of social networks of diverse directors in 
their selection criteria. This lack of consideration of social capital due to demographic 
diversity in director appointments suggests that boards do not seek to enhance board 
capital through director contacts and networks.  Given this, they may be missing out on 
the ability of diverse directors to bridge structural holes (Burt 1992) from the board to new 
diverse connections.  The apparent ignoring of diversity’s impact on social capital in 
board appointments may be a result of directors not recognizing the important value that 
diverse networks could bring to the board, or perhaps it is a result of not seeing the 
additional networks created by diverse directors as helpful to the firm63.  However, there 
is some indication that UK boards may benefit from social capital of directors. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide summary reflections, conclusions, contributions 
and implications of the thesis research. This chapter is divided into four sections. First, 
the introduction, second, a reflection on the research approach of the study is discussed, 
and third a brief discussion of critical research as it relates to the findings of this thesis. 
These three sections are followed by a summary of the key findings of the thesis in 
relation to the research questions provided above. This summary also encompasses the 
discussions of the main contributions to knowledge. The final section is a listing of the 
implication of the research, including a discussion of the limitations of the study and 
recommendations for future research. 
 
9.2 Reflection on Research Approach 
As discussed in Chapter 4, this thesis research was conducted based on the belief that a 
method that incorporated both conversations with directors and surveys would result in a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 See the discussion on how social capital could possibly be decreased as a part of discussion of Figure 8.1 
in Section 8.2. 
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richer dataset (Corbin and Strauss, 1990, Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, Patton 1990, 
Morse 1991).  According to Morse (1991), the process of using at least two methods to 
investigate a research question is called methods triangulation.  Methods triangulation is 
used when a single research method is inadequate.  It is used to ensure that a more 
comprehensive approach is taken to solve a research problem than either of the methods 
can separately provide (p 120).  The methods used for this thesis project were selected to 
provide a triangulation of results therefore strengthening their separate contributions.  
This thesis employed interviews and surveys to construct a detailed, intensive 
understanding involving multiple data sources (Creswell 2007, Patton 2002). The use of 
interviews and surveys also allowed this researcher to develop a better understanding of 
the interactions of gender, race, and national culture on UK and US boards both in the 
way board members select new directors, and in the way the boards govern. 
The interview process allowed this researcher to gather data based on one-on- one 
dialogues.  Follow-up questions could be asked, and a rapport could be established with 
individual directors.  The one-on-one interviews proved advantageous when interviewing 
black and female directors. I am a black female, and it appeared that the black, and or 
female directors became comfortable and more open in their responses as the interview 
progressed.  It is also possible, however, that my race and gender may have negatively 
impacted the willingness of males and whites to respond candidly (Sattler, 1970).  It is 
possible that white male interviewees were not as forthcoming with their answers if they 
felt as if their views were not socially desirable (Sattler, 1970, Kantowitz et al., 2005, 
p.70). 
While the interviews allowed for gathering of more detailed answers, the survey method 
allowed for a great quantity of directors answers to be collected.  The advantage to this 
was the larger number of responses and therefore the ability to generate statistical 
results. A mixed-method approach was taken utilizing a statistical review of the directors 
of the FTSE 350, a survey mailed to UK directors, and semi-structured interviews with UK 
and US directors.  As discussed previously in Chapter 4, the director contact details in the 
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UK were downloaded from the Manifest database.  All directors in the UK FTSE 350 were 
mailed a survey for completion and asked to participate in the director interviews.  The 
US directors were contacted through conference attendance and director referrals.  The 
results were analyzed to look for often-mentioned perceptions, gender or country specific 
particulars, and perceptions which might support previous research or provide new 
insights.   
 
9.3 Reflection on Literature 
Good governance is a function of environment the firm operates in, the lifecycle of the 
firm, expectations of the marketplace, and guidance from governmental and policy 
directives (Combined Code 1998).  The literature review of this thesis provided a 
theoretical framework for the discussion of what is good governance and the perceived 
influence of race and gender on good governance. The governance framework is 
discussed within the context of four theories:  Agency Theory (Moldoveanu and Martin 
2001, Brown and Brown 2002), Stakeholder Theory (Donaldson and Preston 1995, 
Jensen 2001), Stewardship Theory (Mayer et al., 1995), and Resource Dependency 
Theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978); all four are discussed in Chapter 2.  In addition, the 
literature provides suggestions on how board diversity impacts board governance, 
including various often-repeated rationales for board diversity (Fairfax 2005, Dallas 2002, 
Catalyst 2004).  Some of the purported rationales include the idea that diverse directors 
will help the firm to: 1) attract diverse customers (marketing rationale); 2) develop policies 
that provide equal opportunity and fairness (legal rationale); 3) provide an example to 
employees about company values (employee relations rationale); 4) signal to the market 
that the company operates fairly (signaling rationale) and 5) ensure that new and different 
professionals are on the board (talent rationale) thereby providing a diverse viewpoint for 
the board and preventing board groupthink (super-outsider or governance rationale). This 
thesis furthers these studies, as it provides director perceptions on whether these 
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rationales hold true in the opinions of the boardroom directors, whether other rationales 
are worth considering (such as diversity enhancing social capital), and whether there is a 
difference in the perceptions based on gender, race, or country.  The results are 
inconclusive, as there is no one director perception, and director viewpoints differed 
widely depending on a number of issues such as race, gender, and the country where the 
director resides. 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 and 3 also discussed the relationship between social 
capital, board diversity, and firm governance.  Just as financial capital provides benefits 
to the board, so can social capital.  Previous researchers have shown that social capital 
is important to firm outcomes (Baker, 1990; Hitt et al., 2002; Palmer and Barber, 2001).  
One way that firms gain social capital with other firms is through individuals in those firms 
and their interaction with one another (Ireland et al., 2002).  Furthermore, social networks 
of individuals hold value.  This value is often the ability to bridge between the social 
networks of the individual and the other organizations they belong to (Burt 1992).  
Overall, data analysis revealed that directors perceived that unique and diverse social 
capital; based on demographic characteristics, is not sought by boards.  Directors did not 
perceive that they were selected to provide new social capital based on their 
demographics, nor did they perceive that their social capital based on groups or 
affiliations was important to their selection.  However, there are some difference between 
the UK and US answers regarding appointments.   
Burt (1992) suggests that emphasis should be placed on the opportunities to exploit the 
"structural holes" between dense pockets of relationships in networks.  Thus 
organizations should to seek out partners with whom they can form unique, or "non-
redundant," relationship.  A director can serve to fill the structural hole between two 
groups, either as a leader or as a member of both groups.  This individual then provides 
an opportunity of spanning of two individual closed networks, where they are now 
connected, and have enhanced social capital beyond what each group had separately.  
This structural holes argument was used in the data analysis to determine if boards 
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consider social capital in their appointments.  UK directors reported that they were not 
familiar with other board members or the CEO prior appointment, which was somewhat 
different than what US directors communicated in their interviews.  US directors 
frequently mentioned during their interviews that they first met someone on the board, via 
a meeting or through previous contacts, and that individual was important to their gaining 
a board appointment.  This provides some evidence, that in the UK directors are chosen 
who may assist in spanning structural holes for the organization, while in US this may not 
be the case.  Consequently, there is a need for future research on how social capital may 
effect board appointments in different countries. 
The five rationales for board governance have been used in the data analysis to 
determine whether in the perceptions of the directors support these rationales.  The 
results, discussed in Chapter 6 through 8, suggest that director answers indicate support 
for the Employee Relations Rationale for board diversity, as well as the Litigation 
Rationale for board diversity.  However, the Governance Rationale; while it is argued by 
many researchers (Ramirez 2003, Catalyst 2004, Butler 2012, Singh et al. 2008); was not 
supported.  The analysis of the data in this thesis did not provide support for this 
rationale.  Directors did not indicate that their board contributions were based on their 
gender or diverse backgrounds, and survey and interview were inconclusive in 
determining if diverse directors provided more debate or oversight to the board.  
Additionally, diverse directors did not indicate that their opinions, based on their diverse 
backgrounds, were important to the board. 
In this dissertation, because of the lack of clarity within the governance literature 
concerning the relative importance of the alternative and often times competing theories 
of governance theories as well as a lack of a clear theoretical relationship between 
diversity and governance, the theory was more helpful in constructing helping to 
constructing the survey questions than in estimating the size, direction, or significance of 
racial and gender differences on board governance.  
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9.4$Conclusions$on$the$Research$Questions$
The primary purpose of the thesis was to answer the broader question of whether 
directors perceive gender or racial diversity as valuable to the governance process.  
Moreover, if diversity is valuable to the directors, what are their perceptions of why it is 
valuable and what rationales do they use?  Additionally, it was to examine if social capital 
considerations might influence the director selection process, and board governance.  To 
answer these broad questions, five research questions were developed, that were to be 
answered by results of a survey and interviews.  The survey was mailed to all UK 
directors of the FTSE 350, resulting in a total of 72 director responses.  Ten of these 
directors also agreed to be interviewed.  Additionally, 10 US directors agreed to be 
interviewed, resulting in 20 directors interviewed and 72 director survey responses.  The 
analysis and findings of this thesis are based on these survey and interview responses. 
Research Question 1 - Directors perceive that board appointments are impacted by 
demographic factors such as their race, gender, age, or nationality. 
White males remain the undisputed majority in boardrooms; however, white males do not 
believe their race or gender have an impact on their board selection.  Instead, consistent 
with other research (Jost and Banaji 1994), they perceive that their majority status is 
based on superior experience and expertise.  The empirical evidence of the research 
reveals that these results were consistent across the findings of this thesis’s UK survey, 
and the UK and US interviews.  Generally, white males did not believe that demographic 
attributes were important to their appointment.  Instead, UK white males were consistent 
in their view that their appointment was only based on their experience and expertise.  
There were only two exception areas where there was some hint that white males may 
have perceived that demographic differences mattered.  The UK survey results 
suggested that some British directors believed that nationality was an asset to their 
selection, and some non-British directors believed that their nationality was a hindrance 
to their selection.  Unfortunately, due to the small numbers of non-British directors who 
returned the survey; a full analysis of this dynamic was not possible.  This remains an 
 
 
319 
area ripe for future research.  Additionally, there is some indication from the UK survey 
that directors between 35-55 64 believe their age was an asset to their selection.  This 
suggest that younger directors may believe that youth may be more valuable in board 
appointments than additional experience gained by older directors.   
US white males also believed that their appointment was based on their experience and 
expertise; however, US white males were somewhat willing to discuss other attributes to 
their selection.  While UK males communicated that their appointment was based almost 
solely on skills, the US white males both mentioned in interviews that social and 
professional contacts were helpful to their board appointments.  US white males believe 
that their board appointments were assisted by their social and professional contacts; but 
they did not seem to associate the influence of their contacts with either race or gender.  
However, racial segregation in the US is more significant than that in the UK, and affects 
the exposure and contacts that individuals have with those of different races.  UK 
minorities are less segregated than are US minorities.  This is especially true of African-
Americans in the US65.  There is no evidence of ghettos or “hypersegregation” in the UK, 
and levels of segregation in the UK are less than half of those for African-Americans 
(Peach, 1996; Simpson, 2007, 413).  Therefore the effect of segregation on interactions 
is far more pronounced for whites in the United States compared to whites in Britain 
(Fieldhouse and Cutts, 2010).  These effects may be evident in director interactions and 
subsequent contacts. 
Nevertheless, white male directors consistently perceived that race and gender were a 
positive factor of consideration for diverse directors, and a few UK white males mentioned 
that being male may have been at a disadvantage for their own selection.  This 
perception may indicate that white males see those persons who are different on the 
board as having been assisted by their diversity.  Moreover, this perception may be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 The age of respondents were also standardized by experience to account for differences in experience due 
to age.  See Chapter 4 for a full description of this standardization.  
65 The US director sample was comprised of 5 black directors, therefore these directors may be directly 
impacted by these dynamics. 
 
 
320 
dangerous, as it shows that while they do not believe their appointment prospects were 
greater by virtue of being a white male, they do believe that the appointment prospects 
for diverse directors are greater given their demographic characteristics.  Such an attitude 
may make it highly unlikely that white males would feel it necessary to institute initiatives 
to increase board diversity. 
Diverse directors perceived the role of gender and diversity in ways similar to white 
directors as it related to how their diversity affected their appointments.  In an 
environment where women and racial minorities are underrepresented in senior 
management positions and boards, most diverse directors still perceived that gender or 
race was an asset to the board selection of other diverse directors.  However, an area of 
inconsistency was that when asked in the interviews whether their own appointment was 
assisted by diversity initiatives, these directors were hesitant to express that either race 
or gender was a factor in their own appointments.  This inconsistency presents an 
interesting observation where directors are unwilling to believe, or express, that anything 
other than expertise was a significant factor in their board appointments; however, they 
are willing to believe, and express that those elements were important in the appointment 
of other diverse members.  
Research Question 2 - Directors perceive that board governance is positively impacted 
by having diverse members on the board. 
An area of disagreement between UK directors and US directors, was whether directors 
perceived tangible benefits to diversity on the board. The thesis sought to determine if the 
answers would reflect an agreement with traditionally held board diversity rationales, or 
perhaps present an additional rationale of social capital benefits to board diversity.  
Almost all US directors were of the opinion that there were tangible benefits to board 
diversity.  However, UK male directors were less likely than females to attribute any 
specific benefits to diversity.  Instead UK male directors prefer to attribute any such 
observed benefits to individual personality traits.  Some benefits to board diversity 
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according to the UK females interviewed, and US directors, whether attributed to diversity 
or specific women directors, include having a diverse set of opinions represented having 
a ‘richer’ discussion, the board staying on issue and on task during meetings, and diverse 
directors (particularly women) asking probing questions and seeking clarity more often 
(all consistent with the Governance Rationale).  Interview answers by women directors, 
consistent with prior literature, indicate that women tend to question and seek debate 
more than male directors, which may improve the board decision-making process, and 
provide tangible benefits to diversity, but this result was not supported in the UK survey 
data.  The UK survey provided some support for the Litigation Rationale and the 
Employee Relations Rationale.  The US interviews provided some support for the 
marketing rationale.  So while, interview and survey results provide some support for 
these rationales for board diversity, this thesis research did not provide support for the 
Talent Rationale.  
Research Question 3 - Directors perceive board diversity is an important signal of board 
values to the marketplace. 
This thesis research found that the observance of the board using director appointments 
to signal firm values to the marketplace was observed in some of the US director 
interview answers, but not in UK director answers.  The lack of importance UK directors 
placed on signaling with board diversity may be explained by a possible lack of pressure 
that boards feel to diversify.  There are several results that indicate this lack of pressure 
observed in the UK survey and the interviews.  The survey respondents were asked if 
there were special interest groups that monitored the firm’s level of diversity.  Directors 
indicated that there were no such groups.  Without such public monitoring and pressure 
on companies to diversify boards, firms may not feel compelled to pursue diversity.  
Additionally, when observing the level of board diversity by industry, firms with direct 
consumer contact such as retail, and financial firms are more likely to be diverse than 
firms with no direct consumer sales.  This indicates that firms are using diversity as a 
signal when it is apparent that its stakeholders value the signal.  Consequently, boards 
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seem more willing to diversify when there is a customer or stakeholder expectation of 
board diversity. 
Research Question 4 - Directors perceive that board members are chosen to improve 
board networks and board capital, and this enhances board social capital. 
One possible result of diversity on the board is the prospect of the board acquiring 
diverse social capital (Fanto et al. 2011).  Consequently, social capital and its impact on 
board governance was also explored in this study.  Results of both the interviews and the 
UK survey indicate that women directors may provide new and different types of social 
capital and networks to the board, consistent with literature on diversity and structural 
holes.  Findings indicate that UK female directors were more likely to report that they 
provided new and different board capital than did male directors.  Results reveal that 
most male directors do not believe that their appointment provided new or different social 
networks or capital to the board.  This outcome is somewhat expected based on two 
points.  First, US directors reported they were appointed to the board based on their 
experience; however, they also acknowledged that their board appointments were 
assisted by existing social contacts and networks.  This suggests that board members 
shared similar networks and contacts.  This also would suggest that these shared 
networks of directors would make it more difficult for these individuals to introduce new 
social connections to the board.  However, in contrast, female directors in both countries 
were more likely to report that they were chosen because of their unique skills or 
expertise instead of their social contacts, and males also reported that female directors 
were more likely to be appointed because of a specific expertise or skill.  Consequently, 
this may account for why UK women were more likely to report that they had provided 
links to new social networks.  In addition, the different social networks that the UK female 
directors reported were often networking groups comprised of other women.  This result 
suggests that it may be easier for firms to bridge social and professional connections to 
women, possibly including customers, employees, or directors; by virtue of connections 
with other women.  It also suggests, that companies which are not gender diverse in their 
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boards, management, or employees; may be not be completely assessing talent of 
females in the market or their purchasing power as customers.  These boards may not be 
aware of the advantages that diverse social capital may have for the board, or do not they 
do not believe contacts outside of their established social network to be valuable for the 
board. 
Research Question 5 - Directors perceive that recruitment firms are important to board 
appointments. 
This thesis research found that there is a difference in the perceived importance of 
recruitment firms between UK and US directors.  This importance was observed in most 
of the UK responses but few of the US director interview answers.  Both the interviews 
and surveys reflect that UK directors believe recruitment firms are important players in 
the board appointment process.  Answers from most of the US directors did not reflect 
that recruitment firms were as important to the board selection process.  This finding 
provides additional evidence that US boards are choosing directors from individuals 
which are already known to them.  This includes those in their existing professional and 
social networks.  This may make it more difficult for US boards to access new and 
different social capital as discussed above, but in addition it may make it difficult for those 
who do not belong to these specific networks to make themselves known as potential 
directors.  For example, three of the five black US directors were appointed with the 
assistance of a recruitment firm, while none of the white US directors were appointed with 
the assistance of a recruitment firm.  This outcome reveals that black professional may 
not share the same professional and social networks as white directors or professionals 
and therefore are not able to leverage these types of relationships into board 
appointments.  In contrast, their appointment to boards may depend on being identified 
by professional recruitment firms.  Furthermore, if black professionals are more likely to 
only be selected with the help of recruitment firms, it also indicates that a board is 
perhaps: 
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 1) not able to identify a suitable board member to fill an open position, or  
2) has a purposeful and specific reason for wanting to identify candidates outside of their 
existing professional networks. 
Seeking to diversify the board would fall into the second category.  As discussed 
previously, boards seem to only be diverse when they have pursued specific actions to 
increase diversity.  When boards consider diverse directors, that diversity is an element 
of the selection process, and appears to include the assistance of recruitment firms. 
 
9.5 Limitations and Future Research 
Conducting a study involving board directors, especially a study where the participants 
crossed two separate countries, was a challenging exercise.  The most significant 
challenge was director access.  This lack of director access results in a study that 
includes 20 director interviews and 72 director surveys.  These results, while they provide 
a rich source of information, may lack the volume needed for vigorous statistical analysis 
and generalizations.  As such, these results are not meant to be generalized.   
Additionally, race and nationality data are not collected by agencies such as Manifest.  
Therefore, statistical analysis by race or nationality could not be conducted on the full sell 
of 3066 directors, and was confined to the 72 respondents that completed and returned a 
survey.  This also limits the ability to generalize the results.  Once database information is 
extended to include race and nationality information, further analysis is warranted using 
the information on all directors. 
Lastly, the questions in the survey and interviews were designed to determine director’s 
opinions.  In some cases, the directors were asked questions about why they were 
selected, or reasons for their selection.  There is an obvious limitation that the directors 
were answering based on their particular understanding of events that occurred when 
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they were not yet present on the board.  The subjectivity of these answers is 
acknowledged. 
Chapter 2 discusses the four theoretical frameworks of stakeholder theory, agency 
theory, stewardship theory, and resource dependency theory.  Future research could be 
extended in the future by asking more questions to determine what the predominant 
perspective directors take towards each theoretical framework, and performing an 
analysis on whether board diversity is more valuable within a particular theory framework. 
Lastly, while surveys and interview requests were sent to all FTSE 350 directors, due to 
the lack of racial diversity on UK boards, racial diversity amongst the UK respondents 
was virtually non-existent.  Therefore, it was not possible to analyze the responses by 
race such as that done with the US directors.  As such, comparisons between racial 
minorities in the US and racial minorities in the UK were not possible. 
9.6 Research Contributions 
As stated in Chapter 1 this thesis is expected to provide two different types of 
contributions.  First, this thesis presents a thorough discussion of the unique perspectives 
of director opinions about board diversity and how diversity may impact board 
governance, it provides comparisons of how board diversity rationales in the literature 
actually compare to the opinions of directors themselves.  This was accomplished by 
designing the survey and interview guide in a way that allowed the researcher to compare 
the answers to purported rationales commonly found in the literature.  Moreover, this 
thesis provides a comparison of directors in the UK and the US, which provides a review 
of how country specific culture may influence directors, and therefore the governance of 
its firms.  This researcher’s evidence, as elaborated in Chapter 6 and 7, demonstrates 
that the various perspectives on board diversity differ widely depending on director race, 
gender, or country of nationality.  
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Second, the research may have implications for government policy.  The evidence from 
this thesis suggests that diverse boards are diverse because they have taken steps to 
ensure their diversity.  These steps included actions such as asking recruitment firms to 
present diverse directors, and seeking diversity as one of the appointment attributes.  
Thus boards are diverse because they have made diversity a priority.  Their diversity was 
not something that just happened on its own, but instead was something that was 
considered an attribute within the selection process.  This implies that achieving board 
diversity in non-diverse boards may only be reached by specific and purposeful actions 
by those boards to diversify.  Without those specific actions, their boards will likely 
continue to lack diversity.  Additionally, these types of deliberate actions may have to be 
broadened in the UK to include racial diversity.  Without such actions, UK boards may 
remain racially homogenous, and without significant gender diversity.  This raises the 
question as to how aggressive policy directives and government actions may need to 
become, in order to ensure that boards reflect both the gender and racial diversity of the 
workplace.  While government mandates and quotas were not popular with the directors 
interviewed, the lack of such actions may allow boards to continue to seek diversity 
slowly if at all. 
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APPENDIX 1 
A1.1  Survey 
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A.1.2. Interview Guide  
Interview of Directors Guide– NAME 
 
Director was thanked for his or her participation, and told of the expected time to 
complete the interview.   
Introduction 
Director was given a summary of the research.  Director was told about the Topic 
– Board Diversity and Board Governance, and that the interview involved a study 
of the selection process and expectations of directors. 
Confidentiality 
The Director was briefed about the interview process.  They were told the 
following: “The researcher will take notes, and take a written transcript of answers.  
Their answers would be confidential, not attributed to them, or presented in a way 
that makes it apparent that they are the author of the comments”.  Additionally, 
they were instructed that after the interview they had a right to withdraw from the 
study within 30 days after the interview. 
The directors were instructed about the methodology and told that the study was a 
quantitative and qualitative study comprised of a survey (on-line and hard copy) 
and interviews.   
Questions 
I. Selection Process 
1. How were you selected to be a board director?  What was the course of 
events? 
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2. Do you feel that race or gender was a factor in your being appointed to the 
board? 
3. Was the company specifically looking for a minority or woman director at the 
time of your selection? 
4. Was your race or gender an added advantage to your being selected? 
5. Has race or gender been a factor of consideration in the appointment of other 
female or minority members of the board? 
6. If your board is diverse, were there any events preceding the board diversifying 
that helped explain a willingness to diversify (market focus change, public 
relations)? 
7. Did you have connections through your primary current or past employer that 
were helpful in being selected for the board?  How important were they? 
8. Was there a perception that your influence clubs and civic activities would be 
important to the board? 
9. Did you have connections with board members that were helpful in being 
selected for the board?  How important were they? 
10. Did you have connections with the CEO that were helpful in being selected for 
the board?  How important were they?  
11. Was a search fund used for your appointment to the board? 
 
II. Qualifications 
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1. What steps have you taken to ensure you are qualified for the board (formal 
education, director classes, etc.)? 
2. How important was your board performance to in your being asked to sit on 
other boards? 
3. Do you feel like you have more pressure to perform your duties as a director 
well than others may feel on the board? Why? 
 
II. Diversity’s impact on Board Capital 
1. Have you seen tangible benefits to diversity on the board? 
2. What is your assessment of your relationship with the CEO? 
3. What is your assessment of your relationship with other directors? 
4. How agreeable are you with other board members?  Do you normally find 
much debate with other directors, or normally agree right away? 
5. Has your being appointed to the board provided a link from the board to 
new and different demographic groups? 
6. How often is your opinion sought because of your race or gender? 
 
III. Employee Relations 
 
1. What is the impact of your appointment on employees? 
2. What is the impact of your appointment on senior executives? 
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Other things – Open discussion 
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A.1.3.$Sample$Interview$Tracking$Sheet$
 
$
A.1.4$Letter$in$Director$Mailing  
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  Aston University 
Aston Triangle 
Corporate Governance and Board Diversity     Birmingham B4 7ET 
Director Survey and Interview       United Kingdom
  
www.abs.aston.ac.uk  
      
This survey is part of a collaborative research project between Aston University (UK partner) and 
Benedict College (US partner).  The research seeks to canvas the views of directors from leading UK and 
US corporations on a number of issues surrounding board diversity, board governance and the director 
selection process.   
 
We realise the demands on your time are intense, but your opinions would be invaluable to our research. 
We firmly believe our study is unique in that it tries not only to establish if board diversity makes a 
difference, but also seeks to explore the reasons behind why such differences may or may not occur. 
 
Your participation will be of course be held in the strictest of confidence and your answers will only used 
as part of an amalgamated and anonymised data set for our own research.   
 
Survey information: 
 
• This survey is voluntary and completely confidential. 
• It should only take 10-15 minutes to complete. 
• Please answer as honestly as possible, and feel free to skip any question that you feel 
uncomfortable answering. 
• The survey can also be completed online at www.diverseboardstudy.info 
• Completed hard copies can be returned to Dr Graham Sadler, Aston University at the address 
above or faxed to: 0121 345 0973 
 
If you would like to verify the details of this survey (researchers, universities, etc.), please contact 
Professor Darlene Booth-Bell at Benedict College on +1 803 269 4511, email: belld@benedict.edu or Dr. 
Graham Sadler at Aston University on 121 204 3221 or email: g.sadler@aston.ac.uk.   
 
We would most grateful if you could complete and return the survey by April 30th if that is at all possible.  
Finally we would like to thank you for your time and your help on this project, it is very much appreciated. 
 
         
 
 
Professor Darlene Booth-Bell     Dr Graham Sadler 
Enclosure
10035 
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Additional Answers from Open-Ended Survey Questions not included in Chapter 5 
A.1.4.$Open$Ended$Survey$Responses 
The survey respondents were given the opportunity to provide open-ended responses in 
their submissions.   
 
The first open-ended survey question was one about the selection process.  
 “With regard to board diversity, please comment below on any other aspects of your 
selection process you think would be relevant.” 
The following meaningful answers were given: 
 
Relevant sector experience, reputation 
The board was looking for two directors at the same time and appointed one male and one 
female.  Had there been only one appointment, I think a female would have been selected. 
Undue focus is being given to gender or ethnicity by social/political commentators as to board 
composition, rather than business and professional competence of individual board members 
for the benefit of stakeholders and shareholder value.  This focus is bearing adversely on 
selection procedures in the market.   
question - 11/ this is about track record and performance in business.  The questions seemed 
to be biased to obtain an answer you are looking for.  We need more diversity in the supply 
chain/on Executive Committees and on smaller (FTSE 250) Boards. 
A board should not persue diversity at the expense of finding the right person for the job - and I 
speak as one of the few women on boards. 
It is a tradegy for British business that there is not more diversity.  Boards need to be balanced 
and have depth and breadth which can only be achieved with a broad range of skills, 
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experiences and viewpoints. 
An FCA qualification?/FTSE 100 FD 
Issues of diversity reduce in direct proportion to the intensity of performance and competitive 
pressures - companies just want the best people they can attract. 
 
The second open-ended question survey question was one about diversity in general. 
“With regard to board diversity, please comment below on any other aspects you think 
would be relevant.” 
The following meaningful answers were given: 
Question number 21 - 'progressive' - meaningless term in this context.  My answer to the same 
question (21) could have been different if "absolutely essential" had been replaced by "very 
helpful" or similar 
There is no doubt that a diverse board brings diverse thinking which should be valued by any 
company.  However, the duty of the non-executives is not predominantly directed to such ends.  
It does of course include the constructive criticism of strategy which requires diverse thinking 
but much of it is corporate governance which does not. 
This survey is completely ill-judged in its focus.  Board performance is paramount and a survey 
of the effectiveness of diversified boards would be much more valuable in judging their 
desirability. 
Diversity is important for a well run, well balanced, properly informed business, especially one 
with serious interests in Africa. 
I don't think the above issues are the issues!  Need diversity for performance and better 
decision making. 
Question 14 - I have no idea and I don't care!   Question 18 - If they agreed with me, they'd be 
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useless.  Question 21 - Companies have no business sending messages of any kind - there 
should be these things first and foremost the messages will be strong.  Question 24 - Its really 
important to have diverse minds, normal dimensions of diversity (race, gender etc) are 
generally poor indicators of diverse minds.  Any measurement system that uses these 
diversions risks, paradoxically decreasing actual diversity whilst increasing measured diversity. 
To be a PLC non-exec director you MUST have previously been an exec director of a PLC or 
you simply don't make the cut on any recruitment company's list. There are only a small 
number of black, asian or female exec directors of PLCs.  So this inevitably limits the number of 
black, asian and female NEDS. (Corporate governance developments are making NED roles 
more specialist) 
 
The third open-ended question survey question was one about employee relations in 
general. 
“With regard to board diversity, please comment below on any other aspects of employee 
relations that you think are relevant.” 
The following meaningful answers were given: 
I believe equal rights are fundamental to the conduct of any organisation and should be instilled 
in the way the business is run, without the necessity to include specific references to these 
issues in mission statements etc..  I have always believed in employing the best person for the 
job, regardless of race, gender or age and have always worked in organisations that do the 
same. 
I don't believe the place for diversity commitment is in a mission statement 
Not in the mission statement but in the policies - yes.  re 22(1) the board's behaviour does send 
messages  re 22 (4) some groups of employees 
I think it is extremely important that any employee believes that a board position is a possibility 
dependent exclusively on merit.  I think that the board, both executive and non-executive, 
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should meet employees and be accountable to them. 
Lawsuits happen whenever there are redundancies, any excuse used. 
Question - 22 - point 2/only if female directors are there on merit.  point 5/if we've used these 
we've failed  point 7/only if they are there on merit, otherwise its damaging.  Question 25 - I 
have been seeking to always employ the best people, regardless of their race, gender etc for 
over 30 years.  I have found that a) people outside business are more sensitive to perceived 
tendency to homogeneity that people outside, and b) where females, in parr, have been 
appointed to senior positions to reach diversity objectives, they have done damage to the 
cause of females (harriat harmon being a prime case). 
 
Additional survey answers not included in Chapter 6 discussion. 
Director Perceptions of Race Based Group Affiliations in the Selection Process  
One of the group affiliation characteristics studied was director influence in groups with 
members of the same gender.  Overall, directors did not believe that their influence in 
groups with those of the same gender contributed in any way to their board selection.  
When asked whether influence in groups composed of those of their same gender was 
important to their being selected to the board; almost all directors responded that these 
groups were not relevant in their selection to the board.   
Results indicated that 83% of male respondents either strongly disagreed or disagreed 
with the statement that influence in organizations comprised mostly of those of my gender 
was very important to their board selection.  Moreover, only a small percentage 
(approximately 5%) of male directors perceived these groups were very important to their 
selection.  All of the women respondents and approximately either strongly disagreed or 
disagreed with the statement that influence in organizations comprised mostly of those of 
my gender was very important to their board selection.  
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Overall, directors did not believe that their influence in groups with those of the same race 
contributed in any way to their board selection.  When asked whether their influence in 
groups composed of those of their same race was important to their being selected to the 
board; almost all directors responded that these groups were not relevant in their 
selection.    Results indicated that 81% of male respondents either strongly disagreed or 
disagreed with the statement that “influence in organizations comprised mostly of those of 
my race was very important to their board selection.”  Similarly, 84% of the women 
respondents either strongly disagreed or disagreed with the statement that “influence in 
organizations comprised mostly of those of my race was very important to their board 
selection.”   
 
Results indicated that approximately 80% of the white respondents either strongly 
disagreed or disagreed with the statement that “influence in organizations comprised 
mostly of those of my race was very important to their board selection.”  Moreover, the 
only group where some directors perceived the statement as true was amongst 6.5% of 
these white directors.   
 
Personal Connections 
Over 65% of men either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that personal 
connections with other board members were important in their being appointed to the 
board.  Twenty percent of male directors were neutral, and approximately 15% of male 
directors either agreed of strongly agreed that personal connections with other board 
members were important in their being appointed to the board. 
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Over 66% of women either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that 
personal connections with other board members were important in their being appointed 
to the board.  Sixteen percent of female directors were neutral and approximately 15% of 
female directors either agreed of strongly agreed that personal connections with other 
board members were important in their being appointed to the board. 
 
Over 76% of the men either disagreed or strongly disagreed that personal connections 
that they had with the CEO were important to their being appointed to the board.  
However approximately 10% of the male directors agreed or strongly agreed that 
personal connections that they had with the CEO were important.  Over 82% of the 
females either disagreed or strongly disagreed that personal connections that they had 
with the CEO were important to their being appointed to the board.  No women directors 
were of the opinion that these types of connections were important to their selection.   
Director Relationships 
Approximately 27% of the male directors agreed or strongly agreed that their relationship 
with important company suppliers was strong.  When asked about company customers, 
over 50% of the male directors indicated that they did not have strong relationships with 
important company customers; however approximately 30% or males either agreed or 
strongly agreed that they did have strong relationships with important company 
customers. 
Banking and finance groups were another stakeholder group that the directors were 
asked about.  When asked whether they had strong relationships with important banking 
and finance groups, the males’s answers were broadly spread across all categories.  
Approximately 57% of males had strong opinions (either strongly disagreed or strongly 
agreed). 
 
 
 
377 
When asked about company customers, approximately 42% of the female directors 
indicated that they did not have strong relationships with important company customers; 
however approximately 30% of female directors either agreed or strongly agreed that 
they did have strong relationships with important company customers.  When asked 
whether they had strong relationships with important banking and finance groups, the 
female answers were broadly spread across all categories.  Approximately 41% of 
females had strong opinions (either strongly disagreed or strongly agreed). 
 
